Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station

Off-Site Emergency Plan

In an incident, go to Page 11: "Quick Guide to Emergency Response"

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Kent County Council Dungeness B Power Station Emergency Plan

Compiled by:
Kent County Council, Resilience & Emergency Planning Service
Date: February 2025

Approved by:
Head of Resilience and Emergency Planning, Kent County Council
Date: February 2025

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ISSUE & REVIEW REGISTER

Summary of Changes	Issue & Date	Approved By
• New issue of plan. Key changes / additions: • Plan re-formatted in line with new KCC document template; • All terminology reviewed in line with UK *Civil Protection Lexicon*[1], NEPLG *Consolidated Guidance*[2] and relevant KRF arrangements; • Activation & alerting messages and cascade updated in line with Site Operator *On-Site Emergency Plans* and KRF generic alerting protocols; • Separate chapters on 'Site & Scene Management' & 'Command & Control' combined, refreshed & expanded; • Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) arrangements updated to include consideration of potential agencies involved in flooding / shoreline management scenarios; • Radiation monitoring co-ordination arrangements; • Additional information re identifying / supporting 'Vulnerable People'; • Media & Public Information section re-drafted with a 'Media & Communications Strategy' linked to the KRF *Media & Communications Plan*; • Roles & Responsibilities section updated in line with NEPLG *Consolidated Guidance* e.g. DLCG, GDS, Met Office, RIMNET, MOD, EA, FSA; • All existing facts, figures and maps reviewed and updated, as necessary; • New locations for KI tablets / Evacuation Assembly Point and multi-agency Silver (Tactical Co-ordinating Centre – TCC); • Location maps / directions added for key multi-agency co-ordination centres; • All 'Official (Personal)' responder information moved into single appendix at back of plan.	1.0 Feb 2012	Dungeness Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC)
• Official (Personal)' location details & maps added to Appendix 3. Contacts Directory under review & to be added prior to publications.	1.1 Feb 2013	Dungeness EPCC
• 'Official (Personal)' Stable Iodine locations (A.3.1) updated following DEPZ tablet distribution renewal and physical inspection of identified storage sites and rest centres.	1.2 Dec 2013	• Director of Public Health; • KCC Emergency Planning Manager; • EDF Emergency Planning Officer; • Health, Safety and Environment; • Safety & Technical Division, Nuclear Generation.

[1] www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/cplexicon

Summary of Changes	Issue & Date	Approved By
• Removal of A Site from the off- site emergency plan.	1.3 Feb 2014	• EDF Emergency Planning Officer; • Health, Safety and Environment Safety & Assurance Division, Generation; • Magnox Emergency Planning Officer, Emergency Planning Services; • KCC Emergency Planning Manager.
• Contacts Directory updated.	1.4 May 2014	Senior Resilience Officer
• Distribution list updated.	1.4 May 2014	Senior Resilience Officer
• Updated alerting cascade.	1.4 May 2014	Senior Resilience Officer).
• Update following Exercise Hawk; 5.6 Implementation of protective actions – all residents within the 2.4 DEPZ will be advised to take protective actions; inclusion of postcodes within 3km DEPZ Appendix 2 A2.9; update to Contact Directory; paragraph around padlock codes for access to PI tablets.	1.5 May 2014	Senior Resilience Officer).
• Update following Exercise Hawk – reference to JESIP protocol and mnemonic METHANE to replace SAD CHALET.	1.5 Jul 2015	Senior Resilience Officer
• Update on replacement of GTA (Government Technical Adviser) role to new ONR SCC emergency response role.	1.5 Mar 2016	Senior Resilience Officer
• Updated by NHS.	1.5 Apr 2016	Senior Resilience Officer
• Sentence around mass storage facility of stable iodine tablets in Folkestone.	1.5 Apr 2016	Senior Resilience Officer
• New information regarding PI tablet distribution.	1.5 Apr 2016	Senior Resilience Officer
• Full review of plan to include reference to new REPPIR arrangements implemented by BEIS. NB – full review by BEIS will be implemented in January/February 2018.	2.0 Jun 2017	Senior Resilience Officer
• 'Second opinion' review of full plan.	2.1 Aug 2017	Principal Resilience Officer
• Formatting update and review of full plan.	2.1 Aug 2017	Resilience & Emergencies
• Formatting update, contacts directory updated and new mapping.	2.2 Dec 2017	Senior Resilience Officer
• Formatting update.	2.3 Jan 2018	Senior Resilience Officer
• Added Quick Response Guide, changes to stable iodine stores and rest centres, radio stations, changes to NHS role, added social media and general review of the plan	2.4 Dec 2018	Resilience Officer

Summary of Changes	Issue & Date	Approved By
• Version 2.4 approved pending new REPPIR and code of practice when formal approval will be required	2.4 Jan 2019	Head of Resilience & Emergency Planning
• Update following changes to REPPIR 2019 o New DEPZ and OPZ assessments o Restructured o Risk assessment updated o Reference levels of dose added o Outline planning and recovery developed	2.5 Jul 2020	Resilience Officer
• Update DEPZ • Updates to plan from the FSA and RCEHD	2.6 Aug 2020	Resilience Officer
• Updates and amendments were made based on comments from the Office for Nuclear Regulation	2.7 Nov 2020	Resilience Officer
• Updates to countermeasures (Removal of Stable Iodine tablets), following the announcement that Dungeness B will move into decommissioning.	2.8 Nov 2021	Senior Resilience Officer
• Amendments made to public version of the offsite plan, removing KCC Emergency Contacts flowchart	2.9 Jun 2022	Resilience Officer
• Changes SCG location, Evacuation Assembly Points name to Morrisons Daily, updated contact numbers	2.10 Aug 2024	Resilience Officer
• Change name to Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) • New DEPZ zone plan and sector plan	2.11- Nov	Resilience Officer
• Change name Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ**)** and Exercise debrief	2.12	Resilience Officer
• Change name to Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and Amendments from Comments	2.13	Resilience Officer

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Nuclear Restoration Service (NRS) (Operator - Dungeness A)	Rother District Council (RDC)
EDF Energy (Operator - Dungeness B)	Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Kent Police	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ**)**
Sussex Police	Network Rail
British Transport Police	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
Kent Fire & Rescue Service (KFRS)	Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra)
South-East Coast Ambulance Service (SECAMB)	Environment Agency (EA)
Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Food Standards Agency (FSA)
NHS Kent and Medway ICB.	Met Office
UK Health Security Agency- Kent Health Protection Unit (HPU) & Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards (RCEHD)	Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)
Kent County Council (KCC) and Kent & Medway Resilience Team (KRT)	Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Folkestone and Hythe District Council (FDC)	Affinity Water
East Sussex County Council (ESCC)	

Contents

1. QUICK GUIDE TO NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1.1. Off-site Nuclear Emergency

1. The Local Authority will be alerted to an off-site nuclear emergency by a call from either the Operator or Kent Police to the KCC Duty Emergency Planning Officer (DEPO). At this stage there will not be very much information. The alert message they will have received is:

"This is a genuine notification; this is Dungeness B Power Station. We are informing you of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) declared at [specify time]. The wind direction is from [specify degrees] for your action"

   No further details will be given at this time;
2. Start a log book;
   - Record the time of each entry;
   - Log all alerts and any resulting actions;
   - Capture the rational for each of your actions;
3. Inform relevant organisations and parties using flowchart on Page 12;
4. If the County Emergency Centre at Invicta House is mobilised it may be appropriate to work from this location;
5. DEPO may be required to attend or dial-in to a multi-agency Strategic or Recovery Co-ordinating group meeting set up by Kent Police.
6. If the incident is such that a more collective corporate response is required, a meeting of the Corporate Management Team will need to be facilitated.

7. What happens next (key steps):
   - The police, and other organisations, will continue the call-out process;
   - The police will set up the Strategic coordination Centre SCC;
   - The operator will initiate PETIS to warn and inform those in the DEPZ and advice shelter
   - The SCG and STAC will set up and take over strategic coordination of the incident and the generation of public advice;
   - The police, local authority, operator and health authorities will work together to protect, advice and reassure the public;
   - When the situation allows and the key stakeholders agree, there will be a transition, either to normality or to a recovery process.

Figure 1 Emergency Contacts Flowchart

This flow chart shows the alerting process for emergency contacts from Kent County Council and other local authorities, as well as key holders for rest centres that could be utilised in the event of an emergency at Dungeness B Power Station. The KCC DEPO begins the process, and then makes the other relevant parties aware of the situation.

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2. INFORMATION

2.1. Background

There are two Nuclear Power Stations at Dungeness:

- **Dungeness A Station** is owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Magnox is currently the licensee, contracted to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority to decommission the station. Power generation ceased at the end of 2006. The Magnox Hazard Evaluation and Consequence Assessment conclude that no off-site plan is required for Dungeness A.
- **Dungeness B Station i**s operated by EDF Energy as owner and licensee. It has two advanced gas cooled reactors. On the 7th June 2021, EDF announced that Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station will move into the defueling phase and that the plant would be decommissioned.

The legislation under which this plan is written changed In June 2021 to as follows;

- Nuclear Installations Act (1965) requires Operators to be licensed by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), a condition of which is that ONR approved emergency arrangements are in place to respond to any site emergency.

- The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information) Regulations (2019) places a duty on:
  - The Operator to:
    - Undertake a risk assessment of the site - Regulation 4: Hazard Evaluation;
    - Report the results of the risk assessment to the local authority: Regulation 5: Consequence Report;
    - Prepare, review, test and revise an on-site plan. - Regulations 10 & 12;
  - The Local Authority (Kent County Council as the upper tier authority) to:
    - Set a Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) - Regulation 8;
    - Set an Outline Planning Zone - Regulation 9;
    - Prepare, review, test and revise prepare an *Off-Site Emergency Plan* (this Plan) - Regulations 11 & 12;
    - Provide prior information to the public within the DEPZ and make prior information available to those in the OPZ - Regulation 21;
    - Prepare and keep up to date arrangements to provide information to the public in the event of an emergency - Regulation 22.

The remaining regulations set expectations on duty holders, including the local authority, with regard to cooperation, training, dose limitation and readiness.

This plan, and the arrangements it reports, satisfy the requirements of those Regulations

2.2. About this plan

2.2.1. Aim

The aim of this document is to describe how Kent County Council, the Emergency Services and other responding agencies will respond to and manage the consequences of an incident involving the actual or potential offsite release of radioactive materials from Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station.

This off-site plan complements the operator's on-site emergency plans and integrates with the plans of other agencies. Each agency will respond operationally in accordance with the procedures set out in its individual service emergency or contingency plan. The plan will remain the property and copyright of Kent County Council and will be reviewed and updated at regular intervals not exceeding those laid down in the REPPIR Regulations (2019).

2.2.2. Purpose & principles

The purposes of emergency preparedness are (REPPIR-19 Schedule 7):

A) to reduce or stop the effects of the radiation emergency;
B) to reduce the exposure to individuals and to the environment resulting from the release of ionising radiation;
C) if necessary, to ensure that provision is made for the medical treatment of those affected by the radiation emergency; and
D) to prioritise the implementation of the plan in relation to any person exposed to a dose in excess of the reference levels of dose.

This plan concentrates on Purposes B- D, with A being primarily a function of the Operator's on-site plan.

This plan has been developed with the following principles in mind (REPPIR-19, Schedule 7):

- the necessity for the plan to respond to the particular characteristics of a given radiation emergency as those characteristics emerge;
- the necessity to optimise protection strategies to ensure that the proposed response, as a whole, is predicted to do more to mitigate the radiation emergency and facilitate transition from that emergency than to increase its duration or consequence, taking into account—
    - the health risks arising from exposure to ionising radiation as a result of the radiation emergency, in both the long and the short term;
    - the economic consequences of the radiation emergency;
    - the effects of the disruption, both on the premises and the area immediately surrounding it, and on the public perception of the effects of the radiation emergency;
- the necessity of avoiding, so far as possible, the occurrence of serious physical injury to any person or persons;
- the necessity of ensuring that an appropriate balance is struck between the expected harms and benefits of any particular protective action so as to maximise the benefit of that action.

2.2.3. Objectives

The objectives of this plan are to:

- Ensure integration of appropriate operational plans;
- Co-ordinate relevant emergency centres and other appropriate locations;
- Outline public warning & informing processes;
- Facilitate activation of the crisis management systems in order to assess needs and initiate appropriate response;
- Describe liaison arrangements between all appropriate organisations at all stages of an incident;

- Ensure that adequate measures are implemented for the care of members of the public affected by the incident; and
- Outline the activities to be undertaken to protect the public and the environment.

2.2.4. Phases of the response

2.2.5. Community Liaison

A Site Stakeholder Group (SSG) exists to provide an opportunity for local liaison with community representatives, including elected council members, local industry, and residents. Invitations are also extended to local groups having a particular interest in the environment and nuclear power generation. It meets twice a year under independent chairmanship, the chairperson being appointed by the membership.

The primary objectives of the Site Stakeholder Group are to:

- Provide a forum for local issues to be raised and discussed;
- Consider local environmental matters;
- Provide information on emergency planning and exercises;
- Report on any incidents which may have occurred;
- Enable members to discuss relevant matters with representatives of the Emergency Planning Consultative Committee;
- Provide information on nuclear industry policy and developments.

2.2.6. Review and Testing

Regulation 12 of REPPIR-19 requires the review and testing of the local authority off-site plan and the operator's on-site plan at suitable intervals not exceeding three years. The review takes into account:

- changes occurring in the work with ionising radiation to which the plan relates;
- changes within the emergency services concerned;
- new knowledge or guidance, whether technical or otherwise, concerning the response to radiation emergencies;
- any material change to the assessment on which the plan was based since it was last reviewed or revised;
- any relevant information derived from an assessment of or a report about the effectiveness of an emergency plan required by regulation 17(6); and
- any relevant information derived from a report into the outcome of an earlier test.

An Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC) provides a forum to consult on, discuss and develop emergency planning issues. It provides the opportunity to review operator, local authority and individual service / agency emergency plans, determine how improvements can be achieved, consider national developments, and advise on exercise planning.

Its objectives are:

- To keep the adequacy of emergency arrangements under review, considering:
    - changes occurring in the work with ionising radiation to which the plan relates;

  - changes within the emergency services concerned;
  - new knowledge or guidance, whether technical or otherwise, concerning the response to radiation emergencies;
  - any material change to the assessment on which the plan was based since it was last reviewed or revised;
  - any relevant information derived from an assessment of or a report about the effectiveness of an emergency plan; and
  - Any preparation of a report should also include lessons identified and development of an action plan to address them
  - any relevant information derived from a report into the outcome of an earlier test.
- Devise an exercise programme;
  Provide advice and information to a Site Stakeholder Group (SSG);
- Consider issues raised at Site Stakeholder Group which could affect emergency planning;
- Keep under review the information provided to the public within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone.

Members are drawn from the range of agencies involved in planning and response including the Emergency Services, Local Authorities, Government Departments, and utilities companies together with specialist staff from Dungeness A & B.

Emergency exercises are an important part of the review and revision process. There are three levels of exercise, the scenario for each requiring approval of the ONR:

Level 1	Concentrates on the operator's on-site procedures and communications. It may involve limited participation by the Emergency Services and other response organisations.
Level 2	Tests some of the on-site procedures. Concentrates on off-site co-ordination, mainly the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC). It involves participation by the Emergency Services, emergency response organisations, government departments and agencies, and the operator.
Level 3	A national exercise extension of Level 2 by requiring Government Departments to exercise their procedures at their respective headquarters, and the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR) for Central Government, to test the interaction within and between national and local agencies.

The local authority is required to prepare a report on the outcome of Level 2 and 3 exercises within three months of the conclusion of the test.

The revised plan is signed-off by the Duty Holders and Category 1 Responders to confirm that their organisations are aware of the requirements placed upon them and to confirm their commitment to maintain a suitably qualified, experienced, trained and equipped team to deliver on those requirements at short notice and at any time.

Members of Kent County Council staff (Duty and Recovery Directors) that will be involved in the response or recovery phase of an incident of Dungeness will be required to complete the 'Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station' e-Learning which is available on Delta. This will provide all relevant information on the nature of the site and surrounding area so that the most appropriate response can be given in the event of a radiation incident.

2.3. Risk Assessment and planned prompt protective actions.

Dungeness B contains two operating advanced gas cooled reactors (AGR) operated by EDF Energy. This class of reactor has a long history of safe operation. The likelihood of an event occurring is minimised through safety considerations in the siting, design, construction and operation and the granting of, and compliance with, a nuclear site licence regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The Operator's safety case, upon which the Hazard Evaluation is based, recognises the potential for a number of situations that would result in the release of radioactive dusts and vapours into the atmosphere. These releases can lead to an increased dose to members of the public from:

- External radiation from an escaping plume;
- External radiation from radioactivity deposited from the plume on the ground or buildings;
- External radiation from radioactivity within the plume deposited on the skin and/or clothing;
- Internal radiation from any activity inhaled or ingested from the plume;
- Internal radiation from the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs and drinking water.

The Operator's consequence assessment concludes that, because some of the accident sequences would give little or no warning, the off-site plan should be capable of initiating protective actions as quickly as is practical. Depressurisation of the reactor could take up to about 6 hours after which it should be possible to terminate the release, if this has not been possible during depressurisation. This plan therefore assumes that for most, but all incidents, the acute phase would last no more than about 6 - 12 hours.

Credible Protective Actions to reduce the dose to members of the public are:

- Shelter - moving into a building reduces inhalation dose and external radiation dose during plume transit;
- Evacuation - if the person can be removed from the area before the release starts, or soon enough, in a protracted release, then radiation doses can be averted;
- Food controls - if food contaminated by radioactive materials is intercepted then ingestion doses can be averted.

A principle followed by this plan is that protective actions must be expected to do more good than harm. UK Health Security Agency has published guidance on the prompt protective actions of shelter, evacuation in the form of Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) which are levels of dose. If the avertable dose is below the lower ERL then the protective action is not indicated. If the avertable dose is above the Upper ERL then the protective action is indicated. Between the two ERL values the decision makers have latitude to apply those protective actions that can be applied relatively easily and set aside difficult ones (see Section 6 for more details).

Kent County Council has determined the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) on the basis of the operator's recommendations from the EDF Dungeness B Power Station Consequences Report. Kent County Council has acknowledged the operators recommendation for the urgent protective actions of, sheltering within a distance of 1450m from the Dungeness B Power Station, Kent County Council has extended the DEPZ by looking at geographic features in the area, avoiding bisecting communities and including vulnerable groups within the determination of the DEPZ.

The agreed Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DPZ) around Dungeness B is shown in Appendix A2.1

There are currently no significant vulnerable groups of residents just beyond this DEPZ and so there are no pockets of detailed planning beyond the DEPZ as determined

The definition of a detailed emergency planning zone is a defined zone around premises where it is proportionate to pre-define protective actions which would be implemented without delay (e.g. within a few hours) to mitigate the most likely consequences of a radiation emergency (REPPIR-19 ACOP).

The detailed planning is designed to implement shelter with the minimum of delay on the declaration of an off-site nuclear emergency. The key components of this plan are (1) prior information to the public so that they are aware of what they might be advised to do and why. (2) A telephone warning and informing system (PETIS) that can send a pre-recorded message to all registered phones, where occupants of the DEPZ are invited to register. (3) Plans to manage those non-resident members of the public within the DEPZ at the time of the event.

An atmos UKHSA release of radioactive material is likely to contaminate crops it passes over, making them unsuitable for use. The operator estimates that crops within a range of about 30 km would be at risk. The Food Standards Agency has powers to prohibit the sale of food it considers likely to be unfit and plans to be able to assess the need and implement food controls in a timely manner. This may result in significant quantities of potentially contaminated crops needing to be dealt with as contaminated waste. Livestock, and derivative products such as milk and wool, and wild animals, including fish and shell fish, can also become contaminated through direct contact with radioactive material or ingesting contaminated food.

In the event of radioactive material actually or potentially impacting on the food chain, the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Defra) may impose controls and restrictions on the movement and sale of food. Such a controlled area would depend on the nature and quantities of the release and prevailing weather conditions. Such controls would cover growing or exposed foodstuffs but would be unlikely to affect packaged or well stored materials.

Maps of the detailed emergency planning zone and data about its occupancy can be found in Appendix 2.

It is also recognised that there is the potential for more severe accidents albeit at a very low probability. Outline planning builds on the arrangements and capabilities in existing emergency plans to provide commensurate planning for low probability events. In accordance with REPPIR Regulation 9, Dungeness B has an Outline Planning Zone (OPZ) of 30 km.

The components of outline planning include (1) media routes to advise shelter further from the site (up to 30 km). (2) Outline plans to evacuate the areas within a few kilometres of the site. (3) The capability to monitor the radiological situation further from site. (4) Traffic management plans with wider scope. (5) Mutual Aid arrangements with other authorities and emergency services forces to provide access to additional resource.

Maps of the outline planning zone and data about its occupancy can be found in Appendix 2.

2.4. Site Incidents and Off-Site Nuclear Emergencies (OSNE)

The terms 'Site Incident' and 'Off-Site Nuclear Emergency' have separate and distinct meanings, which trigger very different responses:

- **Site Incident**: an occurrence within the site, not necessarily involving a radioactive release, which has no affect beyond the perimeter fence. It will be notified to the appropriate emergency service (e.g. Fire & Rescue Service in the case of a fire) who will liaise with the Police and power station to assess the potential implications of the incident. The operator and regulators will continually review the situation and will declare an off-site nuclear emergence if the situation worsens and an off-site nuclear emergency becomes a likely outcome of the situation.

- **Off-Site Nuclear Emergency**: an occurrence or condition which has caused or will cause / may cause a radiological hazard beyond the site perimeter. The Operator's Emergency Controller will alert the Emergency Services that an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency has been declared. The information is then cascaded to all response agencies thereby triggering emergency plans and responses from those agencies. It may not be possible in the early stages to indicate the extent or likely development of a site incident or Off-Site Nuclear Emergency.

The declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency will always require a full and immediate response by the Emergency Services, Local Authorities and other agencies. In all cases it is preferable to scale down the response than endeavour to scale it up if circumstances change. Therefore, the Operator is expected to take a cautious approach and not underestimate the potential or delay notification.

This plan only details the response following a declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency.

EDF have a designated claims procedure with clear guidance for the public and contact numbers. This will be published shortly after any incident has that has adversely affected the public.

2.5. Description of the Dungeness Area

2.5.1. Description

Dungeness Power Station is located on the Romney Marsh, a low-lying area drained by a network of man-made ditches and characterised by a shingle headland, coastal grazing marsh, arable land, active and historic (flooded) aggregate workings, and settlements. The shingle and flooded workings support internationally significant flora and fauna, including rare species, and forms a part of the wider Romney Marsh and Rye Bay Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Dungeness Special Area of Conservation (SAC). To the north of the site is an RSPB nature reserve. The shoreline supports recreational and commercial fishing and is popular with walkers. The power station is located close to the shoreline, in order to abstract sea water for cooling purposes. It is protected by a shingle bund and a network of seawalls around and within the site.

The Dover Strait Marine Traffic Zone is 7 km offshore of the power station. Small coastal vessels and recreational craft may pass much closer and may anchor nearby or draw up on the beach. It cannot be

assumed that the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) is able to communicate with all such vessels and craft which may not carry marine band radio.

London Ashford Airport at Lydd, 5km north of the sites, is used by a variety of aircraft with a runway able to accommodate large wide-bodied jet aircraft.

2.5.2. Population, Nearest Towns and Protective Action Sectors

The population in the vicinity of the power station varies, increasing during the summer months with visitors and the occupation of holiday homes. During winter months, some coastal properties are left unoccupied.

To the east at a range of distances from about 500 m to 1,500 m are a number of dwellings, a public house, a Lifeboat Station, a public beach, Maritime and Coastguard Agency Coastguard Station and the terminus for the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch Railway.

Whilst public access immediately west of the site is possible, a Ministry of Defence range and training camp extends from the power station to the towns of Lydd and Camber.

To the north the landscape is largely rural with denser occupancy along the beach (Lydd-on-sea just over 3 km and Greatstone Lade just over 4.5 km) consisting of residential and holiday properties, a caravan park and some light industry. The area becomes progressively more populated towards Dymchurch and Hythe, with the larger town of Folkestone 20 km to the north east of Dungeness.

Inland from Dungeness are the towns of Lydd (6 km), New Romney (8 km), Ashford (25 km), Tenterden (25 km) and many smaller rural settlements (including both temporary and permanent gypsy and traveller communities and agricultural worker accommodation). Protective Action sectors for these areas are shown at **Appendix 2** of this plan, as well as details of the dwellings and key locations (places of work, railways etc.) within 5 km of the power station and population figures within a 20 km radius of the site.

3. Public Warning & Informing

The public within the DEPZ, and to a lesser extent, the OPZ are prepared for an off-site nuclear emergency in two ways; information, and access to a warning and informing system

3.1. Prior information

The local authority's duty under Regulation 21 of REPPIR (Prior information to the public) is discharged by the distribution of information to all homes and businesses within the DEPZ on an annual basis. This information has been collated in consultation with the operator and with the UK Health Security Agency and is reviewed annually.

Prior information is available in an appropriate manner and in an accessible format to members of the public in the Outline Planning Zone. Members of the public seeking this information will be directed towards where it is available or directly supplied with a copy.

3.2. During an incident

In an effort to ensure that as many of the people in the DEPZ learn about the incident early enough for the protective actions to be effective, a telephone warning and informing system (PETIS) is in place. Members of the public living and working within the DEPZ are invited to register their telephone numbers with the system. It is then capable of sending a message to all registered phones in short period of time. The SCG should consider the use of the **National Alerting System** to warn the public of offsite incidents.

4. ALERTING & NOTIFICATION PROCESS

4.1. Initial Alerting

On discovering he incident EDF will alert the emergency services it requires via the standard 999 system. When an initial assessment of the situation leads to a formal declaration the three emergency services will be alerted to the declaration via 999 calls giving the message shown below.



Figure 2 Initial Incident Alert

4.2. Alerting Other Responders

Other organisations involved in the response will be advised of the emergency as shown in Figure 2. Each of those organisations in turn, maintains its own internal alerting chain. Many alerting systems will therefore operate in parallel with the potential for an alert to be received more than once. Whilst this should be avoided if possible, it is better to be informed twice than for any incorrect assumption of awareness to be made.

Each of those services will then implement its emergency arrangements which, having been developed through close co-operation and consultation will provide an integrated response in respect of On-Site and Off-Site mitigation.

4.3. Events that the public mistake for nuclear emergencies

It is recognised that some events on the site might be misconstrued by the public as indicating a nuclear emergency. These events include:

- The site releasing steam, often preceded by an explosive sound as a pressure relief valve opens;
- Attendance of the emergency services for;
    - A conventional event such as fire in an office building;
    - A training event.

In such cases the public may phone 999 in alarm, or 101 for information, they may phone the local council, or post on social media.

The fire service, police service, local authority and the operator will liaise with each other if alerted by a member of the public to exchange views about the cause of alarm and how best to manage the public concern. The site will also be proactive in informing the others if they recognise that a planned, or unplanned, occurrence might cause off-site alarm.

Figure 3 Alerting cascade



Figure 3 shows the alerting cascade for an incident at Dungeness B, with the station operator making initial contact with government agencies and Kent Police, who will then notify other relevant Kent/Medway partners and responding agencies (SECAmb, Kent Fire and Rescue, Environment Agency, Medway Council, Kent County Council etc) Kent Police would also make contact with Sussex Police, due to their proximity to the Power Station, who would alert any other relevant Sussex partner organisations. SECAmb would contact relevant NHS groups and hospitals, whilst Kent /County Council would contact voluntary organisations and Borough/District Councils.

5. COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION

5.1. Co-ordination Centres

This section describes the key centres responsible for co-ordinating or supporting the multi-agency response to an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency at Dungeness Nuclear Power Station. Maps, directions & emergency contact details for these locations can be found in Appendix 3.

Single agency co-ordination centres are not described in this plan. However, it is anticipated that each agency's emergency centre may also be established. Each agency will co-ordinate its own specialist response and deployment in liaison with each other and in particular to support the multi-agency co-ordination centres.

Examples of single-agency Emergency Centres that responders may need to liaise with may include:

- Emergency Services Control Rooms;
- Incident Suite, Office for Nuclear Regulation;
- County Emergency Centre (CEC), Kent County Council and East Sussex County Council;
- District Emergency Centre (DEC), Folkestone and Hythe District Council & Rother District Council;
- UK Health Security Agency Centre For Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards Emergency Centre;
- Environment Agency Radiation Assessment Centre;
- Environment Agency Area Incident Room;
- Met Office Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC);
- RREMS (Radiological Response and Emergency Management System)

5.1.1. Site Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

The Emergency Control Centre (ECC) is a dedicated facility to enable the site to be managed, to command the response organisation, and interface with external support during an emergency. This will include monitoring of radioactivity both On-Site and Off-Site, the co-ordination of which will subsequently become the responsibility of the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC).

The basic equipment provided in each Emergency Control Centre includes maps, station procedures, drawings, communications equipment, tenability monitoring equipment, wind speed and direction indicators, plotting equipment, log sheets and general stationery.

The Emergency Control Centre staff will include the Emergency Controller, Emergency Health Physicist, Emergency Reactor Physicist and Emergency Administrative Officer, all available on a 24-hour standby rota. For a protracted incident, they will be assisted by Assistant Controllers and appropriate Emergency Centre support staff to carry out plotting, communications and radio operation.

Should the designated Emergency Control Centre be compromised, a secondary Emergency Control Centre will be activated, located in the Denge Laboratory building close to the site entrance, and providing similar facilities to discharge the same roles and responsibilities.

Providing it is safe to do so, liaison officers from Kent Police, Kent Fire and Rescue Service & South East Coast Ambulance Service will attend the Emergency Control Centre to facilitate the exchange of information and communications with the Emergency Services.

If a safe approach to the site is uncertain, in consultation with the Operator, the Emergency Services will initially deploy to the Forward Control Point / Command Post (FCP) to co-ordinate their response from there – see Section 5.1.3.

Kent Fire and Rescue Service (KFRS) is responsible for fire-fighting action On-Site, although initial attendance may be by the Operator's On-Site fire crew. The level of response and the procedures required for safe attendance, together with liaison and integration with the Operator's fire crew are documented in Kent Fire and Rescue Service's operation orders.

South East Coast Ambulance Service (SECAmb) is responsible for paramedic response, transfer of casualties to hospitals, and the co-ordination of other medical support On-Site. The locations and liaison arrangements for treating and removing injured persons are contained within ambulance service operating procedures.

5.1.2. Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC)

A Central Emergency Support Centre, operated by EDF Energy Generation Ltd., will be established at Barnwood, Gloucestershire to relieve the Dungeness B Site of all aspects of Off-Site radiological protection actions. It will provide a single source of technical support to the site to assist in bringing the situation under control. As well as supporting the affected site, it also serves the Strategic Co-ordination Centre.

The Central Emergency Support Centre is under the overall direction of the Central Emergency Support Centre Controller who is responsible for ensuring that the Central Emergency Support Centre operates in such a way as to fulfil its functions of serving and supporting the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and the site Emergency Control Centre.

One function of the Central Emergency Support Centre is to acquire and assess all necessary technical data that has a bearing upon the radiological hazard to the public. It will also provide expert advice based upon that technical assessment to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre so that the Strategic Co-ordination Group can make informed decisions on the action required to protect the public.

The Central Emergency Support Centre will:

- Provide a technical support service to the affected site and act as the focal point for routing advice and material assistance to the affected site;
- Be responsible for the onward transmission of monitoring results and the outcome of radiological assessments to external agencies, such as the UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards and Food Standards Agency, and for the supply of information to the chief Officers of EDF Energy;
- Provide information to the Office for Nuclear Regulation / Government Liaison Officer (GLO) on how the incident might affect the local environment;
- Collate the information required by the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR) for briefing ministers and pass such information directly to the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room.

5.1.3. Forward Control Point / Forward Command Post (FCP)

The command & control facility nearest to the scene of an incident (but outside any potential hazard zone) is responsible for the immediate direction, deployment and security of the incident, and reporting into the Tactical Co-ordination Centre (TCC) away from the scene.

In the context of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency, a Forward Control Point would be established to support the Site Emergency Co-ordination Centre by overseeing the management of all Off-Site Bronze / Operational activities e.g. cordon control, traffic control, evacuations etc. (see Section 5.1.4).

In the event that a safe approach to the site cannot be guaranteed, first responders from the Emergency Services would deploy to the Forward Control Point and will establish communications with the Site Emergency Co-ordination Centre from there.

5.1.4. Tactical Co-ordination Centre (TCC)

The Tactical Co-ordination Centre is the location at which the multi-agency group of Tactical Commanders (the Tactical Co-ordinating Group - TCG) will meet to determine, co-ordinate and deliver the tactical response to an emergency at the site and oversee all Operational activities. TCG meetings may also be run virtually via Microsoft Teams.

The usual Tactical Co-ordination Centre location for a nuclear incident is ***Location removed*** (see Appendix 3).

5.1.5. Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC)

The Strategic Co-ordination Centre is a purpose-built facility maintained by Kent Police ***Location removed.***

During the emergency response phase, overall co-ordination is undertaken by the Police Strategic Commander from the SCC, assisted by a multi-agency Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). As with the TCG, SCG meetings may also be held virtually via Microsoft Teams.

The organisations expected to be present at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre are:

EDF Energy (Operator - Dungeness B)	Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Kent Police	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)
Sussex Police	Ministry of housing communities and local government
Kent Fire & Rescue Service (KFRS)	Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra)
South-East Coast Ambulance Service (SECAMB)	Environment Agency (EA)
Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Food Standards Agency (FSA)
NHS Kent and Medway ICB.	Met Office
UK Health Security Agency– Kent Health Protection Unit (PHU) & Centre for Radiation,	Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)

Chemical & Environmental Hazards (RCEHD)	
Kent County Council (KCC)	Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Folkestone and Hythe District Council	Affinity Water
East Sussex County Council (ESCC)	Rother District Council (RDC)

Other organisations may attend according to the circumstances of the incident or the additional assistance and expertise they may be able to offer to the response, for example the military and Natural England.

All agencies having an agreed role in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre will appoint a liaison officer to facilitate information flows between their own organisation and the other response agencies. The Strategic Co-ordination Centre liaison officers support, but are distinct from, each organisation's representative at the Strategic Co-ordinating Group.

The primary purpose of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group is to:

- Decide and prioritise Off-Site actions to protect the public;
- Ensure that actions are implemented effectively;
- Provide support as necessary to those implementing the actions;
- Ensure that authoritative advice is passed to the public through the Media Briefing Centre (MBC).

The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will be the focal point for matters of policy and overall strategy for the off-site response to the incident. It will be located within the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and will comprise senior officers of those organisations involved.

As soon as possible after the declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency, an Office for Nuclear Regulation Emergency Response Team (see Section 5.8.2) will also attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. The Office for Nuclear Regulation will not take any executive responsibilities from the Site Emergency Controller, the Strategic Commander or from any other organisation.

Until EDF's Central Emergency Support Centre emergency response is established, the Operator's Technical Adviser (referred to as the Company Technical Advisor – CTA) will provide advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group on public protection measures.

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, as the lead Government Department, will send a small team headed by the Government Liaison Officer to act as a liaison between Government and the SCG during response. The Government Liaison Team will maintain close contact with the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room in London where the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) Strategy activity will be focussed.

In most other emergency situations, the Government Liaison Officer / Government Liaison Team role is provided by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. As a result, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) will support Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) in discharging this function in an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency at Dungeness.

Kent County Council will nominate a relevant Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) representative. That person will represent the interests of the County Council, advise others of the Authority's role and responsibilities during and following an emergency and prepare to take over the co-ordination lead when

the incident enters the recovery phase. The Kent County Council representative would normally be of Director level with support officers and communications links to the County Emergency Centre (CEC).

Folkestone and Hythe District Council will also provide a representative for the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to perform a similar role to the Kent County Council officer and communicating to their District Emergency Centre.

All Strategic Co-ordinating Group representatives will have authority to commit resources and enter expenditure on behalf of their organisation without the need to refer upwards in order that issues may be dealt with speedily and effectively.

The Police Gold Commander will chair Strategic Co-ordinating Group meetings until the response becomes one of recovery and restoration of normality when that role is handed over to the Local Authority (Kent County Council and / or Folkestone and Hythe District Council).

The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will appoint and task the following cells / groups to lead and advise on specific issues (Figure 4):

- Media Cell (MC) – see Section 5.9;
- Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) – see Section 5.8.1;
- Recovery Advisory Group (RAG) – see Section 10.1.

An Agricultural Countermeasures Working Group (ACWG) may also be set up to advise on relevant issues but is likely to operate from a Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) facility.

Figure 4 Indicative Strategic Co-ordinating Group Co-ordination Structure



5.1.6. DESNZ Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)

The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)will set up an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to help coordinate the Government's response. The DESNZ EOC will be a senior member of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)will. It will co-locate representatives of Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)will and other relevant departments and agencies. The main functions of DESNZ is to:

- Brief ministers and through them Parliament;
- Communicate to media and public;
- Co-ordinate Government action;
- Provide international notifications.

The DESNZ EOC will liaise with the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and the Impact Management Group (IMG) in the conduct of the incident response. It will also liaise with the Strategic Co-ordination Centre through the Government Liaison Team (GLT). Other UK Government departments / agencies may be invited or may wish to send representatives to the DESNZ EOC, including the Office for Nuclear Regulation, the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign & Commonwealth Officer (FCO), the Department for Environment,

Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), and the Operator's representative.

5.2. Cross- Border Co-ordination

Kent Police, Kent Fire and Rescue Service & South East Coast Ambulance Service will activate existing inter-County liaison, co-ordination and mutual aid arrangements as appropriate to their service.

Kent County Council & Folkestone and Hythe District Council will liaise with East Sussex County Council & Rother District Council respectively (who will also have been alerted via Sussex Police) to ensure effective co-ordination, exchange of information, mutual aid if required, and public information as necessary.

East Sussex County Council and Sussex Police will deploy liaison officers to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre on receipt of the alerting message. If necessary similar liaison will be undertaken with other adjacent Counties, London Boroughs and Medway Unitary Authority.

Any required liaison with foreign governments (e.g. France) will be undertaken by central government departments e.g. Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) will inform the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will liaise with foreign governments

5.3. Lines of Communication

. Figure 5 Multi-agency co-ordination structures



5.4. Information Management

Information management will initially be dealt with in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre where all agencies will use Resilience Direct and the police will provide a management structure for that system. At a later stage, when Kent County Council takes over in the recovery phase that co-ordination function will transfer to the County Council where Resilience Direct will be used, the management of which will become a Kent County Council responsibility. All participating agencies will be expected to use those systems to maximise the availability and use of information.

If parts of organisations (e.g. County Council directorates or specialist organisations) establish discreet information management processes it is vital that effective links between them and the Strategic Co-ordinating Group / Recovery Co-ordinating Group are maintained to ensure that the Chair is properly informed at all times.

Due to the proximity of Dungeness B to the East Sussex County Council border, provision is made to include a representative from that authority in the Kent County Council County Emergency Centre. In any event, information will be shared with East Sussex as a matter of course via their Emergency Centre.

Each emergency centre will be the authoritative source of information about the activities of its own organisation.

5.5. Information Communications Technology (ICT)

The Strategic Co-ordination Centre contains the infrastructure to support telephone (landline and mobile) and computer (private systems and internet access) communications with a high degree of resilience. If required, the Strategic Co-ordination Centre communications facilities, which are available for use by all participating agencies, can be supplemented by individual agencies' equipment.

Communications between the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and other command centres (Tactical Co-ordination Centre, Forward Control Point etc.) are primarily by private telephone network but radio, internet, intranet, cellular telephone links are easily put in place.

Telephone service suppliers can assist if communications difficulties are experienced by, for example, providing additional telephone points and hardware, prioritising public network usage, monitoring national networks, re-routing calls as necessary and minimising the risk of system failures by network management.

National arrangements exist between BT and the police to deploy a Civil Resilience Duty Officer (CRDOs. to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. This Duty Officer will monitor both the actual and potential impact on the public telephone system, advise on operational communications options and action requests for additional telecommunications support.

5.6. Scene Management

5.6.1. Site Access Control Point (ACP)

For any event which creates an uncontrolled hazardous area, an entry and egress point will be established to command and control activities safely in the area. The control point will be located as appropriate for the event, considering the prevailing conditions. In its simplest form this may be a single barrier.

However, for reactor plant-based events an Access Control Point will be established at a suitable pre-planned location to provide safe, controlled and rapid access to the affected area. The initial location of the Access Control Point will depend upon the location of the event and the prevailing environmental conditions.

An alternative pre-planned Access Control Point will be available should the primary Access Control Point be untenable. Except in exceptional circumstances, approved by the Access Controller, all access to the affected area will be made through an Access Control Point.

The Access Control Point is equipped with means of communicating directly with Emergency Teams, the plants Central Control Room (CCR) and the Emergency Control Centre.

There is adequate space, equipment and facilities for the contamination, radiation dose and breathing apparatus control necessary for the safe and effective dispatch and reception of emergency teams, including emergency services, and for the initial treatment of casualties.

5.6.2. Arrangements for providing assistance to the operator with on-site mitigatory action

The emergency services each have arrangements with the operator detailing the level of support that would be provided to the site. These arrangements include site access, dosimetry, risk assessment and communication and command and control. More detail is given in the Operator's on-site plan.

5.6.3. Cordons & Traffic Control

Kent Police are responsible for overall co-ordination of the scene in respect of land-based issues. Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and National Air Traffic Service (NATS) may be required to exercise control and co-ordination should the consequences or response affect shipping and aircraft respectively.

The extent of the scene will be determined according to the circumstances of the incident. Taking into account dynamic risk assessment and safe systems of work, Kent Police will establish cordon control / Traffic Control Points (TCPs) to prevent the public from entering the predicted hazard area. **Appendix 3** contains information on pre-identified Traffic Control Point locations. Reference should also be made to the Romney Marsh Diversion and Evacuation Plan, held in the Force Control Room at Kent Police.

5.6.4. Evacuation Assembly Points (EvAPs) / Rest Centres

Pre-nominated Evacuation Assembly Points are:

Option 1	Option 1 – Morrisons Daily, 1 Taylor Road, Lydd, TN29 9PA
Option 2	Option 2 – Lydd Community Centre, Manor Road, Lydd, TN29 9HT

Pre-nominated Rest Centres are located at:

Option 1	Brockhill Performing Arts College, Sandling Road, Hythe, CT21 4HL
Option 2	Marsh Academy, Station Road, New Romney, TN28 8BB

Additional Rest Centres will be determined according to need. Options are listed in District Council Welfare Centre Directories and emergency plans. If deemed appropriate rest centres within the East Sussex County Council area may be requested. See also **Section 5.9** and **Section 6.0**.

5.7. Medical Co-ordination, Casualty & Fatality Management

5.7.1. Co-ordination

NHS England & NHS Improvement South East Region will provide an NHS Co-ordinator at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. They will arrange for the dissemination of information to appropriate organisations and take necessary action to activate monitoring centres for those who may have been, or believe they have been, contaminated. They will co-ordinate radiation monitoring of personnel who are operating in support

of the NHS. They will also liaise with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) on NHS policy decisions and overall logistical support.

An NHS Incident Coordination Centre (ICC) may be activated to manage the overall NHS response. There will be close liaison between the NHS Incident Coordination Centre and the NHS representative at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre.

5.7.2. Hospitals

The alerting of hospitals and all matters relating to the transportation of casualties to hospital(s) will be the responsibility of the Ambulance Service.

A range of Designated Receiving Hospitals (DRH) will be used to treat casualties, categorised as either:

- Injured, but not irradiated / contaminated casualties;
- Irradiated / contaminated casualties.

However, life-saving treatment overrides the need for decontamination or treatment for radiation exposure. In this event specialist advice will be obtained by the deployment of medical physicists to the relevant hospital. The hospitals concerned will co-ordinate arrangements for relocation of patients to other hospitals as a direct or indirect result of the incident.

5.7.3. Casualty Clearing Station (CasCS)

The need for, and location of, a Casualty Clearing Station will be determined according to the circumstances of the incident by the Emergency Services. The decision will be influenced by any possibility of contamination and irradiation.

5.7.4. Casualty Bureau (CasB)

If a large number of enquiries concerning people affected by the incident are likely, the Police may decide to set up a Casualty Bureau (CasB). In this event telephone numbers will be made public via all forms of media (including TV, Radio and social media).

The Casualty Bureau provides information on people and not general information on the incident. The latter type of enquiries will be directed towards more appropriate locations, e.g. Emergency Services media officers, Local Authorities, Strategic Co-ordinating Group / Recovery Co-ordinating Group, the Operator, Government Agencies etc.

5.7.5. NHS 111

In a major incident, the primary role of NHS 111 is to provide support to the Department of Health, UK Health Security Agency and, wider NHS family and the Emergency Services via the non-urgent NHS 111 number to offer pathways triage assessments and specific health information to those directly affected by the major incident and the worried well

NHS 111 also has a role in supporting the UK Health Security Agency and other agencies in the provision of health surveillance.

NHS 111 are notified via South East Coast Ambulance Service representation or NHS England & NHS Improvement South East Region (see **Annex 4.1**).

4.7.6 Holding & Audit Area for Deceased People & Human Remains (HAADR)

The need for, and location, of this type of facility is determined according to the nature of the incident by the Emergency Services in consultation with the Operator and will be influenced by possible radioactive contamination.

5.8. Provision of Scientific & Technical Advice

The first key issue the Strategic Co-ordinating Group will face is 'have the recommended protective actions been initiated successfully and are they sufficient? Should they be extended, or should they be reduced in scope and content?'

The Scientific and Technical Advice Cell in conjunction with the ONR will become the sources of authoritative science and technical advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) in the Strategic Co-ordination Cell. The chair of STAC will usually be UK Health Security Agency and . The STAC will adhere to the principles of the UK Health Security Agency South East Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Plan.

5.8.1. Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

The Scientific and Technical Advice Cell operates under the direction of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group would agree the high-level objectives guiding the multi-agency response, including immediate priorities. The Scientific and Technical Advice Cell has as its primary function the provision of health advice for public health protection but will need to co-ordinate advice in relation to an event with regard to the wider context of public safety, environmental protection and the results of sampling and monitoring of radiation levels and any radiological contamination.

The role of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell would be to:

- Provide a common source of science and technical advice from the multiple agencies to the Police Gold Commander, Strategic Co-ordinating Group and the Recovery Advisory Group;
- Monitor and drive the responding science and technical community to deliver on Police Gold's high-level objectives and immediate priorities;
- Agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing scientific and technical input;
- Pool available information and arrive, as far as possible, at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action;
- Provide a common brief to the technical lead from each agency represented in the cell on the extent of the evidence base available, and how the situation might develop, what this means, and the likely effect of various mitigation strategies;
- Liaise with national specialist advisors from agencies represented in the cell and the wider scientific and technical community to ensure the best possible advice is provided;
- Liaise between agencies represented in the cell and their national advisors to ensure consistent advice is presented locally and nationally;

- Ensure a practical division of effort among the scientific response to avoid duplication and overcome any immediate problems arising;
- Maintain a written record of decisions made and the reasons for those decisions.

The membership of the cell is as follows:

- Cell Lead (UK Health Security Agency and);
- Secretariat / Staff Officer support (Cell lead organisation);
- Strategic Co-ordinating Group and Recovery Advisory Group Liaison Officers;
- NHS England & NHS Improvement South East Region;
- UK Health Security Agency– Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards & relevant specialist advisors;
- Kent County Council Public Health;
- Emergency Services technical advisors (e.g. Fire Service HAZMAT officer);
- Regulatory bodies;
- Local Authority (Environmental Health Officers);
- Operator – Company Technical Adviser;
- Met Office;
- Office for Nuclear Regulation;
- Operational partners of Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra);
- Other agencies invited to address sector specific issues, such as the Utilities or transport operators;

One of the first tasks that will be undertaken by the STAC is to make “a provisional assessment of the circumstances and consequences of the event”. This first formal Situation Report would be completed as soon as is reasonably practical to help the SCG, and other responders, know and to “respond effectively to, the particular characteristics of the radiation emergency” (REPPIR Regulation 17(4)&(5)). This would explain the nature of the event, the extent of damage on the site, the release prognosis and the fitness for purpose of the default protective actions. It would be updated as required until its role is subsumed into the event’s information management system.

5.8.2. Office for Nuclear Regulation Strategic Co-ordination Centre Emergency Response Role

To fulfill the office for nuclear regulation strategic co-ordination centre role, the office for nuclear regulation will send a team to the strategic co-ordination centre comprising the following roles:

- Office for nuclear regulation strategic co-ordination centre lead inspector;
- Office for nuclear regulation strategic co-ordination centre health physicist inspector;
- Office for nuclear regulation strategic co-ordination centre engineering inspector;
- Office for nuclear regulation strategic co-ordination centre business support.

The main duties of the Office for Nuclear Regulation Strategic Co-ordination Centre team are to:

- Provide relevant advice[3] to organisations involved in the emergency response;
- Monitor the activities of duty holders at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre;
- Ensure shared situational awareness through engagement with the Government Liaison Officer (GLO) at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and by maintaining communications links with the Redgrave Court Incident Suite (RCIS);
- Ensure the Office for Nuclear Regulation Strategic Co-ordination Centre team maintain a presence in the Science & Technical Advice Cell[4] and attend Strategic Co-ordination Group as required.

5.8.3. Other Sources of Scientific Advice

The major sources of scientific advice are:

- Central Emergency Support Centre;
- Radiation Incident Monitoring Network;
- UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards;
- Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room
- Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies.

5.9. Media & Public Information

All media & public information will be co-ordinated on behalf of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group by the multi-agency Media Cell (MC) – see **Section 6.0**. In the nuclear industry, the term Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC) may be used to refer to the Media Cell.

[3] **"Relevant advice" is advice on matters related to Office for Nuclear Regulation's purposes (TEA Part 3 Ch.1) and may include, where appropriate: technical advice on the course of the emergency on-site; prognosis for the development of the incident and implications Off-Site; the source term for the emergency; & the end of the on-site emergency.**

[4] **ONR Strategic Co-ordination Centre Health Physicist Inspector routinely attends the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell, and may either support or deputise for the Strategic Co-ordination Centre Lead Inspector at these meetings.**

Annex 5.1 NHS 111 Information Requirements

Notifying organisation (name of organisation contacting NHS 111)	
Notifying individual (name of individual contacting NHS 111)	
Contact number (contact number(s) of individual(s) contacting NHS 111. If possible provide additional/alternative contact numbers for the notifying organisation)	
Is it a health issue? (Y/N) (does the incident have health implications needing any assessment)	
Nature of the incident (provide as much information as possible / as is available about the incident including type of incident, numbers of people affected etc.)	
Area(s) affected (what area is affected by the incident? Is it a national / regional or local incident?)	
Assistance requested from NHS 111 (what is required from NHS 111 in support of the incident?)	
Major Incident Declared? (Y/N - Time - By which organisations?)	
Has a Strategic Co-ordinating Group / Tactical Co-ordinating Group been established? *(Y/N - Does NHS 111 need to join this?)*	
Which organisations are involved in the incident?	
Has the UK Health Security Agency been notified? *(Y/N What are their contact details?)*	

6. PUBLIC PROTECTION & PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

6.1. Assessments of Radiation Exposure

The unit of measurement for exposure to radiation is a milliSievert (mSv) and the average annual radiation dose in the UK is 2.7mSv, received from natural sources, with many people receiving additional doses from artificial sources such as medical x-rays. Adverse effects from radiation exposure have only been observed in people exposed to high doses of radiation, for the purposes of radiological protection the assumption is that any radiation dose, however small, carries some risk to health.

An Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) (see below) may result in an invisible plume of radioactive material being released into the environment. Proximity to this material, whether in the air or as ground contamination, may result in radiation exposure. The harmful effects to human beings of such exposure may include an increased risk of developing cancer in later years, but if the exposure is very high earlier medical effects could occur.

The area affected by a release will depend upon the scale and type of incident and the wind and weather conditions. Estimates of the projected dose to individuals as a function of location based on the current situation and predictions of the release profile and atmos UKHSA dispersion will be constantly updated by the operator and by RREMS (Radiological Response and Emergency Management System)/Met Office and discussed within STAC. They will advise the SCG of the optimum public protection strategy to keep all doses as low as reasonably practical within the UKHSA emergency reference level (ERL) system.

6.2. Dose constraints

6.2.1. Reference Levels

ICRP-103 states that Reference Levels “represent the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and for which therefore protective actions should be planned and optimised”. They suggest for planning they should be “typically between 20 and 100 mSv/year according to the situation”.

For members of the public, Kent County Council have adopted default reference level of 100 mSv. This may be revised in the light of circumstances on the day based on advice from STAC and the authority’s RPA or by direction from the Secretary of State (REPPIR Regulation 20).

The plan prioritises keeping doses below the reference levels by prioritising the application of protective actions to those most likely to be exposed to higher doses of radiation i.e. those living or working closest of the event and likely to stay in the area unless advised otherwise.

6.2.2. Emergency Workers and Emergency Exposures

“Emergency exposure” means an exposure of an employee engaged in an activity of or associated with the response to a radiation emergency or potential radiation emergency in order to bring help to endangered persons, prevent exposure of other persons or save a valuable installation or goods, whereby one of the individual dose limits referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the 2017 Regulations could be exceeded (REPPIR Regulation 2).

The Nationally agreed default reference levels (emergency exposure limits) are -

Role	Default Reference level
Emergency responder off-site (more than 300 m from site fence).	100 mSv
Emergency responders and others providing support to those within the areas subject to protective action advice.	100 mSv (But ideally each entry would be assessed by the employer's RPA to confirm that the arrangements are ALARP (minimising time in dose areas, appropriate PPE/RPE) and justified.
Emergency responder on-site preventing releases	100 mSv
Saving of life	500 mSv

An emergency worker is someone who might be exposed to radiation whilst taking action in response to an emergency, to be in receipt of such exposures, their role will usually involve working on the operator's premises or in the vicinity of the premises. Kent County Council employees are not identified as being Emergency Workers.

Some Operator employees and some members of the emergency services who have a role on site may be emergency workers in the terms of the regulations. Each organisation has identified those roles that are emergency workers and have their own processes for the provision of training, protective equipment and dosimetry for these roles. For the emergency services, this includes site familiarisation and training on-site with the Operator's personnel.

It is not considered that people such as social workers and home helpers carrying out urgent care activities within zones subject to protective action advice are "emergency workers" as defined in REPPIR-19 as they are not "assisting in the management of a radiation emergency" rather, they are carrying on their usual job in more trying circumstances. All entries into the affected areas will be subject to a risk-assessment.

The emergency services and the operator have their own processes for setting emergency exposure limits and ensuring that all radiation doses are adequately controlled based on the situation. These are described in their own plans.

6.2.3. Emergency Reference Levels

The quantitative criteria recommended by the UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards for the introduction of protective actions are known as Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs), and cover the dose to an individual that could be averted if a protective action is applied. Emergency Reference Levels are conceptually separate from 'dose limits', the latter being recommended for application to routine exposure of members of the public to ionising radiation. Emergency Reference Levels are specific to each protective action because the harm associated with each option is different (Table 1).

	Effective dose or organ dose	Averted dose (mSv)	
		Lower	Upper
Sheltering	Effective	3	30
Evacuation	Effective	30	300

Table 1 Recommended ERLs for the planning of sheltering-in-place and evacuation for protective actions.

It is also necessary to check that total doses to individuals will be below the thresholds at which deterministic effects[5] may occur because the Emergency Reference Levels are in terms of averted dose.

It is not, however, necessary to be certain that doses would be received if protective actions were not introduced. Precautionary actions should be taken if it is probable, but not certain, that they will avert doses.

6.3. Reduction of Risk

There are many factors which can prevent or reduce the risk of a radiation dose, including:

- **Location relative to the plume**: A plume will travel according to the wind direction, dissipating more quickly in a strong wind and spreading laterally in a low wind. The safest location will always be upwind from the plume or source.
- **Time spent within a radioactive or contaminated area**: The risk can be reduced by minimising the time spent within that area.
- **Personal protective equipment used**: The recognised personal protective measures for both power station and emergency workers are protective clothing (including respirators, if appropriate, for those required to work at the scene on-site).
- **Other protective measures**: Radiation can be absorbed through the skin, by inhalation and by ingestion. Any form of physical barrier will assist further by acting as a filter thereby reducing the uptake rate, including:
    - Closing vehicle air intakes and air re-circulation systems;
    - Sheltering in buildings, with windows closed and any air-conditioning / intake systems closed - the more substantial the building the more effective the protection;
    - A prohibition on eating, drinking and smoking whilst exposed to radiation and before decontamination;
    - Covering exposed areas of skin (gloves, headgear, full sleeves etc.).
- Decontamination after exposure to contamination:
    - Removal of clothing worn in contaminated areas, washing, showering will reduce risk to the individual;
    - Contaminated vehicles must also be decontaminated to avoid radioactive material being transferred to ‘clean’ areas or contaminating subsequent occupants;
    - Decontamination of properties prior to re-occupation.

Initially, the (Site) Emergency Controller, or if the Central Emergency Support Centre is operational, the Central Emergency Support Centre Controller, will provide advice to the Police Gold Commander / Strategic Co-ordinating Group on recommended protective actions.

Public protection options may include one or more protective actions, including shelter, evacuation, and radiation monitoring and decontamination. Protective actions, whether applied to the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone or an extended scenario, are intended to reduce radiation doses to the greatest extent possible.

In all cases the protective action being considered must be justified in the circumstances and result in doing more good than harm. For example, evacuation during severe weather or through a substantial radioactive plume may put persons at greater risk than sheltering. The term 'harm' is used in a wide sense and includes less quantifiable factors such as social disruption and anxiety.

6.4. Implementation of Protective Actions

The automatic protective actions within the DEPZ will be initiated by the operator following the declaration of an off-site nuclear emergency.

Any appropriate change to the recommended set of protective actions and the areas affected will be agreed by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group based on expert advice from, initially, the Site Emergency Controller and subsequently the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell & the Office for Nuclear Regulations and Central Emergency Support Centre.

The Police Gold Commander may also make an executive decision on protective actions in cases of urgency, for example, before the Strategic Co-ordinating Group or Central Emergency Support Centre are operating or the Central Emergency Support Centre has not yet formulated their advice.

Based on information from the Central Emergency Support Centre, the STAC will provide independent and authoritative advice to the SCG. The individual Radiation Protection Advisors appointed by the employers will take on board advice from EDF (CESC) and the STAC and give advice on protective actions to the personnel of the various agencies involved.

The primary means of advising the public of the appropriate protective actions will be via automated telephone message to premises within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone coupled with radio and television broadcasts, social media and subsequently verbally at evacuee assembly points and rest centres. These may be supplemented by other means (e.g. door knocking) if practical, which will essentially depend on factors such as resource availability, personal protective equipment available and the risk to personnel entering any potentially contaminated area.

Occupants of premises within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone have been issued advice on appropriate emergency action to take, and how to obtain additional advice and guidance in the event of a release of radioactivity.

The implementation of protective actions, and the advice pertaining to those protective actions received from the Central Emergency Support Centre, will be based on sectors and distances from the site. Sectors

and distances are shown in Appendix 2. All residents within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone will be advised to take protective actions.

It is possible to extend all protective actions to cover an area wider than the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone by utilising public information systems (broadcast and social media), incrementally arranging rest centres further away and wider ranging traffic, aircraft, shipping, evacuee and response management measures.

6.4.1. Sheltering

Sheltering may have advantages over evacuation. Sheltering may be advised if a release is expected to result in small doses or be of short duration, if evacuation is impossible, the risks in attempting evacuation are too high, or as an interim measure whilst an evacuation is being planned. There are no legal powers to confine persons in such circumstances, therefore they will be encouraged to remain under shelter and provided with regular and accurate advice and information on the situation.

Buildings will generally provide a good level of protection depending on the structure and building materials used. A house of standard construction will provide a substantial level of protection providing windows and doors are closed and, for example, air conditioning intakes are switched off. It is recognised that any structure where doors and windows can be closed offers some degree of protection from the inhalation of airborne radioactive material. The degree of protection offered by a structure will vary depending on how air permeable it is and how it manages air exchanges. Sheltering in temporary structures such as caravans and mobile homes can therefore be appropriate but if there is the option of sheltering in a more substantial structure then this should be used. When considering lifting sheltering and introducing relocation or introducing evacuation, consideration should be given prioritising to those in less protective dwellings.

Vehicles provide a lower level of protection and will have an adverse effect in that, when moving, material which had been deposited on the ground will be disturbed by air movement and carried into otherwise uncontaminated areas.

It should be ensured that members of the public in affected sectors receive advice from the Police to open doors and windows (and to ventilate building) after it is confirmed by monitoring that the release has been terminated and the plume has passed.

6.4.2. Stable Iodine (KIO_3) Tablets

Stable Iodine tablets are no longer required, as the nature of a radiation emergency at Dungeness B has changed, Iodine Radionuclides are no longer a significant hazard due to the Dungeness B reactors not being in operation since September 2018, during this time, the quantities of radioactive iodine within the reactors has decayed to the point where stable iodine is no longer a justifiable protective action for any age group at any distance from the site.

6.4.3. Evacuation

Evacuation may be implemented if there is a large or prolonged release, or as a precautionary measure after a release has ended, to avoid exposure to depositions and allow decontamination of an area to be undertaken.

Removing people from the source of exposure means that a further or continuing dose from a direct source is prevented. These people may need to be monitored for radiological contamination and decontaminated if required. Usually removal of the outer layer of clothing and the gentle wiping of skin with a paper towel would be adequate decontamination.

The Operator's *On-Site Plan* includes procedures to evacuate their non-essential staff.

If the decision is made to evacuate an area, the Police Strategic (Gold) Commander will determine the best method of advising those concerned according to the prevailing situation. This could be by one or more means, e.g. telephone, local radio broadcasts, social media, personal contact etc.

Kent County Council / Folkestone and Hythe District Council will, as required, arrange for:

- Transport from Evacuation Assembly Points to the designated Rest Centres;
- Rest Centres for short term (up to 48 hour) accommodation; and
- Longer term accommodation and re-housing the homeless.
- Humanitarian Assistance Centres (48-72 hours after the onset of the emergency).

It is important that evacuees are screened as soon as possible for their own medical welfare and to reduce the potential for cross-contamination of others.

Evacuees may decide to arrange their own temporary accommodation and / or to use their own means of transport. Vehicles used by evacuees, Emergency Services and others who have travelled through and are leaving contaminated areas may need to be monitored and decontaminated to avoid the risk of spreading radioactive material.

Evacuation Assembly Points are given in Section 5.6.4 . Alternatives will be identified if necessary.

Should response agencies become aware of vulnerable persons within the affected zones who require special attention, every endeavour will be made by the Social Services and Police to respond to those needs, calling upon the support of other agencies as appropriate.

Wherever possible the names and destinations of all those who do not wish to go to Rest Centre(s) will be recorded at the Evacuation Assembly Points and Traffic Control Points. Recording of evacuees will also be undertaken at Rest Centres in accordance with predetermined Rest Centre procedures.

Radio, television, social media and press may be used to ask those who left the area but were not documented and those who were outside the area and were prevented from returning home or to work, to contact the Casualty Bureau on the published number. All information concerning evacuees or those otherwise affected by the incident will be sent to the Casualty Bureau for collation, action and to assist in responding to public enquiries.

There will inevitably be a degree of 'self-evacuation' when the public becomes aware of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency. Individuals who self-evacuate will, wherever possible, be directed to assembly points where monitoring may be undertaken.

Advice will be given, by media announcements and where practicable at traffic control points, in respect of, for example protective actions, contamination and casualty bureau procedures.

NHS and Police plans cover issues relating to people 'self-presenting' at other locations such as hospitals, surgeries and clinics, and police stations in terms of advice, health monitoring and documentation.

The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will determine a policy in respect of any persons refusing to evacuate.

6.4.4. Vulnerable People

Vulnerable groups of people are those that are disproportionally exposed to risk, but who is included in these groups can change dynamically.

Identifying, planning for and providing for the needs of vulnerable groups will involve a large number of partners and compiling a large amount of changing information. For this reason, it is unrealistic to expect a central list of potentially vulnerable individuals to be maintained. Rather the approach is to maintain a list of partners and contact telephone numbers that can be used to gather relevant information in the event of an emergency.

Those considered potentially vulnerable include:

- Children;
- Older People;
- Mobility impaired;
- Mentally / cognitive impaired;
- Sensory impaired;
- Individuals supported by health or local authorities;
- Temporarily or permanently ill;
- Individuals cared for by relatives and their carers;
- Homeless;
- Pregnant women;
- Minority language speakers;
- Tourists;
- Gypsy and Traveller communities;
- Residents of static and holiday caravan parks.

Records of vulnerable people are held and kept up to date by Kent County Council, Medway Council, NHS and some other utilities companies and organisations, each organisation will hold records of its own clients. During an emergency this information will be supplied to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and other partner organisations as required.

Further information can be found in the Kent Resilience Forum *Identifying Vulnerable People in an Emergency Plan* which includes a 'list of lists' with contact numbers for organisations able to supply the information.

6.4.5. Rest Centres

The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will formally determine the need for Rest Centres and task Kent County Council, although the presumption is that they will be required in such incident. Arrangements will be made by District Councils and Kent County Council for the activation of the pre-identified rest centres.

Details of the two initial and preferred rest centres are given in Section 5.6.4. These have sufficient space, feeding and showering facilities together with large hard standing areas for vehicles. Additional Rest Centres are listed in the KMRF *Welfare Centre Guidelines*, and each district holds a *Welfare Centre Directory* Additional capacity and resource can be sought through mutual aid with adjacent District, County and Unitary Authorities if necessary.

The principles in the KMRF *Welfare Centre Guidelines*, and each district holds a *Welfare Centre Directory* will be applied:

- District Councils are responsible for selecting and managing all Rest Centres in their areas, subject to the fact that in the immediate response 2 rest centres have been pre-determined;
- The County Emergency Centre will facilitate requests for the use of Kent County Council premises;
- Kent County Council Social Care will provide support from trained personnel in the staffing of Rest Centres wherever possible;
- Voluntary agencies, who have received training in rest centre duties, have committed to assist when called upon.

There are Rest Centre boxes available at the Control Centre at Folkestone and Hythe District Council and these have all the necessary equipment and registration forms in. These will be delivered to the rest centres by Folkestone and Hythe District Council if the setting up of rest centres is necessary, this will be co-ordinated and authorised by the KCC DEPO.

In the event of an extended release, options are available to utilise Rest Centres throughout the County and across borders into Medway and East Sussex under mutual aid agreements.

6.5. Radiation Monitoring & Decontamination

6.5.1. Responsibilities

Radiation monitoring during and after an off-site nuclear emergency is an important input to decision making and in the provision of information to the public and to official bodies. Monitoring might relate to the immediate impact of the emergency on people and the potential future impact resulting from environmental contamination.

Within the UK, responsibilities for radiation monitoring in the event of an off-site nuclear emergency lie with several organisations and may, for example, derive from: a legislative requirement; an extension of

responsibilities under non-emergency conditions; or the recommendations of national reviews of emergency arrangements. Principal responsibilities are shown on the following page.

Operator	Monitor up to 30 km from the site in accordance with the on-site emergency plan. See Appendix 3 for a map of monitoring stations around Dungeness.
Food Standards Agency	Monitoring and food sampling and assessing the results to define any area to be subject to food advice and restrictions.
Environment Agency	The Environment Agency organises targeted environmental sampling and analysis through its call off monitoring framework and adapts its routine monitoring programmes to an incident: • Monitoring of radioactivity in the environment near nuclear sites, including dose rate monitoring and sampling and radio-chemical analysis of environmental materials • Radio-chemical analysis of raw water sources which are used for drinking water supplies • Monitoring radioactivity in air and rainwater.
Local Authorities	Environmental Health Officers are principally responsible for monitoring food in the retail chain. Trading Standards Officers are responsible for screening potentially contaminated non-food goods.
Water supply companies	Ensure the quality of drinking water supplied to their customers – including its radioactive content – and identify potentially contaminated water supplies.
Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)	This service is operated by the Met Office, would continue to take readings from 94 permanently operating environmental gamma dose rate monitoring stations located throughout the UK. RIMNET is the agreed national resource for the collection, collation, storage and dissemination of monitoring information.
Ministry of Defence	Provide equipment and manpower for monitoring and general support. The MoD would assist with the presentation of monitoring outputs by making them available as small-scale maps in hard copy, or as graphical computer representations of the monitoring data base.
UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards (RCEHDH)	A fundamental component of the RCEHD radiation emergency response plan is maintenance of capability to deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and undertaking measurements of radioactivity on or in people. Teams can be deployed from Chilton (Oxfordshire), Leeds and Glasgow.

6.5.2. Principles

The monitoring co-ordination arrangements should consist of a Monitoring Co-ordination Team, comprising of technically qualified staff, which would utilise all available environmental and personal radiation monitoring resources made available to it, to meet the monitoring requirements which would arise from issues to be addressed by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. Three functional levels would be relevant in the context of monitoring co-ordination:

Strategic	Strategic Co-ordinating Group (as advised by Scientific and Technical Advice Cell) determining the need / approach for monitoring
Tactical	Monitoring Co-ordination Team, implementing the issues and priorities from the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and allocating tasks to the operational level
Operational	Monitoring Organisations carrying out monitoring related tasks and feeding back to the other levels.

UKHSA also has a national monitoring co-ordination role during radiation emergencies. UKHSA will co-ordinate the radiation monitoring resources[6] made available to it in the event of an emergency and prepare a monitoring strategy for approval by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). This responsibility covers the responsibility for monitoring people and the environment (in the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), Outline Planning Zone (OPZ) and further afield, as required).

The monitoring strategy will be developed and updated in consultation with external stakeholders in radiation monitoring and will take account of monitoring being undertaken by organisations with statutory or existing radiation monitoring responsibilities, to achieve the most effective use of the available radiation monitoring resources.

The strategy does not change or re-allocate any existing responsibilities that organisations might hold with regards to radiation monitoring.

UKHSA has no power to commandeer resources and UKHSA would not expect to take direct tactical control of any resources made available. Each organisation is responsible for ensuring that their staff are properly trained, and its resources are adequately maintained. Operational responsibility would be retained at each monitoring organisation's emergency centre. UKHSA RCEHD will periodically provide organisations with what information it has as the incident develops, this should include:

- A summary of the incident situation
- UKHSA RCEHD local rules for its own monitoring teams being deployed
- UKHSA RCEHD radiological risk assessment for its own monitoring teams being deployed

Organisation's monitoring teams will however need to:

1. be self-sufficient in respect of their own accommodation, transport, meals, communications, etc.;
2. have appropriate health physics skills to competently carry out the agreed monitoring tasks;
3. work under the supervision of their own management structures; and
4. be self-sufficient in terms of PPE (including RPE where appropriate)

If requesting support from Ministry of Defence radiation monitoring resources, UKHSA will submit a Military Aid to Civil Authorities, MAC(A), request if authorised to do so by the SCG.

Requests for additional radiation monitoring resources from other civil organisations will be made via the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) if authorised to do so by the SCG.

[6] Radiation monitoring resources include resources for:

1. **undertaking direct radiation monitoring of the environment and people;**
2. **collecting samples from the environment or people;**
3. **undertaking laboratory analysis of samples from the environment or people.**

Each organisation undertaking monitoring would retain responsibility for ensuring data flow and that the results are clearly presented; they would retain responsibility for their own resources. Radiation Incident Monitoring Network would provide the agreed channel for bringing together the results of monitoring.

Robust voice and electronic communications links should be in place between the Monitoring Co-ordinator and the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and between the Monitoring Co-ordinator and the organisations undertaking the monitoring.

Some degree of preparation will be required by organisations which would be involved in co-ordinated monitoring. Specifically, they should include this aspect of their emergency response in their own response arrangements. They should identify the resources that would be most likely to be made available, and the communications routes by which they would maintain contact with other relevant bodies and the Monitoring Co-ordinator. As with all emergency response plans, those organisations with a specialist role to play should develop and maintain adequate awareness and preparedness.

6.5.3. Monitoring Resource Availability & Capability

The best use should be made of the resources offered to the Monitoring Co-ordination Team. These resources might include staff to undertake monitoring and sampling, laboratory analysis capability, communication facilities and other specialist equipment such as data plotting and mapping capabilities. These resources could be provided by the range of organisations with monitoring responsibilities listed in 6.5.1 but could also include resources made available from research organisations and general industry.

6.5.4. Practical Arrangements

The site has two off-survey vehicles which are equipped to go into the plume and measure the levels of particulate activity in the air, the external dose rates and the identity of the radionuclides present.

There is a ring of gamma detectors (the Emergency Perimeter Gamma Monitoring System - EPGMS) around the site fence and further, similar, detectors at fixed points around the area.

Data from the monitoring effort is combined with understanding of the situation on site to provide estimates of the projected dose (the dose someone would accrue without taking any precautions) and avertable dose (the dose that could be avoided by protective actions) in publicly assessable areas to inform the discussions on protective actions advice to give the public.

As time progresses more mobile monitoring vehicles will reach the area from other sites and other organisations, increasing the rate of data collection.

The UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards liaison officer would act as the link between the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and the Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards Monitoring Co-ordinator. He/she would convey the Strategic Co-ordinating Group's priorities for monitoring to the Monitoring Co-ordinator, and report progress on work underway back to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. Through the UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards liaison officer, the Monitoring Co-ordinator would propose to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, and where necessary update, a monitoring strategy that would aim to address the priorities of the organisations at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. The UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards' Liaison Officer would be a member of the STAC.

The Monitoring Co-ordinator and their team would operate at the tactical level, aiming to make the best use of existing resources. Operational responsibilities would be retained at each monitoring organisation's emergency centre. They would match monitoring tasks to specific resources and request completion of the task through the relevant operational centre controlling the resources. This approach would encompass existing mutual support arrangements between nuclear operators.

The Monitoring Co-ordinator would advise, in respect of specific monitoring, whether the outcome was best expressed textually, or graphically as an annotated map. Decisions on how this information should be passed on to the media and the public would rest, predominantly, with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group under police or local authority chairmanship. The SCG media cell would provide a principal spokesperson on the subject. The Monitoring Co-ordinator would not be expected to make public statements.

6.6. Decontamination

6.6.1. Radiation Monitoring Units (RMU)

The NHS plan details the potential locations for an RMU, the facilities to be provided and by whom they are to be provided. The intent is to be able to activate the unit within a few hours of the alert that one may be needed.

The facility will be able to measure external contamination on people and their clothes and internal contamination within them. The personnel will also be able to identify the symptoms of Acute Radiation Syndrome although this is very unlikely to affect members of the public.

6.6.2. Self-help decontamination

People who are concerned about potential contamination or have been monitoring and shown to have low levels of contamination can be advised by NHS 111 on personal decontamination techniques suitable for the home.

6.6.3. Food Supply

The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has statutory responsibility for protecting animal welfare and minimising the impact of emergencies on food production, fishing and farming. The Food Standards Agency has similar objectives and will determine the level of contamination within the food chain, provide advice to the public, implement preventative action as necessary and ensure safe disposal of contaminated foodstuffs.

The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has a formal agreement with the Food Standards Agency to provide support in a nuclear emergency. If necessary, the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) will ensure supplies of alternative foodstuffs are made available. Foodstuffs are routinely sampled in the Dungeness area. In the event of an emergency intensive monitoring will be undertaken to assess levels of radiation contamination.

The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) can act under the Food and Environment Protection Act (FEPA) (1985) and appoint Investigation / Enforcement Officers from Kent County Council Trading Standards and Folkestone and Hythe District Council Environmental Health. They may also act to minimise the effects of the emergency on the agricultural, fisheries and food industries in the affected area. Certain advice has already been issued to local farmers but if required, they will provide supplementary advice on farming, fisheries and food, supported by the Police and the local authorities if necessary and practicable.

6.7. Water Supply

6.7. Water Supply
General arrangements for monitoring the quality of water are the responsibility of the water companies, the Environment Agency and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). In an emergency, the Environment Agency will introduce modelling and monitoring arrangements and assess the results. Based on such assessments they will provide advice on the impact of radioactivity on water in the environment to the water supply companies and Defra. The Environment Agency does not make decisions about whether water is safe to drink. The assessments will be used by local water companies for public supplies and the local authority for private supplies, as a basis for their decision making.

If required, the water supply companies, in association with other agencies as necessary, will ensure that adequate supplies of water, particularly potable water, are made available during the emergency. Information and announcements concerning the supply and quality of mains water supplies will also be the responsibility of the water supply companies. If necessary, the Environment Agency will provide information and advice on other sources of water in Kent.

If required, further measures for the purification of the water supply from the Denge Pumping Station can be introduced by Affinity Water and the Site Operator to ensure that the quality of water from this source is satisfactory even during an emergency.

6.8. Special Foods & Medicines

Special foods and medicines that have been stored in their normal packages during an emergency may be used as previously advised by the doctor, pharmacist or specialist. If evacuation is necessary, individuals requiring special foods and medicines will be advised to take these with them. In situations where shelter is the appropriate protective action, and considering prevailing circumstances, the Strategic Co-ordination Centre will endeavour to make appropriate arrangements for persons requiring special foods or medicines.

Annex 6.1 Record of Advice on Protective Actions to Protect the Public

Nuclear Site	Dungeness B (EDF Energy)
Location	Dungeness, Romney Marsh, Kent
Date	
Time Off-site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) Declared	
Time advice issued / updated*	
Organisation responsible for providing Assessment and / or Advice	Company / Scientific and Technical Advice Cell*
Emergency – (Brief Description)	

The following protective actions are required to protect the public:

Protective action Type	Area Covered by Each Protective action
Shelter – Go in, Stay in, Tune in (including closing windows, doors, air-conditioning and intakes)	
Evacuation	
Avoid food left in open	
Access Restrictions	
Other	

Signed	Distribution
..... Chair of Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)	All members of Strategic Co-ordinating Group, Tactical Co-ordinating Group & supporting Cells Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room / Cabinet Office Briefing Room Operator NHS 111

7. Media and Communications Strategy

7.1. Purpose & Scope

The aim of this Strategy is to:

Detail the **specific** arrangements for managing multi-agency media & communications in the event of an offsite nuclear emergency at Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station, in support of the **generic** arrangements in the Kent Medway Resilience Forum *Media & Communications* Plan.

This Strategy should therefore be implemented in conjunction with the KMRF *Media & Communications Plan.*

7.2. Key Objectives, Consequences & Challenges

In addition to the **generic** communications 'Aim, Objectives & Principles' outlined in the KMRF *Media & Communications Plan*, the following are **specific** objectives, consequences and challenges that will need to be achieved / overcome in an off-site nuclear emergency:

- Awareness / preparedness for an off-site nuclear emergency amongst local residents / businesses is high, particularly those who receive pre-information (calendars) in the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone and / or are members of the Dungeness Site Stakeholder Group;
- However, the impacts of an off-site nuclear emergency (either real or perceived) are likely to extend beyond the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (even internationally) and there will be a need to communicate with a diverse audience, over a wide area, using a range of communication channels;
- Efforts to reassure and instil public confidence will be paramount;

In the event of an off-site nuclear emergency at a nuclear site in the UK, it is expected that:

- The public will:
  - Seek direct advice and reassurance from whoever they can contact, particularly those within the affected area;
  - Demand information from responding agencies.
  - Interact on social media with friends and family and with hosts of "influencers" giving out information with a range of validity and clarity.
- The media will:
  - Attend in very large numbers including international news organisations from an early stage of an off-site nuclear emergency, arriving locally within hours, and seeking information while the emergency services response is still getting underway;
  - Attempt to get as close to the site as possible, in search of information and images;
  - Quickly seek out members of the public who can provide eyewitness accounts and photographs taken with mobile phones or digital cameras which are likely to be broadcast within minutes of the incident occurring;
  - Be equipped with up-to-date communications technology seeking information for immediate broadcast and reporting deadlines;

  Most importantly, likely to be the most effective and resilient method of quickly reaching large numbers of people.

- Other key stakeholders will:
  - From the point of view of their different interests seek information from the responder organisations;
  - Require accurate and timely information to play their part in support of events and help promote the correct messages.

Long-term recovery of the affected area (and particularly public confidence) may take a significantly long time (months and years) and those affected will need significant support, including information, advice & reassurance.

7.3. Multi-Agency Co-ordination

7.3.1. Media Cell (MC)

All media & public information will be co-ordinated by the multi-agency Media Cell (MC)[7]. The core membership of the Media Cell will consist of a nominated Lead Organisation and Supporting Organisations. However, dependent on the nature / location of the specific incident, additional supporting organisations may be drafted-in, as required.

7.3.2. The Lead Organisation

The Media Cell will be chaired by a senior media & communications professional from the relevant Lead Organisations for that emergency phase, as follows:

Preparedness	Potential Emergency	Emergency / Response	Recovery
Before		During	After
Dungeness B Station Operator		Kent Police	Kent County Council

7.3.3. Supporting Organisations

The relevant Lead Organisation will be supported by equivalent officers from other partner agencies involved in the response, as follows:

All other 'Lead Organisations'
Kent Fire and Rescue Service
South East Coast Ambulance
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
NHS Kent and Medway ICB.
UK Health Security Agency and Office for Nuclear Regulation
Local Authorities
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
Environment Agency
Food Standards Agency
Met Office
Radiation Incident Monitoring Network
Affinity Water
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)

[7] **In the nuclear industry, the term Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC) may be used to refer to the Media Cell.**

7.4. Media Management

7.4.1. Statements, Briefings & Press Conferences

The nominated Lead Organisation for the incident co-ordinates joint statements, briefings and press conferences, with contributions from relevant Supporting Organisations. Individual organisations will have specific areas of responsibility / messages that they will wish to comment upon / communicate (see **7.4.2**). However, such information should be shared with and, wherever possible, cleared via the Media Cell **before** it is issued, to ensure a consistent message, particularly where this may impact upon / conflict with another organisation or the multi-agency response.

In the event of a civil nuclear accident, a nominated government officer would be responsible for providing authoritative statements on behalf of Government on the course of the emergency and measures to protect the public. All public messaging should go through the SCG, in partnership with ONR's comms team to ensure consistent messaging. The timing of press conferences and media briefings will be agreed between the Gold Commander and the Office for Nuclear Regulation Emergency Response Team.

The Operator will despatch a Media Technical Briefer (MTB) and Press Officer to the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre to work with the Media Cell, also linking with their Company Technical Adviser, Technical & Senior representatives from the Office for Nuclear Regulation and Government Liaison Officer / Government Liaison Team.

Consideration should also be given to establishing the nominated Media Briefing Centre (MBC) – see **Appendix 3** for location details. However, the media will clearly look to congregate at the incident scene and other key locations and arrangements for 'on scene' media liaison should be put in place (see **Section 7.4.2**).

7.4.2. Media Liaison

As far as reasonably practicable, Media Liaison Officers (MLOs) should be deployed to the incident scene and other key locations (e.g. Evacuation Assembly Points, Rest Centres) where the media are likely to gather and to establish appropriate Media Liaison Points (MLPs) and Forward Briefing Points (FBPs), linking in with the Media Cell and, where established, the Media Briefing Centre. However, given the speed of the incident and the extent of the area affected, it is unlikely and undesirable that Media Liaison Officers will be able to cover all the areas where the media will congregate.

However, working with the responders at those locations and considering any health, safety & welfare considerations and available resources, efforts should be made to put in place media liaison arrangements at key locations to retain some element of control.

Appendix 3 gives details of pre-identified Media Liaison Points.

7.5. Warning & Informing the Public

7.5.1. Key Target Audiences & Communications Channels

Generic advice / arrangements for communication with the public are set-out in the Kent Resilience Forum *Media & Communications Plan*. Additionally, specific arrangements for communicating with vulnerable people and hard-to-reach groups can be found in the Kent Resilience Forum *Identifying Vulnerable People in an Emergency Plan*.

7.5.2. Initial warning and advice message

Once operational, and with no further authorisation required, the Central Emergency Support Centre will initiate the PETIS telephone warning system to send the following message to all registered telephone lines within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone[8].

"All residents within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) are advised to bring domestic pets indoors, leave all farm animals where they are, 'Go In, Stay In, Tune In' - close all outside doors and windows, switch off any ventilation or extractor fans, monitor official social media accounts.

This will be reinforced by messages on local broadcast media.

7.5.3. Social Media

Social media will be monitored by the Media Briefing Centre which will coordinated, so far as is practical, outgoing messages on local authority and category 1 responders' social media feeds. Messages will give advice to the public and also respond to any rumours/speculation found to be trending on social media.

A relevant hashtag will be agreed at the earliest opportunity but defaults of #dungenessaware #lyddaware and #romneymarsh should be considered and #Dungenessincident may be appropriate

The police twitter feed should be considered as the lead for other agencies to follow. Other agencies, including local authorities, will need to use their social media channels to communicate with the local community and to deal with requests for information made through their social media channels. They must ensure they use information cleared for the release by the Media and Comms Chair and link where possible to fuller information on a website. It may be that other accounts and hashtags are established as an emergency response.

The following social media platforms can be used:

TV	Radio	FM/DAB	Social Media
BBC 1	BBC Radio Kent	96.7/104.2	Kent Fire and Rescue Service Facebook
ITV	BBC Radio Sussex	104.5 / 116 / 95.3	Kent Fire and Rescue Service Twitter (@kentfirerescue)
Sky News			

[8] **All residents and businesses within the DEPZ are invited to register with PETIS. This invitation is repeated with the distribution of prior information.**

Heart Radio: East Kent	102.8	KCC Twitter Feed (@Kent_cc)
Heart Radio: West Kent	103.1	Kent Police (@kent_police)
Heart Sussex	102.4/103.5	Kent News Twitter (@kent_online or @kentlivenews)

7.5.4. Informing

The following information will be supplied to the public via media briefing and web-sites.

1. Information on the type of emergency which has occurred, and, where possible, its characteristics, for example, its origin, extent and probable development.
2. Advice on protective action which may include, depending on the type of emergency—
   (a) any restrictions on the consumption of certain foodstuffs and water supply likely to be contaminated;
   (b) any basic rules on hygiene and decontamination;
   (c) any recommendation to stay indoors;
   (d) the distribution and use of protective substances;
   (e) any evacuation arrangements;
   (f) special warnings for certain population groups.
3. Details concerning any announcements recommending cooperation with instructions or requests by the regulator.
4. Where an incident which is likely to give rise to a release of radioactivity or ionising radiation has taken place but no release has yet occurred, the information and advice will include the following—
   (a) details of the relevant communications channels on which information about the incident will be available;
   (b) preparatory advice to establishments with particular collective responsibilities; and
   (c) recommendations to occupational groups particularly affected.
5. If time permits, information setting out the basic facts about radioactivity and its effects on persons and on the environment.

7.5.5. Pre-Prepared Information

This section gives examples of pre-distributed / scripted information for residents:

- Operator's Emergency information;
- The FSA will provide advice based on the situation of the event

Figure 6 Prior information



Dungeness B

Nuclear Power Station

Emergency Information for the Public

Kent County Council
2nd Floor
Invicta House
County Hall
Maidstone
ME14 1XX

Published by
Kent County Council in partnership with EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd in accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019.

OFF-SITE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY INFORMATION

You have received this information because your resident/business premises lie within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) of Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station (Dungeness B). Please refer to the location map in section B of this information.

This information describes how a radiation emergency at Dungeness B might affect you as a local resident, visitor or worker and has been issued by Kent County Council in accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019.

Please retain this information for future reference.

Nuclear power stations are designed, operated and regulated to ensure that any accidents are highly unlikely. However, it is prudent to have arrangements to deal with such a situation should it occur.

This information advises you of these arrangements and explains what you may need to do in the event of an emergency to protect yourself from exposure to radiation and radioactive material.

CONTENTS

ATTACHMENTS

- EDF Public Emergency Telephone Information System Letter
- EDF Public Emergency Telephone Information System Sign Up Card
- Change of Occupancy Card
- Evacuation Registration Card

REFERENCES

- Nuclear emergencies: information for the public
- Basic concepts of radiation

Both of these leaflets are available at the following address:

www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-emergencies-information-for-the-public

STABLE IODINE TABLETS

Residents and businesses within the DEPZ were previously issued with Stable Iodine Tablets and would have been instructed to take these in the event of a radiation emergency at Dungeness B. Faults at operating nuclear reactors can release radioactive forms of iodine, which can lead to radiation doses to the thyroid gland. It has been shown that taking stable iodine speeds the removal of radioactive iodine from the body, resulting in a reduced radiation dose.

Dungeness B is no longer an operational power station and has entered into the defueling phase. Therefore the type of radiation that would make these tablets necessary no longer exists, and it is no longer appropriate to issue these and they have been withdrawn from use. This does not increase the risk to you in the event of a radiation emergency.

New occupants of these premises can apply for additional copies of this information from:

In the first instance,	or:
Kent County Council Resilience & Emergency Planning Team Invicta House County Hall Maidstone ME14 1XX 01622 670570	EDF Emergency Planning Group Barnett Way Barnwood Gloucester GL4 3RS 01452 656841

Contact information

Kent County Council	03000 410 410
EDF Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station	01797 343300

1 FACTS ABOUT IONISING RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON PERSONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The basic facts about ionising radiation and its effects on persons and the environment are detailed in the UK Health Security Agency (previously known as Public Health England) leaflet **Basic Concepts of Radiation** which is included with this information.

This leaflet is also available on-line at **www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-emergencies-information-for-the-public**.

Further information on radiation, its effects and risks can be found on-line at **www.gov.uk/topic/health-protection/radiation**.

2 TYPES OF RADIATION EMERGENCY THAT COULD OCCUR AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

The likelihood of a radiation emergency occurring at Dungeness B is very low and there are a significant number of safety barriers in place to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment. Dungeness B has never had a radiation emergency, however, accidents have occurred elsewhere in the past when radioactivity has been released from other sites around the world.

If a radiation emergency were to occur at Dungeness B, it would be most likely to take the form of a release of gas containing small amounts of radioactive particles.

In this instance, people could be exposed to radiation in the following ways:

- Breathing in radioactive materials.
- Direct exposure to radioactive materials that are carried in the air or are deposited on surfaces.
- By eating or drinking uncovered foods or liquids which have been exposed to radioactive materials.

During a radiation emergency of this type the weather may play a significant role in the spread of radioactive materials. In particular, the wind direction and speed on the day will determine the areas affected and where radioactive materials may be deposited.

Sections 3 and 4 give direction on the actions that can be taken to protect against the risks from exposure to radioactivity.

PERCEIVED RISK

Dungeness B is a complex industrial site with many processes that take place, which to the public may look as though an incident is occurring. This may include, but not be limited to, occasional releases of large amounts of steam and loud noises.

In addition, emergencies could take place on the site, such as fires, or industrial incidents that could generate smoke or require the attendance of large numbers of emergency service vehicles.

These would not necessarily involve a radiological hazard and therefore you should not take any protective actions unless you are advised to do so.

All protective actions carry with them a risk of harm. Therefore taking unnecessary actions, such as evacuating, when there is not a risk from radiation, is not justified.

3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO ALERT, PROTECT AND ASSIST THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF A RADIATION EMERGENCY

WARNING

If there is an off-site nuclear emergency, the primary means of notification will be by:

- automated telephone notification system (if you have registered your details*)
- announcements through local and social media outlets
- direct communication from members of the emergency services.

* Please refer to the attached **EDF Public Emergency Telephone Information System letter** and **Sign-Up Card**.

SHIPPING AND BOATS

The Coastguard will warn shipping and boats.

RADIO

- BBC Radio Kent (96.3 FM & 2 MHz FM/DAB/Internet)
- BBC Radio Sussex (104.5 MHz FM/TX: Kent MHz FM/DAB 2 MHz (Central)/DAB/Internet)
- Heart Radio
  - East Kent (102.8 MHz FM/DAB/Internet)
  - West Kent (103.1 MHz FM/DAB/Internet)
- Heart Sussex (102.6 MHz FM/102.5 MHz FM)
- KMFM (96.2 107.9 MHz FM/DAB/Internet)

TV

- BBC South East Today
- ITV Meridian

FACEBOOK

- East Kent Hospitals University Trust: EastKentHospitals
- Folkestone & Hythe District Council: FolkestoneandHytheDC
- Kent & Medway NHS and Social Care Partnership Trust: kmpt.nhs
- Kent County Council: KentCountyCouncil
- Kent Fire & Rescue Service: kentfireandrescue
- Kent Police: kentpolice
- Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust: mgmtwhealthcare

TWITTER

- East Kent Hospitals University Trust: @EKHUFT
- Folkestone & Hythe District Council: @folkestonehythedc
- Kent Community Health: @NHSKentCHFT
- Kent County Council: @kent_cc
- Kent Fire & Rescue Service: @kentfireandrescue
- Kent Police: @kent_police
- Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells Hospitals: @NTWHnhs

SITE SIRENS AND EMERGENCY SERVICE VEHICLES

The site emergency sirens are sounded regularly for testing purposes and as part of site emergency exercises. Hearing the siren is not an indication that an incident is occurring. You should not take action on the basis of hearing the siren as it is not part of the incident notification process.

Emergency services vehicles regularly attend the site for training and exercising and for low level incidents such as staff illness. The presence of emergency services vehicles at site is not an indication that an incident is occurring. You should not take action on the basis of emergency service vehicles attending the site.

THE DUNGENESS B OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

Kent County Council are responsible for the development of the off-site emergency arrangements for Dungeness B, as required by the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPIR 2019).

The **Kent County Council Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station Off-Site Emergency Plan** sets out the detailed planning arrangements to provide prompt protection to members of the public in the area. A copy of the plan can be found at **www.kent.gov.uk/about-the-council/strategies-and-policies/community-safety-and-crime-policies/emergency-planning** or by searching for **Dungeness B Off-Site Emergency Plan**.

4 INFORMATION ON PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF A RADIATION EMERGENCY

In the event of a radiation emergency occurring, you will be provided with advice on what action to take, via the methods identified in section 3. There are three primary protective actions that could be applied depending on the specific emergency scenario:

- Sheltering/staying indoors.
- Avoiding consumption of contaminated food/drink.
- Evacuation/leaving the area.

The initial message will be to:

GO IN

STAY IN

TUNE IN

SHELTERING/STAYING INDOORS

Staying inside with doors and windows closed is an effective method of protection from breathing in radioactive material in the air outside and from direct radiation from radioactive material in the air and on the ground.

If directed to shelter/stay indoors....

People at home/at their place of work should:

- go indoors
- bring domestic pets indoors
- leave all farm animals where they are
- close all outside doors and windows
- switch off any ventilation systems or extractor fans that are not safety critical
- tune into your local radio/TV and listen for any further instructions
- monitor official social media accounts.

People not at home/at their place of work:

- If you are indoors, remain where you are
- If you are outdoors, make your way to a nearby premises where you can remain indoors
- If you are travelling in a vehicle, ensure all windows and vents are closed and leave the DEPZ by a route that does not take you closer to the station, ensuring you observe any access restrictions in place. Alternatively, seek shelter in a permanent building.

People outside the affected area:

If you live/work within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone but are not in the area when an incident occurs you **should not return** to the area until advised that it is safe to do so if at all possible.

AVOIDING CONSUMPTION OF CONTAMINATED FOOD/DRINK

In the event of a radiation emergency at Dungeness B, radioactive material could be deposited on uncovered food/drink, which could then be ingested. It could also find its way into foods through crops and animals.

Food, drink and medicines

If a radiation emergency occurs it is safe to continue to use:

- food stored indoors, for example in homes or shops
- medicines stored in their normal packaging
- mains tap water, unless told otherwise.

You should wait for official guidance before:

- using private water supplies
- consuming food stored outdoors, for example on open-air markets or stalls
- harvesting fresh produce to eat, for example from a garden or allotment.

Food production

- The Food Standards Agency is responsible for providing advice on food safety in the event of a release of radioactivity.
- If a radioactive release occurred, radioactive material could contaminate food production (for example, crops in fields, allotments or animals eating contaminated grass) over a wide area.
- The Food Standards Agency's advice will protect those people who may consume this contaminated food on a regular basis and over a long period of time. The area covered by food advice is therefore likely to be larger than the area in which other protective actions are required.

EVACUATION/LEAVING THE AREA

In the event of a radiation emergency at Dungeness B, it may be necessary to ask people to leave the immediate area. However this carries with it an element of risk and therefore would only be done in situations where the risk posed by the radiation hazard outweighs the risk of moving people out of the area. You should not expect to be evacuated as in most situations staying indoors would provide more than adequate protection from radiation.

In preparation for leaving the area:

- tune into the public broadcast information and listen out for instructions on leaving the area
- get together the people in your household/place of work (excluding children at school) and pets
- pack a supply of appropriate clothing
- pack any special food that anyone needs
- pack any medicines that anyone needs
- take personal documents and valuables
- pack some books and toys for children
- complete the Evacuation Registration Card.

If you are asked to leave the area:

- listen to the public broadcast information for news on which rest centres have been designated as the most appropriate for immediate use
- take your completed Evacuation Registration Card with you.



5 ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIFIC GROUPS OF PEOPLE

SCHOOL CHILDREN

PETS

VULNERABLE PEOPLE

VISITORS/TRADESPEOPLE

6 AFTER AN EVENT

7 THE AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

8 THE DETAILED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (DEPZ)

9 THE OUTLINE PLANNING ZONE (OPZ)

10 SECURITY INFORMATION

SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

8. OUTLINE RESPONSIBILITIES

Duties and responsibilities of organisations responding to an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency are contained in the NEPRG Planning and Response Guidance (part 2) - issued by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). The agreed roles and responsibilities within Kent, including those of the Emergency Services, local authorities, voluntary agencies etc. are detailed in the Kent Resilience Forum *Pan-Kent Strategic Emergency Response Framework*. This section summarises responsibilities appropriate to this plan.

8.1. Operator: EDF Energy (B Station)

Prior to any incident	• Enrol members of public on the PETIS system for warning and informing.
In the event of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency	• Warn the site staff by activating the site siren; • Alert Kent Police, Kent Fire and Rescue Service & South East Coast Ambulance Service by 999 call and send confirmatory fax message to Kent Police and give advice and information to the Emergency Services about the nature of the emergency, the wind and weather conditions, safe access route(s) to the site, number of casualties, and protective actions; • Alert the Dungeness A Operator, CESC, Office for Nuclear Regulation, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and other government departments / agencies e.g. Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Environment Agency, Food Standards Agency • Initiate PETIS telephone warning system to alert and provide appropriate protective action advice and information to residents within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone; • Establish the Emergency Control Centre under the direction of the Site Emergency Controller; • Account for all personnel and visitors on the site; • Deploy site emergency teams to assess the nature and severity of the incident and put mitigation measures in place; • Deploy off-site survey teams to monitor off-site conditions; • Enforce site security, control movement of vehicles within the site and prevent unauthorised entry or exit; • Activate the Central Emergency Support Centre; • Provide CTA, health physicist and admin support to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre; • Establish liaison between the site, the Central Emergency Support Centre and the Operator's technical advisor at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre; • Provide advice on the dispersion and effects of any radioactivity released from the site; • Provide advice to the Emergency Services on public protection until the Office for Nuclear Regulation Emergency Response team is established in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre; • Provide the Emergency Services with special information, clothing or equipment as

	required; • Establish a media interface and support the co-ordinated approach in the Media Briefing Centre; • Keep a record of actions taken; • Gather and preserve evidence for the subsequent investigation; • Advise the Strategic Co-ordination Centre when the Off-Site Nuclear Emergency is considered to be over.

8.2. Emergency Services

Kent Police	• Co-ordinate generic alerting cascade for Kent Resilience Forum partner organisations & inform Sussex Police; • Co-ordinate the activities of responding agencies at and around the scene; • Saving and protection of life; • Preservation of the scene – evidence, criminal investigation etc.; • Establish and maintain cordons; • If suspected terrorism assume overall control of the incident; • Carry out a criminal investigation; • Undertake Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) on behalf of the Coroner;
Kent Fire & Rescue Service	• Fire-fighting, search and rescue; • Protecting life and property; • Decontamination of people; • Assist the ambulance service with mass decontamination; • Salvage and damage control at fire incidents; • Safety management within the inner cordon for Kent Fire and Rescue Service-led incidents; • Requesting additional resources from other fire and rescue authorities through mutual aid arrangements; • Deploy a liaison officer to the Site Emergency Control Centre, Tactical Co-ordination Centre and Strategic Co-ordination Centre;
Maritime and Coastguard Agency	• Receive alerting call and other information from the Police; • Warn vessels, harbour authorities and pilots, Royal National Lifeboat Institute (RNLI) etc. in the affected area; • Warn vessels to avoid entry into the affected area; • Alert the UK Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU); • Alert French and Belgian maritime authorities; • Obtain up-to-date fall-out predictions from the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and circulate advice to ships at sea; • Establish pre-determined liaison arrangements with the Police and local authorities to ensure rapid exchange of information; • Inform the Secretary of State for Transport through the Marine Directorate Emergency Information Room of developments;

	• Receive requests from other services for military and civil helicopter assistance; • Provide helicopter / ground communications and if necessary provide a communications vehicle for this purpose; • Co-ordinate evacuations by sea if required.
South East Coast Ambulance Service	• Receive emergency calls from the Emergency Services or other sources; • Decontamination of people assisted by KFRS; • Dispatch ambulance resources to the scene of the Major Incident, including the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART); • Alert the appropriate Designated Receiving Hospitals of the possibility of a Major Incident; • To alert NHS England (NHSEI) • To alert the UK Health Security Agency • To alert NHS 111 • Receive from the first ambulance response at the scene, confirmation of the nature of the Major Incident; • As appropriate, 'Stand Down' or confirm a 'Major Incident' exists with the alerted hospitals; • Confirm with the appropriate hospital the requirement for a Medical Emergency Response Incident Team (MERIT) and arrange the provision of ambulance vehicles for their transportation to the scene as necessary; • Provide a senior ambulance officer at the scene to act as Ambulance Incident Commander (AIO); • Dispatch to the scene sufficient ambulance resources, Incident Support Units (ISU) and, as appropriate, the ambulance Incident Control Vehicle (ICV) to be located with the Police and Fire & Rescue; • Provide identifying accoutrements for the Strategic Medical Advisor (SMA); • Establish communications from the ambulance Incident Control Vehicle to the Designated Receiving Hospital and, if required to any officer deployed to the relevant Site Emergency Control Centre • Liaise at scene with Kent Police and Kent Fire and Rescue Service and any other organisations involved; • Forward to the receiving hospitals any information obtained at the scene relating to toxic or radiation hazards and possible contamination of casualties; • Determine the evacuation priorities for casualties and the hospitals to which they are to be sent. (In conjunction with the Strategic Medical Advisor (if deployed); • Advise the receiving hospitals on the prevailing situation and the categories and estimated times of arrival of casualties; • Organise additional ambulance cover for the emergency and routine tasks by re-deploying resources between ambulance stations or by arrangements with other divisions or ambulance services and voluntary organisations; • Provide a Hospital Ambulance Liaison Officer (HALO) at the receiving hospitals to supervise the unloading and turn-round of ambulances; • Organise the relief of ambulance crews in the event of a prolonged emergency; • To convey to receiving hospitals a 'scene evacuation complete' message and to

	receive a 'Stand down' from these hospitals when they can stand down their Major Incident procedure; • As appropriate organise transportation for patients who may require transfer or discharge from the receiving hospitals.

8.3. Health

NHS 111	• Receive an alerting call from NHS England & NHS Improvement South East Region via South East Coast Ambulance Service representation; • Collate information on the type and extent of an incident; • Establish protective actions recommended / implemented; • Assess health implications as necessary; • Provide advice to the public; • Receive health related enquiries from the public on help-lines; • Provide appropriate health advice to the public; • Maintain liaison with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group / Recovery Co-ordinating Group.
NHS Kent and Medway ICB.	• Receive alerting messages for an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency or any assessment requiring NHS standby, alerting procedures or preparatory measures; • Alert relevant local trusts and the UK Health Security Agency (Kent Health Protection Unit); • Alert the Department of Health providing all information available, and thereafter maintain liaison as required; • Implement arrangements for the deployment of a senior NHS officer (and support officer as necessary) to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre, including Scientific and Technical Advice Centre and Recovery Advisory Group; • Provide advice and assistance as may be required to Local Authority Environmental Health Officers; • Assess the effect of any emergency or contingency measures invoked as a result of potential hazards, on special care groups, e.g. premature babies, dialysis patients etc. and co-ordinate contingency measures; • In conjunction with neighbouring health authorities co-ordinate arrangements for reassurance and validation monitoring; • Respond to requests for information from the public on the health consequences of the emergency; • Provide information and advice to NHS staff and other health providers including: ○ NHS hospitals; ○ Community Health Services; ○ General and Dental Practitioners; and ○ Independent hospitals and nursing homes. • In consultation with the Media Briefing Centre, prepare press or media releases, concerning health services and advice to the public.

UK Health Security Agency	• Receive alerting calls from NHS South East (Kent Health Protection Unit) and EDF Energy (Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards); • Despatch senior advisers from Kent Health Protection Unit locally and from Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards. • In co-operation with the NHS and other partners, form a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell as required; • Gather relevant information (particularly radiation monitoring information). • Undertake assessment of information gathered and provide expert radiation protection advice and information. • Deploy radiation-monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and measurements of radioactivity on or in people. Support Radiation Monitoring Units (RMUs) or other arrangement for monitoring people as required. • Undertake the role of national radiation monitoring co-ordination. • Provide expert advice on radiological issues for the recovery phase.
Designated Receiving Hospitals (DRHs)	• Receive the alerting call from the Ambulance Service; • DRH's media & comms will be coordinated with NHS England and NHS Improvement • Receive casualties requiring hospital treatment in accordance as follows: o Injured, but not irradiated / contaminated casualties; and o Irradiated / contaminated casualties. **NB:** See **Appendix 3** for pre-identified Designated Receiving Hospitals • Maintain communications, as appropriate, via the Ambulance Service radio system, with the Ambulance Incident Commander (AIO) at the scene of an emergency to liaise on matters relating to casualty evacuation; • Establish a Hospital Information / Emergency Control Centre (ECC) to act as the focus for the co-ordination and necessary dissemination of information; • Activate facilities and procedures for the gross decontamination of casualties prior to entry to the Accident & Emergency (A&E) Department as necessary; • Provide facilities for Police Documentation Teams and provide details of the identity, general condition and location of casualties; • Inform, or arrange for the informing of, next of kin or a close relative of deaths certified at the hospital, all seriously ill casualties or those likely to be admitted; • Liaise with the Police Documentation Team in respect of fatalities and injured persons and their next of kin etc.; • Organise periodic briefings and press releases and provide appropriate facilities for accredited media representatives.

8.4. Local Authorities

County Councils / Unitary Authorities	• Appoint a County Emergency Co-ordinator to manage and direct County activities, Kent County Council for Kent and East Sussex County Council for East Sussex; • Provide Liaison Officers at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre, and, as practicable, other Emergency Centres; • Alert, or inform, as appropriate, County Council Directorates, District Councils,

	neighbouring authorities, appropriate Central Government departments, voluntary organisations and other organisations which will or may become involved, including the NHS Emergency Response Manager; • Chair the Recovery Advisory Group and subsequently take over the co-ordination of the incident from the Police and lead the Recovery Co-ordinating Group; • Arrange transport for evacuees to rest centres; • Ensure provision of public information as required under the REPPIR Regulations (2019); • Arrange Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) if required
Borough / District Councils	• Set up and staff relevant District Emergency Centres (DECs) • Collect information and assess impact on the population within the District; • Provide and deploy Council resources as appropriate; • Deploy senior officer to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, Recovery Advisory Group and, subsequently, to the Recovery Co-ordinating Group; • Assist with circulating public information in liaison with the Police and County Council; • Assist the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs with Information / Enforcement Officers; • Provide staff for Rest Centre duties; • Arrange re-housing as required; • Maintain financial records of Local Authority expenditure; • Arrange for the briefing of elected members as required.

8.5. Government Departments & Agencies

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)	• Preparation and distribution of information and advice to the public and media; • Coordination and monitoring the overall response to the incident; • Assessing the requirements and current priorities of the Government Departments in delivering the response to the emergency; • Considering the requirement for fundamental science or research to be undertaken in order to underpin the response and recovery to the incident in conjunction other government scientific advisory bodies; • Preparing and distributing an outline agenda for use across government based upon the following broad topics: o Summary of current situation; o On-going public health issues; o On-going environmental issues; o Initial considerations of recovery strategy and plan; o Future public health issues; o Future environmental objectives; o Environmental recovery issues; o Waste management issues; o Finance and Legal issues; o Strategy for lifting of imposed restrictions;

	○ Public and Media Communication issues; and ○ Any other issues arising from the emergency impacts.
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)	ONR is responsible for regulating nuclear and conventional safety for the GB nuclear facilities. In the event of an emergency ONR is responsible for monitoring the activities of the operators, Local Authority and responding agencies and keeping the central Government and devolved administrations fully informed on all matters related to the response. ONR provides authoritative, independent advice and guidance to the Government in the event of a nuclear emergency in the UK or overseas. Senior ONR representatives, usually the Chief Nuclear Inspector, attend the Government-level meetings and, for UK emergencies, ONR inspectors attend local response co-ordination centres. ONR's headquarters in Bootle, Merseyside, has an incident suite, from which the overall ONR response would be co-ordinated. Using its statutory powers, ONR will inspect and review the activities of the operator to ensure that they are taking all responsible steps both to restore the plant to a safe state and to minimize the risk to the public. • As the licensing authority for Civil Nuclear Installations, ONR will be informed of a 'site incident' or an 'off-site nuclear emergency' occurring at Dungeness B Power Station. On being notified of a site incident or off-site emergency, ONR will: ○ Activate the ONR Incident Suite at Redgrave Court, Bootle, Merseyside to provide an assessment facility and deployed ONR Inspectors, ○ Send inspectors to the affected site's (Dungeness's) emergency facilities, ○ Send inspectors to the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) to monitor the situation and the steps taken to restore control and provide advice through the Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC). ○ Send inspectors to the operators (EDF's) Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) at Barnwood, Gloucester, ○ Deploy the Chief Nuclear Inspector to the BEIS Emergency Operation Centre (EOC). The Chief Nuclear Inspector will act as an advisor to central Government in nuclear emergencies and will give advice based on ONR's assessments to Government departments, devolved administration, HSE, and the operators as appropriate, ○ Independently investigate the likely cause and circumstances of the incident, its consequences, monitoring events on the affected site and satisfying itself that the appropriate actions are being taken by the site licensee to restore the plant to a safe condition, ○ Consider implications for other nuclear installations, and ○ Investigate the circumstances of the event and whether a breach of health and safety legislation has occurred.
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ))	• Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) will act as the Lead Government Department (LGD) in a Civil Nuclear Emergency, its activities being focused on the Emergency Operations Centre which will be set up as soon as possible after an off-site nuclear emergency is declared. Key responsibilities are:

	○ Receive the alerting call from the Operator; ○ Co-ordinate the response of, and act as the main source of public information from Central Government; liaising with other Government Departments, Cabinet Office Briefing Room, Office for Nuclear Regulation, Strategic Co-ordinating Group etc. on measures being taken to protect the public and make the site safe; ○ Alert the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission and neighbouring countries; ○ Brief the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (who is responsible to Parliament) on the progress of the incident; ○ Appoint and deploy a Government Liaison Officer / Government Liaison Team to support the Office for Nuclear Regulation Emergency Response team, by providing the link between the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and the Emergency Operations Centre; ○ Collate real time information (primarily via the Office for Nuclear Regulation Emergency Response team and from the Central Emergency Support Centre) on the actual or potential emission of radioactive material and the effect of the incident both within and outside the site; ○ Provide statements to inform and reassure people in areas not affected.
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)	• Following activation of the Ministry for Housing, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) Resilience & Emergencies Division (RED) emergency response arrangements, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) will send an Assistant Government Liaison Officer to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre to support the Assistant Government Liaison Officer / Government Liaison Team appointed by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and will also liaise closely with representatives from other Government agencies. • Their main duties will be to: ○ Act as the Government Liaison Officer until relieved. ; ○ Liaise with and brief the Government Liaison Officer prior to their arrival, unless the Government Liaison Officer arrives first; ○ Support the Government Liaison Officer in the delivery of their duties; ○ Where necessary, assist in the co-ordination between Government, and local bodies by facilitating discussions and contact and by acting as a liaison point; ○ Compile situation reporting on local consequence management ensuring the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) are fully briefed; ○ Assist in recovery planning from the outset of preparations, which might be expected to start in the emergency phase. For this, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) will attend meetings of the Recovery Advisory Group on behalf of the Government Liaison Officer, or with other representatives of the Government Liaison Officer's team. • Where necessary, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) will activate an operations centre to: ○ Facilitate national coordination and assurance for situation reporting on

	national consequence management; o Facilitate mutual aid requests; o Address requests for national assets; o Liaise and share information with devolved administrations; o Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) staff in discharging their role and engage other necessary bodies; o Co-ordinate and support Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) attendance at Cabinet Office Briefing Room at ministerial and official levels; o Communicate Top Line Briefs (TLBs) to Local Resilience Forums; o Support the LGD with organising Ministerial or VIP visits in consultation with local partners whilst the Strategic Co-ordinating Group is still standing. • A Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened where the response to an emergency would benefit from some co-ordination or enhanced support at a cross-SCG level. In such circumstances, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) may, on its own initiative, or at the request of local responders, or of the Lead Government Department, in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a Response Co-ordinating Group to bring together appropriate representatives. • In the response phase, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will be supported by a minimum of two officials from Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) at the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. They will be scaled back if appropriate as and when the lead government department for recovery officials arrive. • Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) will undertake the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Government Liaison Office to Lead Government Department officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Coordinating Group(s).
Dept. for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra)	• Deploy liaison officer to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre and keep the Department of the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) Emergency Centre informed; • Responsible for all the necessary control and co-ordination activities concerning food, food supply, fishing and farming at and, if necessary, beyond the scene; • As required and in association with the Police, consider arrangements to feed or recover animals at the scene; • If necessary, take steps to control the movement and production of food; • To support the Food Standards Agency in food related issues.
Environment Agency (EA)	• Ensure health, safety and wellbeing of Environment Agency staff who may be involved; • Provide advice on the impact of the incident on: ▪ water in the environment; ▪ radioactive and conventional waste; ▪ the natural and built environment;

	• Provide advice to multi-agency partners on the protective and remedial measures which can be taken to reduce the impact on the environment • Provide Environment Agency representatives with specialist knowledge of radioactive substances at relevant multi-agency centres, such as the Strategic Coordination Centre, DEFRA Emergency Operations Centre, BEIS EOC. • Activate internal incident management structures to support the response • Advise DEFRA on technical and regulatory aspects of the response and recovery; • Provide information to the public and the media, in consultation with the Lead Government Department and the SCG associated with the affected site; • Manage flows of regulated waters if appropriate, to minimise impact ; • Check for breach of site operator's environmental permit, where relevant; • Pursue relevant regulatory investigations in accordance with the Environment Agency's statutory duties;
Food Standards Agency (FSA)	• To assess the risk of any contamination of food and determine whether statutory limits will be exceeded; • To take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain, implementing, as necessary, restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act (FEPA, 1985) • To provide advice and information to the public and public authorities, including advice on precautionary measures to be taken in the early stages of a response; • To provide advice to other organisations, including the Environment Agency, on issues relating to the safe disposal of contaminated food; • To ensure that subsequent recovery arrangements take account of food safety issues.
Met Office	• Upon notification of an incident, the Environment Monitoring & Response Centre (EMARC) Duty Forecaster will respond with a verbal brief emphasising current wind speed and direction. A more detailed forecast will be prepared on the 'Procedures And Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Material' (PACRAM) Forecast Information Form (FIF) and upon completion is sent to staff at the nuclear plant involved and to other relevant organisations. The Met Office has a multiple response target to return all 'Procedures And Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Material' (PACRAM) forecasts within 30 minutes and 70% within 20 minutes. Forecasts are updated as required. • Upon request, the Met Office will run NAME (Numerical Atmos UKHSA-dispersion Modelling Environment), its long-distance pollution transport model, and send outputs to the RREMS (Radiological Response and Emergency Management System) • A MET Office Civil Contingencies Advisor will attend the relevant Strategic Co-Ordination Centre in person or virtually.
Radiation Incident Monitoring	• Support the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Environment Agency by activating the Radiation Incident Monitoring Network Technical Co-ordination Centre, where Department of Business, Energy and

Network (RIMNET)	Industrial Strategy and Environment Agency staff would respond to ad hoc requests for advice, information and contributions to Ministerial briefing. • Monitor the network of 94 fixed monitoring sites across the UK, automatically measuring, analysing and informing on background radiation levels 24 / 7, providing information, advice and guidance to responders, as required.
Defra CBRN Emergencies (formerly GDS)	• Offer advice, guidance and facilitation on options for decontamination of the built and open environment, for infrastructure and for transport to a Responsible Authority from its HQ location; • Offer advice and guidance on issues relating to decontamination of the above to Strategic Co-ordination Centre from its HQ location; • Establish liaison with specialist suppliers to prepare for possible deployment for decontamination of the above; • To provide advice on the potential impact of decisions made during the incident response phase on short, medium and longer-term decontamination approaches; • Provide advice and guidance to a Responsible Authority at a Strategic Co-ordination Centre in the development of a decontamination strategy as part of an over-arching recovery strategy; • Work with specialist agencies (e.g. specialist police and military resources) on specific aspects of decontamination as they might impact positively or adversely on their operations; • Work with other Government agencies (e.g. the Environment Agency, UK Health Security Agency & Food Standards Agency) to develop joint strategies to deal with the consequences of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) or major HAZMAT event upon the environment; • Work with responders to identify, address and resolve operational issues arising from the possible deployment of specialist suppliers to undertake decontamination following a Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear or major HAZMAT event; • Provide guidance and advice to a Responsible Authority during delivery of a decontamination strategy; and • Participate in the development of decontamination priorities at Local, Sub-National and National levels.
Ministry of Defence (MoD)	• In addition to its responsibilities for defence, the Ministry of Defence has agreed to provide mapping and monitoring resources on a mutual aid basis in the event of a civil nuclear accident in the UK. • Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) needs to be applied for at the time of the incident and depending on operational conditions cannot be guaranteed. It would if operational condition were guaranteed they would provide unarmed military assistance to the civil authorities, when there is a needed to helping to deal with a natural disaster or major incident. In such a case, the military would be deployed in a supporting capacity as responsibility for dealing with the emergency would lie with the civil authorities.
National Air	• On receipt of information from the Aeronautical Information Section (Military)

Traffic Services (NATS)	(AIS(M)) that an Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA) has requested temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations: ○ Consider the impact of airspace restrictions on other airspace users. ○ Draft a Statutory Instrument for Emergency Restriction of Flying Regulations. ○ Draft a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning airspace users and controllers of the introduction of xxxx airspace. • When no longer required arrange revocation of the Restriction of Flying Regulations and Notice to Airmen.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)	• Advise on radiological aspects of environmental contamination; • Provide specialist advice and, if required, representation at LGD meetings; and • Advise DEFRA Divisions on technical and regulatory aspects.
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)	It is anticipated that SAGE will be activated in support of COBR for a radiological emergencies where 1) there has been an off-site release of radiological material, 2) an off-site release is considered possible, or 3) there is an incident that has serious implications for the site itself and those on it. During a radiological emergency SAGE is responsible for coordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to support Ministers in making evidence based decisions on key national policy questions During a radiological emergency it is anticipated SAGE will focus on three primary areas: • Peer reviewing and supporting the STAC; • Undertaking horizon scanning activity to understanding how the situation may evolve; and • Consideration of the on-site technical diagnosis / prognosis.

8.6. Other

Affinity Water	• Receive an alerting call and information from the Police; • Establish an appropriate emergency centre; • Implement measures necessary to maintain or protect the water supply; • Ensure adequate supplies of portable water in consultation with the Environment Agency; • Implement the planned measures to preserve water quality at the Denge Pumping Station; • Advise and inform the public on water quality and supply (if more than one water company area is involved, determine the 'lead company' to ensure consistency of information; and • Examine and take action as necessary to preserve water quality in the long term.
Voluntary Organisations	The Voluntary Sector does not have a formal role. However, KVSEG members can be called upon to assist in a range of support roles, including: • First aid • Logistics and transport – land, specialist and marine. • Radio and satellite communications. • Refreshment provision. o Faith support.

	• Trauma support. o Post-incident support. • Humanitarian resource provision, such as clothing and bedding. • Search and rescue – land and marine. • Aerial reconnaissance (aircraft and drone). • The voluntary sector response to an evacuation and shelter event is requested and coordinated through KCC / Medway Council. • Full details of the sector's capabilities are listed in the Kent Voluntary Sector Emergency Group (KVSEG) Capabilities Document. • The KCC / Medway Duty Emergency Planning Officer and / or the KCC CEC / Medway CEC (when set up) provides a 24/7 point of contact with all KVSEG members.

9. Outline Planning

This plan primarily details actions and arrangements within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone. Outline planning within the OPZ, at a lower level of detail, has been undertaken for events of lower probability but higher consequence,

It is possible to extend the off-site plan by using the general emergency plans of the relevant agencies and mutual aid agreements between local agencies and authorities, more detailed information of the outline planning zone can be found in the KCC Dungeness B outline plan which is an extension to the offsite plan.

REPPIR-19, regulation 9, requires that outline planning extends to 30 km from the site. The Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Consolidated Guidance recommends outline planning arrangements give consideration to sheltering and evacuation up to 4km from the release site. This does not significantly increase the size of the affected population in respect of an incident emanating from Dungeness. Appendix 2 of this plan details an approximation of the number of premises within 5km, and the number of residents within 20km of the site.

A mutual aid agreement is in place between all Local Authorities within Kent. The County Council will also provide support to or within any Districts requiring assistance in the response to any incident. The County Council will take the lead in an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency in respect of local government duties and provide whatever mutual aid resources are appropriate and practicable.

The arrangements for communication between all the organisations that could be called upon to become involved in an extended response will follow the same generic principles outlined within this plan. Arrangements for warning and informing the public beyond the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone will be based in the main on utilising national and local media and the national principles of *'Go In, Stay In, Tune In'*, to which the broadcast media have given their support. Any additional warning and informing requirements will be determined and responded to according to the circumstances of the incident, the information required to be passed and the timescales necessary. For example, information to evacuees at rest centres and elsewhere may require a combination of verbal, printed and broadcast material to meet the public need.

The coordination of the media response will continue to be based in the Media Briefing Centre at SSG. Subsequently Kent County Council, with support as necessary, will co-ordinate the longer-term media response which may require moving the function to a County or District Council premises.

In the event of an extended release scenario:

- The generic plans and arrangements outlined in the Kent Resilience Forum *Pan-Kent Strategic Emergency Response Framework* are scalable and would be implemented in support of this Plan;
- The Kent County Council *Major Emergency Plan* and *each District's Rest Centre Directory* details all of the most suitable premises throughout Kent to temporarily accommodate displaced persons;
- District Council and County Council plans document how emergency care, feeding and housing may be undertaken;
- County and District Plans address logistical issues such as provision of evacuee transport, emergency bedding, finance arrangements etc.;
- Mutual aid agreements with neighbouring local authorities provide scope beyond County boundaries;
- The integration of these functional and geographic plans, coupled with mutual aid from neighbouring authorities, enables the overall response to build according to the perceived need.

10. Recovery

Detailed guidance on recovery can be found in:

- UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents;
- National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance – Part 3 Recovery
- KRF Pan-Kent Strategic Emergency Recovery Framework.
- Duty and Recovery Director Handbook

10.1. Response Phase – Recovery Advisory Group (RAG)

The declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency anticipates off-site contamination. The assumption is that, in the early stages the Strategic Coordinating Group will initiate a Recovery Advisory Group (RAG) to be led by the KCC Recovery Director in close liaison with Folkestone and Hythe District Council.

The Recovery Advisory Group will operate initially from the Strategic Co-ordination Centre or nearby facilities within the complex. In due course, given the long duration of the recovery process, the Recovery Advisory Group will transfer to County Council and / or District Council premises.

The Recovery Advisory Group will consider recovery issues on behalf of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, and will, at this stage, only become directly involved in the wider strategic responsibilities such as media handling and public health if there is an operational need.

Membership will vary according to the tasks being performed, but may include;

Kent County Council (Chair)	Office for Nuclear Regulation
Kent Police	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)–

	Government Liaison Officer / Government Liaison Team
NHS Kent and Medway ICB.	DCLG – Government Liaison Officer
UK Health Security Agency– Kent HPU & Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards	Environment Agency
Folkestone and Hythe District Council	Food Standards Agency
East Sussex County Council	Defra
Rother District Council	Natural England
EDF Energy (Operator Dungeness B)	Ministry of Defence

It is possible that members of the Recovery Advisory Group will also be members of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and / or the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell. Additional members may be co-opted as necessary, e.g. transport operators and specialist organisations such as Natural England, who may have specific interests or resources.

The Recovery Advisory Group will report to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group with options for recovery and proposals for action. It will be expected to work on its own initiative as well as considering specific matters delegated by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. These proposals, the advice upon which proposals were formulated and reasons why any advice was rejected will be documented by the Recovery Advisory Group.

The Recovery Advisory Group may decide that small sub-groups should be formed to deal with individual issues or take actions forward.

The Terms of Reference will be determined by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, and will include:

- Characterisation of the extent and nature of the contamination;
- Identification of options and strategies for clean-up and disposal of contaminated materials;
- Identification of priorities, timescales and costs for the options considered;
- Proposing recovery options (with justifications and recommendations) to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group;
- Planning implementation of recovery processes;
- Advising on and monitoring recovery activity ensuring that targets and objectives are achieved;
- Maintaining an awareness of alternative and additional recovery strategies available;
- Maintaining records relating to recovery actions;
- Providing briefings and information as necessary.

10.2. Transition to Recovery

The graphic below, taken from NNEPRG Annex T shows how the emergency actions will tail off after some hours or days while recovery actions may continue for significantly longer.



Recovery activities may be assessing the deposition of radioactive material in the environment, estimating its consequences and considering decontamination activities while talking to the local community and trying to get their lives back to normal.

The resources and expertise required at this stage are very different to that of the acute phase, the stakeholders are different and there is more time for dialogue. Thus different management structures with different aims and objectives are required.

Transition of the management structure starts to take place when the emergency situation at the site is contained.

Prior to transition:

- some aspects of nuclear facility operation may still be out of control;
- Radiation exposures are managed according to the ICRP framework for emergency exposure situations. Experts will be considering recovery actions which will shift dose management towards the application of the ICRP framework for existing exposure situations;
- Initial focus on air sampling will have stopped when plume passed. People monitoring (at Radiation Monitoring Units) will be winding down. Environmental radiological sampling and monitoring will be underway to understand the levels and extent of contamination and impact on food and water;
- Up to this point emergency countermeasures will have been in place. At this stage, thought will be given to reassessing doses and efficacy of measures to protect the public;
- There will be minimal involvement of elected local authority members and community leaders at SCG level. This will change during transition;
- Emergency and off-site plans will have been implemented during the response phase. The implementation of the recovery strategy and plans will mark the start of transition.

After transition:

- Nuclear facility under control – no further release envisaged;
- Radiation exposure to the public managed by ‘existing exposure framework’;
- Elected local authority members and community leaders are involved in strategic level discussion;
- Radiological monitoring will be driven by the need to prioritise clean-up operations and provide reassurance concerning food, water and environment;
- Focus on clean up, restricting access and relocation to manage exposures;
- Site emergency Plan and Offsite plans no longer applicable. Recovery strategy and recovery plan for the event have been implemented.

The Chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, in consultation with its members, will identify when the primary responsibilities of the Emergency Services in terms of protecting life and property have been achieved. The Kent County Council representative will then be asked formally to take over responsibility for leading the recovery phase and a signed document to that effect will be recorded (Section 10.2.1).

There will inevitably be involvement by all agencies as the recovery phase takes precedence, but it is expected that the Emergency Services will gradually play a lesser role albeit they may still be involved to some degree in recovery planning and implementation.

The transition to “existing exposure situation” has occurred when the actions of the health physics community of responders are no longer urgent actions to advise and implement protective actions to reduce radiation doses due to the presence of a temporary cloud of radioactivity but are more measured steps advised to reduce doses over longer periods resulting from deposited activity. These decisions may evolve over several days or even weeks rather than the tens of minutes tempo of the acute phase. Accordingly, the SCG may meet periodically rather than be permanently set up.

The assessment of the distribution of radioactivity and the potential dose consequences requires time, expertise and resources. It will be led by UKHSA-RCEHD.

A default reference level for public dose in the year following the event of 100 mSv will be employed. Decontamination and restrictions on the usage of land and produce would be prioritised in areas where the projected doses were higher than this reference level.

The reference level will be reviewed in the light of initial surveys and dose estimates and could be changed by the local authority or the Secretary of State following discussions with the appropriate stakeholders (the local authority and the community advised by UKHSA-RCEHD).

10.2.1. Draft Handover Certificate – Response to Recovery

Brief Outline of Incident

The signing of this Handover Certificate by both the lead Local Authority officer and the Chairperson of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, acknowledges an agreement that the emergency emanating from Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station described above has moved to the recovery phase, the Recovery Co-ordinating Group for which will now become the responsibility of Kent County Council.

It is agreed that at this time:

- There is no known further risk to life in relation to this emergency;
- The circumstances dictate it more appropriate for Command, Control & Co-ordination to rest with Kent County Council in that the phase is clearly now one of recovery;
- There are no serious public order or crime prevention issues existing or anticipated which impact on the overall strategic co-ordination of the recovery phase;
- Emergency Services are operating at a level which does not necessitate a Strategic Co-ordinating Group to co-ordinate and facilitate their activities;
- There are no known circumstances which may require the reinstatement of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group in relation to the response phase of this emergency;
- Kent County Council is satisfied that it has in place the infrastructure to take over co-ordination from Kent Police; and
- The Office for Nuclear Regulation agrees that the emergency response phase On- and Off-Site has concluded.

Signed: …… **(Kent County Council)**

Name: ……..

Designation: ……..

Signed:……**Rank:** ……

Name: ……..... (**Strategic Co-ordinating Group Chair)**

Date:…….. **Time:** ……..

10.3. Recovery Phase – Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG)

This plan briefly outlines the recovery process and responsibilities; the detailed process of managing recovery is contained within the Kent and Medway Resilience Forum *Pan-Kent Strategic Emergency Recovery Framework* agreed across the broad range of responders within the County.

The point at which the recovery phase supersedes the response phase can only be determined by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group according to the circumstances of the incident. However, the preparation undertaken by the Recovery Advisory Group will assist in ensuring that relevant issues, options and decisions have been fully explored in anticipation of this handover.

Step 1 →	Determine radionuclides involved; scope extent and scale of contamination
Step 2 →	Determine extent of existing protective actions, e.g. food precautionary advice, Food & Environment Protection Act (1985) Order, sheltering etc.
Step 3 →	Prioritise contaminated area into broad bands based on urgency of need for decisions for each band
Step 4 →	Determine land uses (see following page for suggested classification of land uses and topic areas)
Step 5 →	Divide contaminated area into broadly similar regions and into topic areas based on information obtained
Step 6 →	Prioritise regions and / or topic areas. Develop and implement monitoring strategy
Step 7 →	Consider options for each region and / or topic area (using *UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents* to assist)
Step 8 →	Assess options for each region and / or topic area (using *UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents* to assist)
Step 9 →	Choose options for each region and / or topic area
Step 10 →	Implement options. Monitor and review effectiveness and impact of chosen options

Figure 7 Framework for Developing a Nuclear Emergency Recovery Strategy

Subject	Issues involved

Subject	Issues involved
Finance	• Operator has statutory responsibility under the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) to have available £140 million to respond to and clear up such incidents
Resources	• Equipment, personnel and specialist resources required • PPE for recovery personnel • From where they may be obtained (Nuclear industry, specialist contractors, commercial sources, military).
Evacuees	• Long-term accommodation planning • Wider use of rest centres – outline planning scenarios • Mutual aid – premises, support staff, equipment • Timescales for displacement and return • Planning re-occupation – numbers, transport • Ongoing information to evacuees re progress • Safety advice – issues to be aware of on return • Practical support, reassurance and authoritative information
Support for the affected population and consultation	• The need for Humanitarian Assistance Centres to support the affected population • Who leads consultation process • Where consultation will be conducted • Representative groups, individuals, commercial concerns to be consulted. • Issues for consultation • Timetable and programme for consultation sessions
Monitoring of People (incl. Recovery Personnel)	• Monitoring of public –UK Health Security Agency • Monitoring equipment • Supplier(s) • Operators • Locations
Monitoring Food, Livestock Land & Buildings	• Responsibility for, provision and co-ordination of continued monitoring of ground / air contamination • Personnel required and source – other nuclear power station teams & Ministry of Defence • Agricultural products – by Food Standards Agency • Consumer goods – by Trading Standards • Edible products – by District Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) • Reassurance monitoring for those who may not be contaminated but demand examination

Subject	Issues involved
Recording of Monitoring	• Within & outside area covered by the *On-Site* & *Off-Site Emergency Plans* • Buildings, plant, vehicles, non-consumer products • Members of the public • Recovery Workers • Proposals to demonstrate that required decontamination level has been achieved.
Decontamination	• Private – houses, farms, businesses etc. • Public premises – schools, libraries, etc. • Entry to private premises during absence of occupants • Subsequent security of premises entered • Public highways, parks, public open areas, private open areas • Animals and farm livestock • Vehicles, boats, farm equipment etc. left in the area • Vehicles used in evacuation • Emergency Services Vehicles • Public / response & recovery personnel – person, clothing, vehicles, equipment • Evacuees & vehicles arriving at rest centres and elsewhere – potentially other parts of the country
Disposal of Radioactive Waste	• Advice from Environment Agency and Office for Nuclear Regulation • Place(s) of disposal – local or distant • Transport to point of disposal, • Transport method(s) – vehicles, containers • Security of loads • Planned routes • Staff required & personal protection • Decontamination of vehicles • Public concern • Legal requirements in disposal. • Disposal of foodstuffs – advice from Food Standards Agency.
Local, National & International Guidance & Advice	• The national agencies representing (e.g. UK Health Security Agency Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards & Office for Nuclear Regulation) will have knowledge of or access to the latest technical advice and good practice both nationally and internationally. • All agencies on the Recovery Advisory Group **must** give clear and unambiguous advice and information • Reasons behind guidance given must also be provided and documented

Figure 8 Key Recovery Considerations

APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY

Term	Definition
Access Control Point (ACP)	Entry and egress point to provide safe, controlled and rapid access to the affected area in a nuclear emergency.
Ambulance Control	The permanent office which receives all demands for South East Coast Ambulance Service and co-ordinates their response.
Ambulance Incident Commander (AIC)	Officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of that service at the scene of an emergency.
Ambulance Liaison Officer (ALO)	The ambulance officer responsible for providing radio communication and for the supervision of Ambulance Service activity and liaison at a hospital receiving casualties from a major accident.
Ambulance Loading Point (ALP)	Area in close proximity to the Casualty Clearing Station, where ambulances can be manoeuvred, and patients placed in ambulances for transfer to hospital
Agriculture & Food Protective actions Working Group (AFCWG)	A group, established in 1997, to involve stakeholders in the development of strategies for managing agricultural land and products following a nuclear accident.
AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment (Ministry of Defence)
DSIT	Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT)
Bronze (Operational)	The tier of command and control within a single agency (below Gold (Strategic Co-ordinating Group) level and Silver (Tactical Co-ordinating Group) level) at which the management of 'hands on' work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas. The Bronze level is also known as the Operational level.
Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)	UK Government's dedicated crisis management facilities, which are activated in the event of an emergency requiring support and co-ordination at the national strategic level
(Police) Casualty Bureau (CasB)	Initial point of contact and information, maintained by the police, for all data relating to casualties.
Casualty Clearing Station (CasCS)	Entity set up at the scene of an emergency by the ambulance service in liaison with the Strategic Medical Advisor to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation
Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC)	Part of Nuclear Energy Headquarters at Barnwood, established at the declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) to assess technical data that has a bearing on the radiological hazard to the public and to pass expert advice based on that technical assessment to the Strategic Co-ordination Centre.
Centre for Radiation, Chemical & Environmental Hazards (RCEHD)	A specialist centre of UK Health Security Agency and , which deals with radiation and chemical hazards and threats.
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act (2004)
Company Technical Advisor (CTA)	Site Operator's technical advisor appointed to advise the Strategic Co-ordinating Group in the event of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency.

Term	Definition
County Emergency Centre (CEC)	The designated place from which the overall activities of the County Council are directed and co-ordinated and will be the focal point for the recovery phase.
Defra	Department for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
DEPO	Duty Emergency Planning Officer (KCC)
Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ)	Area surrounding a nuclear licensed site for which detailed plans for emergencies have been prepared. The area covered by the DEPZ is agreed with the nuclear regulatory and is based on the reference accident for that site.
DHSC	Department of Health and Social Care
Director of Public Health (DPH)	A senior Public Health official who provides strategic leadership for health protection, improvement and joint working with social services
DSTL	Defence Science & Technology Laboratory
District Emergency Centre (DEC)	The designated place from which the overall activities of the District Council are directed and co-ordinated.
Emergency Centre	A place designated or assigned at the time from which the activities of one or more organisations can be directed and / or co-ordinated in the event of an emergency.
(Site) Emergency Control Centre (ECC)	The emergency centre at Dungeness B Power Station controls and co-ordinates emergency action On-Site and initiates emergency action Off-Site.
(Site) Emergency Controller	The senior member of staff located in the site Emergency Control Centre with overall responsibility for directing the activities of the Operator's employees and implementing the *On-Site Emergency Plan.*
Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC)	Multi-agency forum chaired jointly by the Site Operators for Dungeness A and B, to consult on, discuss and develop emergency planning issues.
Emergency Services	The Ambulance, Fire, Police and Coastguard Services.
Emergency Mortuary (Emort)	Temporary structure or converted existing structure designated for use for the time being as a mortuary.
Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs)	Quantitative criteria used to plan for the introduction of urgent protective actions in the event of a nuclear emergency.
EA	Environment Agency
EMARC	Environment Monitoring & Response Centre (Met Office)
(Major) Emergency / Incident	An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.
ESCC	East Sussex County Council
ESFRS	East Sussex Fire & Rescue Service
Evacuation Assembly Point (EvAP)	Building or area on the periUKHSAry of an area affected by an emergency, to which evacuees are directed to await transfer to a survivor reception centre or rest centre
Extendibility	The principal of having in place outline arrangements to respond to an emergency extending beyond that which is reasonably foreseeable.
Fire Control	Central Kent Fire & Rescue Service communications centre with links to all other Emergency Services.
FEPA	Food & Environment Protection Act (1985)
FSA	Food Standards Agency

Term	Definition
FDC	Folkestone and Hythe District Council
Force Control Room (FCR) – Kent Police	Kent Police communications centre, with links to all other Emergency Services, and through which initial response to any incident is co-ordinated.
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Forward Briefing Point (FBP)	Site with good views over the area affected by an incident, at which media briefings are conducted
Forward Control Point / Forward Command Post (FCP)	Any service's command & control facility nearest the scene of the incident, responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security. This might be an Operational / Bronze or Tactical / Silver facility depending on the circumstances of the incident. In the context of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency, Forward Control Points would be established at or near to the site (e.g. the Site Emergency Control Centre or nearby locations) reporting into the Tactical Co-ordination Centre / Incident Control Point, established away from the site.
Gold	The strategic level of command and control (above Silver level and Bronze level) at which policy, strategy and the overall response framework are established and managed for individual responder agencies. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group (the multi-agency strategic co-ordinating body) may colloquially be referred to as the 'Gold Group', but not simply as 'Gold'.
(Police) Gold Commander	Senior officer in overall strategic charge of the incident, both in terms of their own single-agency response and / or the multi-agency response, as Chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. In the response to a nuclear emergency, the Chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group will be a senior officer from Kent Police e.g. the Police Gold Commander.
ONR SCC Emergency Response	A senior Office for Nuclear Regulation official attends the Strategic Co-ordination Centre to provide independent and authoritative advice to the Police and other authorities handling the Off-Site response to a nuclear emergency.
HART	Hazardous Area Response Team (Ambulance Service)
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HSE	Health & Safety Executive
HPU	Health Protection Unit
Holding Area	An organised area adjacent to the site from which resources can be drawn when required.
Holding & Audit Area for Deceased People & Human Remains (HAADR)	Area close to the scene where the deceased can be temporarily held until transfer to the emergency mortuary or mortuary
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
Incident Control Point / Incident Command Post (ICP)	Silver level command & control facility, away from the incident scene, responsible for tactical co-ordination of the On-Site and Off-Site emergency response – see Tactical Co-ordination Centre.
INES	International Nuclear & Radiological Event Scale
IRR	Ionising Radiation Regulations (1999)
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer (Ministry of Defence)
KCC	Kent County Council

Term	Definition
KFRS	Kent Fire & Rescue Service
KIO_3 Tablets	Stable Iodine tablets
LGD	Lead Government Department
Listed Hospitals	Hospitals listed by the NHS as adequately equipped to receive casualties on a 24hr basis.
MCA	Maritime & Coastguard Agency
Media Briefing Centre (MBC)	Central location for media enquiries, staffed by spokespeople from the major responders, providing communication links and briefing facilities
Media Cell (MC)	Multi-agency group of media & communications professionals established in the event of an emergency to support the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (and other key groups / organisation involved in the response) by developing and implementing a co-ordinated and joined-up media & communications strategy for the incident.
Media Liaison Officer (MLO)	Representatives who have responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his / her organisation at the scene of incident or other key location e.g. Rest Centre, Hospitals.
Media Liaison Point (MLP)	Area adjacent to the scene, staffed by Media Liaison Officers, for the reception and accreditation of media personnel and for briefing on reporting, filming and photographing.
Media Technical Briefer (MTB)	Provided by the nuclear site operator to provide input to press conferences and media briefings ahead of the Office for Nuclear Regulation Strategic Co-ordination Centre emergency response arrival.
Strategic Medical Advisor (SMA)	Lead medical officer responsible for clinical management at the scene of an emergency
MACA / MACC	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities / Community
MOD	Ministry of Defence
Mobile Medical Team (MMT)	The team sent to the scene of a major accident usually at the request of the Ambulance Service or Medical Incident Officer.
Radiation Monitoring Unit	Location at which the NHS / UK Health Security Agency will monitor people for radioactive contamination and carry out decontamination.
Mortuary	A building used for post mortem procedures.
NHS	National Health Service
NAME	Nuclear AtmosUKHSAric Modelling Environment (Met Office)
NDA	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room (NEBR)	A Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy facility to brief the government following declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)
Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG)	A Forum which brings together, under Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy chairmanship, a wide range of organisation with interest in Off-Site planning for an emergency at civil and defence nuclear sites.
Off-Site Emergency Plan	This Plan. Multi-agency plan which sets out the arrangements to mitigate the Off-Site impacts of a nuclear emergency, linking in with the response On-Site – see On-Site Emergency Plan
Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)	A hazardous condition the effect of which is to cause, or likely to cause, a radiological hazard to the public outside the boundary of the nuclear licensed site.

Term	Definition
OGDs	Other Government Departments
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
On-Site Emergency Plan	Site Operators' plans detailing the arrangements to manage the response to incidents On-Site and to mitigate the consequences Off-Site – see Off-Site Emergency Plan
Operational Co-ordinating Group (OCG)	A multi-agency group of operational (Bronze) commanders that meets to determine, co-ordinate and deliver the operational response to an emergency.
PACRAM	Procedures & Communications in the event of Release of Nuclear Materials (Met Office)
PGD	Patient Group Directions
Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU)	In the event of a radiation emergency, there may be a requirement to establish a Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU). The purpose of an RMU is to provide information on levels of radioactive contamination on or in people, by facilitating individual monitoring (also known as personal monitoring or people monitoring). This information will be used to inform decisions on some of the measures that could significantly reduce dose to individuals, and to advise and inform affected members of the public
REPPIR	Radiation Emergency Preparedness & Public Information Regulations (2019)
Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)	The national radiation monitoring and nuclear emergency response system.
(Designated) Receiving Hospital (DRH)	One of the designated receiving hospitals identified by the strategic health authority and selected by the ambulance service to receive casualties during an emergency
Recovery Advisory Group (RAG)	Provides advice on recovery considerations arising from a nuclear emergency to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group during the response/acute phase.
Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG)	Strategic decision-making body for the recovery phase once handover has taken place from the Police. In the event of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency, the Recovery Co-ordinating Group will be Chaired by the Local Authority e.g. County or District Council.
Reference Accident (RA)	Worst possible accident considered reasonably foreseeable for a nuclear licensed site. The type of accidents considered reasonably foreseeable will depend on the specific hazards to be found on each site which will vary according to the stage in its lifecycle.
Rendezvous Point (RVP)	Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment
Rest Centre	Building, including overnight facilities, designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees
Scene	Point or area of the immediate impact of an incident or emergency
Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE)	Group of scientific and technical experts that is established to provide a common source of advice to inform decisions made during the central government response to an emergency.

Term	Definition
Scientific & Technical Advisory Cell (STAC)	Group of technical experts from those agencies involved in an emergency response that may provide scientific and technical advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group chair or single service Strategic (Gold) Commander
SECAMB	South-East Coast Ambulance Service
Silver	The tactical tier of command &d control within a single agency (below Strategic (Gold) level and above Operational (Bronze) level) at which the response to an emergency is managed. Multi-agency co-ordination at the tactical level is undertaken by the Tactical Co-ordinating Group.
Site	The specific location of an event, in this case the affected power station.
Site Stakeholder Group (SSG)	Consultative group of local stakeholders of community representatives, elected council members, local industry, and residents. Invitations are also extended to local groups having a particular interest in the environment and nuclear power generation.
SofS	Secretary of State
Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC)	The location at which the Strategic Co-ordinating Group meets and co-ordinates its activities. Sometimes referred to as Gold Control
Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)	If the scale and nature of an incident is such that it requires strategic guidance, then a Strategic Co-ordinating Group will be set up to provide this. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group is made up of senior representatives with executive authority of each key organisation involved in the local response. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will take strategic decisions on managing the emergency locally.
Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC)	Term used in nuclear emergencies, synonymous with Media Cell (MC), which is the preferred term adopted in Kent.
Supporting Hospital	A hospital nominated to support a Receiving Hospital in dealing with casualties from a major accident.
Tactical Co-ordination Centre (TCC)	The location at which the Tactical Co-ordinating Group meets and co-ordinates its activities. Sometimes referred to as 'Silver Control' or the Incident Control Point / Incident Command Point (ICP)
Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)	A multi-agency group of tactical (Silver) commanders that meets to determine, coordinate and deliver the tactical response to an emergency.
Traffic Cordon	Supplementary cordon around the Outer Cordon to control internal traffic access for emergency and other vehicles
Traffic Control Point (TCP)	Point from which Police would control access through a Traffic Cordon

APPENDIX 2. MAPS, PLANS & POPULATION DATA

A2.1 Detailed Emergency Planning Zone



A2.2 Outline Planning Zone



A2.3 DEPZ Sector Map



A2.4 Folkestone and Hythe District Council Electoral Wards (0-20km)



A2.5 Premises within 0-3km of the Site (the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone)

Sector No	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
0-1 km	0	10 Dw 1Bus	2	16 Dw Rly Stn PH O/LH 1bUS	9 Dw ExpStn	5 Dw	0	SwH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-2 km	13 Dw 1PS	39 Dw PH RNLI ESS	11	27 Dw LH 1Bus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	MOD	MOD 0	0	0	1Bus
2-3 km	63 Dw 1Bus	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	MOD	RSPB	RSPB	0
Totals	76 Dw	75 Dw 1 PH 1 RNLI 1 ESS	13 Dw	43 Dw 1 Rly Stn 1 LH 1 O/LH 1 PH	9 Dw 1ExpStn	5 Dw	Nil	SwH	Nil	Nil	Nil	MOD	MOD	RSPB	RSPB	Nil

Key:

Dw = Dwellings
Bus = Business premises
PH = Public House
RNLI = Lifeboat Station
ESS = Electricity Sub Stn
Rly Stn = Railway Stn
LH = Lighthouse
O/LH = Old/Lighthouse
Exp Stn = Experimental Stn
MOD = Buildings & Land
RSPB = Bird Sanctuary

A2.6 Premises within 3-5km of the Site

Sector No	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
3-4 km	334 Dw 1 ESS 1Bus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	MOD	8 Dw 1 Bus RSPB	2 Dw RSPB 1 P Stn	17dw 1ESS
4-5 km	219 Dw HV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	MOD	12Dwl 10 Bus 2 W Sp 1PH CV	1Dw 1Bus LA	132Dw 1ESS 1HV
Totals	559 Dw 1 HV	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	MOD	20 Dw 1 Fm 11Bus PH 2 W Sp 1 CV	3 Dw 1 P Stn 1Bus LA	149 1ES 1HV

Key:

Dw = Dwellings **Bus =** Business premises **W Sp =** Water Sports Centre **CV =** Caravan Site **LA =** Lydd Airport

STW = Sewage Treatment Works **PH =** Public House **RSPB =** Bird Sanctuary **Fm** = Farm

HV = Romney Sands Holiday Village – (Static caravans, chalets, & apartments with 480 units open 21 March To 31 October, 168 of which are residential)

A2.7 Other Significant Locations within 7km of the Site

Just outside Sectors 14 & 12 15 (North West), on the main access route to the power station, is the small town of Lydd comprising a population of just under 6,000 (based on the 2011 Census) with a variety of residential properties, small shops, public houses, community centre, police office, etc. An Evacuation Assembly Point is located at the Lydd Community Centre. On the south western side of Lydd is Lydd Ranges Army Camp and firing ranges, the resident population of which varies according to the military presence at any given time.

A2.8 Premises with 5 - 20 km of the site

Sector No	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
5-10 km	729 Dw 19Bus 1ESS 1PS 2PH 1Ryl Sta												1WF MOD OSND	764Dw 22Bus 3PH 1Sch 2Nur 2ESS 1PS MOD	936Dw 107Bus 2CV	2972Dw 280Bus 3Nur 3Sch 3PH 7PS 8ESS 1DCC 2CV
10-20km	5038Dw 234Bus 6ESS 3PS 2Rly ST 6CV 3Sch 2Nur 2STW 10PH												OSND	194Dw 20Bus 2PH 2ESS 1WF 1Sch OSND	222Dw 1ESS 24Bus 1PH OSND	343Dw 72Bus 2PH 1Sch OSND
Totals	5772Dw	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1WF MOD OSND	958Dw 42Bus 5PH 4ESS 1WF 2Sch MOD OSND	1279Dw 179Bus 2CV 2PH 1Sch OSND	

Key: **Dw =** Dwellings **MOD =** Ministry of defence land **Bus =** Business premises **Sch =** School **CV =** Caravan Site
LA = Lydd Airport **W Sp =** Water Sports Centre **Nur =** Nursery School **WF =** Wind Farm **ESS =** Electricity Sub Stn
OSND = all or part out of Shepway limited data available **DCC =** Day Care Centre **HV =** Holiday Village **STW =** Sewage Treatment Works

A2.9 Total Population

Source: Kent County Council, area profiles, ward profiles

Ward Name	All Ages	0 - 4	5 - 9	10 - 14	15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 34	35 - 39	40 - 44	45 - 49	50 - 54	55 - 59	60 - 64	65 - 69	70 - 74	75 - 79	80 - 84	85 - 89	90+
Broadmead	3,890	180	170	180	220	200	190	170	180	210	290	290	270	290	310	260	190	130	100	70
Cheriton	12520	790	860	820	920	680	750	760	750	810	950	940	750	610	730	490	370	270	170	100
East Folkestone	11900	840	930	790	790	730	830	780	700	760	870	840	730	570	630	410	310	190	140	60
Folkestone Central	11,810	600	550	380	500	820	1140	870	830	770	850	770	680	610	660	490	390	380	290	240
Folkestone Harbour	7,020	480	500	450	410	430	470	510	470	450	540	480	410	380	380	230	180	440	70	50
Hythe	11,270	410	500	430	470	390	390	400	510	650	690	820	850	810	1070	850	670	530	440	390
Hythe Rural	5880	220	300	290	330	210	220	200	260	280	470	480	430	380	560	460	320	230	120	70
New Romney	7380	340	300	360	370	310	310	260	260	340	500	530	570	550	700	560	420	310	170	150
North Downs East	11,850	790	800	770	730	590	660	630	720	780	970	890	730	650	800	590	370	290	150	60
North Downs West	6,370	250	360	310	300	220	230	250	300	370	420	530	520	480	560	480	340	190	140	80
Romney Marsh	7,260	250	250	260	320	280	240	240	290	300	420	560	600	640	800	690	500	290	220	110
Sandgate & West Folkestone	5,730	320	290	230	270	360	300	280	340	350	420	400	380	410	480	350	230	160	120	80
Walland & Dengemarsh	8,320	420	510	460	430	370	470	390	380	470	550	650	640	570	660	540	370	250	140	60
Totals	=111,200	5,890	6,320	5,730	6,060	5,590	6,200	5,740	5,990	6,540	7,940	8,180	7,560	6,950	8,340	6,400	4,660	3,660	2,270	1,520

N.B. all figures have been rounded to the nearest 10.

A2.10 Communal Establishments within 20km of the Site e.g. Residential / Care / Nursing Homes, Sheltered Housing etc.

Source: 2011 Census - Produced by Kent County Council Research

Ward Name	All Ages
Eastern Rother (part)	1 x Care Home with 8 clients
Rother Levels (part)	3 x Care Homes with 24,15 and 55 clients respectively = total of 94
Rye	2 x Care Homes with 10 and 6 clients respectively = total of 16
Marsham	2x Care Homes with 6 and 10 clients respectively= 16 total
Isle of Oxney (part)	TBA
Saxon Shore (part)	TBA
Weald South (part)	TBA
Broadmead	131
Cheriton	0
East Folkestone	11
Folkestone Central	422
Folkestone Harbour	45
Hythe	338
Hythe Rural	28
New Romney	215
Romney Marsh	115
North Downs East	41
North Downs West	51

Sandgate & West Folkestone	341
Walland & Dengemarsh	80
Totals	

A2.11 Postcodes within the 3km Detailed Emergency Planning Zone

Post Code	Distance from Power Station (km)
TN29 9NN	2.679
TN29 9NP	2.53
TN29 9NL	2.27
TN29 9NG	1.998
TN29 9NH	1.94
TN29 9NF	1.80
TN29 9NE	1.55
TN29 9NA	0.50
TN29 9ND	1.062
TN29 9PP	0.172
TN29 9PX	Power Station
TN29 9NB	0.774

A3.1 Site Emergency Control Centre (ECC)



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A3.3 Rendezvous Points (RVPs), Traffic Control Points (TCPs), Forward Command / Control Posts (FCPs) & Evacuation Assembly Points (EvAPs)

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A3.4 Rest Centres




The Marsh Academy,
Station Rd,
New Romney,
Kent.
TN28 8BB
Academy
Sports Centre
Station Road
B2071
Dymchurch Road
A259
High Street
Health Centre
Industrial Estate
St Martin's Field
Brickyard Poultry Farm
Day Centre
Depot
Lawrence Field Farm
100 m
500 ft
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Mapping to be used solely for preparing for and responding to emergencies.
Ordnance Survey
ResilienceDirect

A3.5 Brockhill Performing Arts Layout Map

1	Manor House, Reception and Conference Facilities	10	The Frank Lloyd Wright Centre, Art, Design Technology & Music 51 - 63
2	Farm, Rural Studies 121	11	The Peter Catmull Theatre
3	Geography 123	12	Sports Hall
4	The Judith Centre J1 - J4	13	Terrace Restaurant
5	The Penrose Centre, Science 1 - 5	14	De Coubertin Centre, PE
6	The Penrose Centre, Science 6 - 9	15	Sinclair Building, ICT 71 - 75
7	The Rowntree Centre, English and Media Studies 11-23	16	The Comenius Centre, Foreign Languages & Mathematics 81 - 87
8	The Saga Centre, Vocational Studies and Citizenship 31-45	17	The Phoenix Centre, Performing Arts 90 - 95
9	Student Office	18	The Wells Centre, Mathematics, Humanities 101 - 114

A3.6 RSPB - Boulderwall Farm

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A3.7 Tactical Co-ordination Centre (TCC) / Incident Control Point (ICP)

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A3.8 Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) & Media Briefing Centre (MBC)

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A3.9 Pre-Identified Locations

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A3.10 Off-Site Radiation Monitors

A3.11 Contacts Directory

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APPENDIX 4. RECOVERY CO-ORDINATING GROUP MODEL AGENDA

Model Agenda for Recovery Co-ordinating Group briefing

The following is a list of points that could be put on the initial agenda for any Recovery Co-ordinating Group briefing:

- Introductions
- Terms of reference for the group (further detail located in the Pan Kent Emergency Recovery Framework)
- Membership
- Responsibilities and authority
- Other agencies that may be required
- Briefing / Progress report, including the latest impact assessment and the Strategic Co-ordinating Group strategy (brief overview, keep concise)
- Agree recovery strategy (including detailed objectives and targets as necessary)
- Immediate actions and/or urgent issues relating to the emergency
- Recovery action plan formulation and delegation of tasks (including deciding what Sub-Groups are required)
- Priorities for action
- Media issues
- Any other business
- Schedule of meetings

Notes or minutes of the meeting should be taken as well as the maintenance of a key decision / action log. Local Authority support staff may be brought in for this function