Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

Official
Version 3.1
February 2024

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Next scheduled review: February 2025

KCC Resilience and Emergency Planning Service are accredited under ISO14001 (Environmental Management)

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Issue and Review Register

Summary of changes	Version number & date	Approved by
Version 2: Complete re-draft Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergencies Manager New Appendix N Mark Norfolk: Operations Manager – Trading Standards	N/A May 2016	 Mike Overbeke: Group Head Public Protection
'Draft' watermark removed from risk assessment	N/A September 2016	Tony Harwood Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
2017 Update	N/A May 2017	Tony Harwood Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
2019 Update	1.0 June 2019	Tony Harwood Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
Conversion to Multi-agency Plan	1.0 January 2020	Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
Winter 2021/22 update	2.0 January 2022	Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
Autumn 2022 / winter 2023 update – incorporating updates from the generic Animal Health plan guidance produced by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel & ACTSO – including a new Avian Influenza Annex page & AIPZ Field Officer guidance.	3.0 January 2023	Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager

Compiled by: Date: January 2024
Name: Matt Sandwell & Laura Newman
Role: Resilience Officer
Organisation: KCC Resilience and Emergency Planning Service

Approved by: Date: January 2024
Name: Tony Harwood

Role: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager
Organisation: KCC Infrastructure

Contents

Distribution List

Name	Role/Organisation
DLUHC RED	Government Department
Defra (Animal & Plant Health Agency)	Government Department
Defra (Fera Science Limited)	Government Department
Director of Public Health	KCC
Director of Public Health	Medway Council
Kent County Council	KCC Trading Standards KCC Resilience & Emergency Planning Service KCC Director of Public Health KCC Highways KCC Press Office KCC Internal Communications
Kent Police	Kent Police
Environment Agency Incident Management Business Partner Kent, South London & East Sussex	Environment Agency
Environmental Health Leads	Kent Districts & Medway Council
Head of KCC Trading Standards	KCC
Head of Kent Resilience Team	Kent Fire and Rescue Service
KCC Duty Directors	KCC
KCC Natural Environment & Coast Manager	KCC
KCC Public Rights of Way & Access Manager	KCC
Medway Council	Medway Council Trading Standards Medway Council Emergency Planning Medway Council Director of Public Health Medway Council Press Office
Operations Manager KCC Trading Standards	KCC
Resilience Leads	Kent Districts
UKHSA South East	United Kingdom Health Security Agency

1. Aim

This emergency plan sets out the planning and response framework for notifiable and other serious animal or plant disease outbreaks within the administrative boundary of Kent and Medway, as well as outlining the broader community impacts of such an event.

2. Introduction

Animal and plant disease outbreaks can have significant negative public health, environmental, economic, and social impacts. Effective emergency planning and response helps ensure that the good health of both farmed and non-commercial animals and plants, and that our livestock, arable, forestry, horticultural and tourism industries are safeguarded, and that any resultant harm to biodiversity and biomass is addressed.

In the UK, plant and animal health and welfare are devolved matters; the responsible body in England is the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).

In the event of a notifiable animal or plant disease outbreak, there will be a co-ordinated approach to disease control and eradication, with close working between stakeholders.

The Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA), working alongside Defra, takes the operational lead in preparing for and controlling outbreaks, and incidents of notifiable diseases of plants and animals in England.

Each country in the UK publishes a contingency plan for notifiable diseases of animals, which sets out the roles, responsibilities, systems, and structures in place to respond to disease and highlights the important work undertaken to prevent disease incursion and to prepare for emergencies. The Defra (England) plan can be accessed through the following link: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758789/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

The responsibilities of public agencies for plant health are set out in the Plant Health Act 1967. This divides the lead responsibility between the Forestry Commission, which are responsible for the protection of forest trees and timber products in England, and Defra, having responsibility for other aspects of plant health.

The Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan template can be found at Annex M and has been customised to fit a Kent County Council context.

3. Legislation

The following legislation provides for the Defra, KCC, Medway Council and partner statutory duties and powers that may be utilised in the event of a notifiable or other serious animal or plant disease outbreak.

- **Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA):** The Act places a statutory duty on KCC and Medway Council (and other category 1 and 2 responders) to plan and respond to major emergencies. The definition of an emergency at part 1 of the Act specifically references: 'An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom' which threatens 'Disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life'.

- **Animal Health Act 1981 (amended by Animal Health Act 2002):** The Act places statutory duties upon a range of agencies to respond in the event of a confirmed notifiable animal disease outbreak and gives powers for the Minister to make orders for preventing the spread of notifiable animal diseases.

- **Aquatic Animal Health (England & Wales) Regulations 2009:** Where notifiable diseases are suspected or confirmed, disease control measures are applied in the form of a designation notice to movements of live and dead aquatic animals, and to certain site activities.

- **European Communities Act 1972:** The European Communities Act 1972 is now utilised to implement a range of European animal health and welfare legislation aimed at protecting human health.

- **Plant Health Act 1967:** The Act places statutory duties upon a range of agencies to respond in the event of a confirmed notifiable plant disease outbreak and gives powers for the Minister to make orders for preventing the spread of notifiable plant diseases.

- **Plant Health (England) Order 2015:** This Act contains measures to control the importation of potentially infective material, prevent the spread of plant pests and requirements for plant health movement documents.

- **Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981:** The Act addresses nature conservation, the countryside (including public rights of way) and restrictions on the introduction of certain animals and plants to the UK.

4. Wider Stakeholders

The livestock, agricultural, horticultural and forestry industries and Kent and Medway's wider environment, and economy are served by a range of representative, trade, and other interest groups. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a specific stakeholder working group to supplement and support the integrated

emergency management response by KCC and Medway Council and its professional partners.

Farming, Trade, Logistics and Landowner Bodies and Unions

Organisations such as the National Farmers Union (NFU), Country Land and Business Association, Road Haulage Association, Livestock Auctioneers Association, Kent Smallholders Association, Tenant Farmers Association, British Horse Society, Federation of Small Businesses and Tourist Boards may represent businesses affected by an outbreak.

Local Veterinary Practitioners

Local Veterinary Practitioners may be able to assist with advice and information to their clients on strategies being employed to combat a notifiable disease outbreak. Co-ordination through the British Veterinary Association, British Small Animals Veterinary Association and British Equine Veterinary Association should be considered.

Local Veterinary Practitioners may also be able to provide useful knowledge to KCC and/or Medway Council about the location of any unregistered animals. Such information could be pertinent if the disease outbreak affected animals currently unregistered, such as poultry.

Amenity Societies and Groups

Amenity societies and groups such as the National Trust, Kent Downs and High Weald AONB Units, Business Link, Woodland Trust, can also assist KCC and/or Medway Council in evaluating the ongoing impact of an animal or plant disease outbreak, and contribute to the recovery strategy.

Animal Welfare and Wildlife Conservation Groups

The RSPCA, RSPB, British Trust for Ornithology, Kent Wildlife Trust, Kent Field Club, Buglife, Plantlife, Kent Field Club and other specialist groups may provide assistance and advice.

Charities and Voluntary Sector

The Kent Voluntary Sector Emergency Group and Kent Resilience Team provide the link to this sector.

5. Alerting

Alerts to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents may be received by KCC and/or Medway Council from a range of partners, including:

- Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)
- Food and Environment Research Agency (Fera)
- Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO)
- Ports and Port Health Authorities
- Local veterinary practices
- Forestry Commission

- Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre
- Local or national media outlets
- Members of the public

For Kent County Council all alerts must be notified directly to:

REDACTED

For Medway Council all alerts must be notified directly to:

REDACTED

6. Activation

The KCC Trading Standards On-call Manager and Emergency Planning Duty Officer and/or Medway Council, informed by available information, will initiate an expandable response. This may involve a watching brief or mobilisation of some elements of this emergency plan through to the initiation of a major emergency and appropriate Integrated Emergency Management Structures.

7. Response

- At the operational level, the Animal and Plant Health Agency may establish Central Disease Control Centre – a virtual structure that coordinates operational activities taking place FOBs / permanent CSCs, which in the event of a notifiable animal or plant disease outbreak, will be headed by the APHA outbreak director. Central Disease Control Centre co-ordinates and implements the disease control operation to ensure that all the relevant agencies and stakeholders are involved. The Central Disease Control Centre follows tactical direction and policy guidance set out in disease control strategies. The CDCC, if established, will inform the local multi-agency response.

- The principal mechanism for local multi-agency response is Kent Resilience Forum. This body brings together resilience partners for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act. A flexible application of integrated emergency management principles will be used to manage animal and plant disease outbreaks in Kent and Medway (please see Fig. 1).

- In the event of an animal or plant disease outbreak, KCC, and/or Medway Council and partners will be bound by the following broad principles:

    - Protect the health and safety of the public and those directly involved in controlling the outbreak.
    - Protect animal welfare, biodiversity, and the wider environment.
    - Minimise the wider economic impact of the outbreak; and

- Control and slow the spread and eradicate the disease to regain a disease-free status.

- **Strategic Co-ordinating Group for Animal or Plant Health Emergency**
The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will lead the multi-agency response and recovery to animal or plant health emergencies in the county and will:

  - Determine strategic aims and objectives - review regularly.
  - Establish policy framework for the overall management of the situation.
  - Prioritise requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources.
  - Formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans, delegate to one agency: and
  - Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.

- **Integrated Emergency Management – Animal Health Key Issues**
The following issues should be considered when responding to an animal health emergency impacting the county:

  - Ensure effective liaison across KCC and/or Medway Council and wider partners, to support strategic, tactical, and operational elements of the response.
  - Enforcing movement restrictions and controls.
  - Working with the APHA, including tracing, and issuing movement licences if required.
  - Cleansing and disinfection.
  - Animal Health and Welfare Management and Enforcement System (AMES) data inputting; and
  - Communication with key stakeholders.

- **Integrated Emergency Management – Plant Health Key Issues**
The following issues should be considered when responding to a plant health emergency impacting the county:

  - Mobilise and provide support within an Integrated Emergency Management structure; and
  - Ensure effective liaison across KCC and/or Medway Council and with resilience partners, to support strategic, tactical, and operational elements of the response.
  - Working with the APHA, Fera and/or the Forestry Commission, including tracing and issuing movement licences if required.
  - Bio-security interventions; and
  - Communication with key stakeholders.

Figure 1: sets out a model integrated emergency management structure for animal and plant health emergencies in Kent. Please note that flexibility may be exercised in relation to detail of the structure dependent upon specific characteristics of the outbreak.



8. Stand Down

At a national level stand down procedures only commence upon notification from Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA. This will only be considered once there has been an acceptable period after the last disease confirmation, and upon consideration of veterinary opinion.

It is recognised that local contingency plans may be stood down at a different time to the national plans, for example there could be an isolated, confirmed case of Avian Influenza within a local authority area and all controls are completed well ahead of the whole country being disease free.

Local authorities should consider any LRF processes for standing down after an animal disease outbreak, both in relation to timing and lessons learned. It would also be important for a local authority to discuss this matter with APHA before any recovery activities are commenced.

Lessons learned should be undertaken and any relevant findings shared with APHA.

9. Debrief

Following any significant animal or plan disease outbreak response the KCC and/or Medway Council must ensure that formal internal and multi-agency Debriefs are undertaken in a timely manner, and while experiences and learning remain vivid. A core component of the Debrief process should be to review the effectiveness of this Plan.

Debriefs undertaken as part of relevant resilience exercises should also inform the future evolution and development of this Plan.

For any animal and plant health disease outbreak affecting the KCC and/or Medway Council administrative area the Council(s) will nominate the Debrief chair and secretary and accept overall responsibility for drafting the report and implementation of any recommendations. The KRF Structured Debrief Report template should be used as the basis for the report. A model Debrief agenda can be found at Annex L.

10. Recovery

KCC and/or Medway Council will lead the recovery phase, with planning for initiation undertaken by the Recovery Advisory Group. The following table sets out a model framework for the Recovery phase for an animal or plant health emergency:



Figure 2 - Structure chart depicting the new, updated APHA Response Model.



Training and Exercises

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Regulations require "Category 1 Responders" to include provision for training and exercises in their emergency plans.

Regular training and exercise events will raise staff awareness of potential risks and provide an understanding and confidence in emergency response and recovery procedures.

Training and Exercising (April 2016 – present day)

Organiser	Title of Training / Exercise	Type	Date
KCC	Exercise White Raven (Foot and Mouth disease)	Live / Table-top	13th September 2016
KCC	KCC Animal and Plant Health	e-Learning	Launched August 2017
KCC / Defra / Forest Research / CCRI / FERA	Resilient Treescapes – Defra Tree Health Workshop – European Union Withdrawal Policy Development	Workshop	21st January 2019
KCC	Exercise Lundy 2.0 Transit / Resting Fields	Workshop	11th September 2019
KCC	Exercise Morrigan (Foot and Mouth disease)	Virtual / Table-top	9th December 2021
KCC	Exercise Artemis (Anthrax)	Virtual / Table-top	19th December 2022

11. Horizon Scanning

Emerging International Animal and Plant Health Issues

Good intelligence and early warning can be key to enabling proactive identification of risks and grasping opportunities for prevention in relation to emerging overseas animal and plant health issues. Greater understanding of the epidemiology of overseas pests and pathogen outbreaks can also enhance biosecurity policy and practice and reduce the risk of expansion into the UK. Effective preventive biosecurity interventions and constructive decision making are all informed by a global outlook in terms of potential future threats. Future political, environmental, technological, and societal changes will have multiple implications for animal and plant health, potentially affecting food security, food safety, national economies, biological diversity, and the wider environment (Defra).

The most recent global assessment, 'A 2018 Horizon Scan of Emerging Issues for Global Conservation and Biological Diversity' (Sutherland et al., 2017), is intended as an early awareness and alert system, drawing attention to novel issues that, if realised, may create pivotal opportunities or threats, and thus warrant further analysis in the

near future. This annual publication supports the capabilities of authorities, organizations and/or agencies to deal better with an uncertain and complex future.

Border checks on high-risk imports provide a key biosecurity safeguard in terms of preventing potentially harmful organisms entering Kent and the rest of the UK. Kent Resilience Forum partners assume a proactive stance through their active engagement with border issues and risk assessment.

Link to 2018 publication: https://www.cell.com/trends/ecology-evolution/fulltext/S0169-5347(17)30289-6

Climate Change Impacts

Projections from global climate models indicate that the frequency of extreme weather events will increase as the planet warms. Such impacts include:

- Increasing average atmospheric temperatures causing generally drier summers and more frequent drought conditions (particularly in the South East) as well as wetter and milder winters.
- Decreasing number of frost days;
- Increasing frequency and intensity of rainfall events.
- Rising sea level (which, in relative terms, is predicted to be greater in the South East of England); and
- Increasing storm events, resulting in escalating coastal storm surges and an elevated risk of tidal/coastal flooding events.

However, it must be noted that the UK has always been subject to long-term weather variability, which will continue across all Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) potential future emission scenarios.

Such direct changes, for example, increasing average temperatures and decreasing frost, allow for invasive/alien species (particularly invertebrates) to modify their distribution/range and expand into new areas. Exeter and Oxford Universities have found that species with the potential to become crop pests are moving at an average of 3km a year towards the northern and southern latitudes. Extreme weather events can result in stresses to native species which can become more physiologically vulnerable to secondary-pests and pathogens e.g., susceptibility of trees to attack by leaf eating and bark-boring invertebrates and endophyte fungi increased as environmental stresses mount and impair effectiveness of natural defences. Further, several studies found an association between a drought during the previous year and West Nile virus incidence. The non-native mosquito vectors of dengue and chikungunya virus are adapted to exploit aquatic habitats created as a response to drought (e.g., water troughs, irrigation ponds and storage containers). Milder winters also work to reduce the periods of dormancy and increase survival rates of many pests and pathogens. For example, incidence of the zoonotic Lyme disease is already increasing at northern latitudes where the active period of its tick vector is lengthening. The recruitment of new pests and pathogens can also increase under such conditions.

Forecast increasingly wet and warm winters and more intense rainfall events in summer will result in the humid environments favoured by many bacterial and fungal pathogens, increasing the opportunity for them to gain footholds in the UK, increase populations and expand range. For example, Leptospirosis, a zoonotic bacterial disease which can be carried by wild and domestic mammals, is expected to occur

with increasing frequency and greater intensity as storms, flooding and high humidity events become more common.

Such climatic changes can also affect the phenology and synchronisation of pest/pathogen controlling predators as well as, indirectly, the biology of pests/pathogens as they adapt to changing climatic conditions, potentially influencing length of breeding cycles, foraging times, food availability and overwintering success.

Kent County Council recognises the UK Environment and Climate Emergency and will continue to commit resources and align its policies to address this. Animal and plant health considerations are central to this agenda.

Ecological Decline Impacts

Naturally occurring pests and pathogens play a crucial role within the functioning of natural ecosystems and are in balance with their hosts and predators maintaining a long-established equilibrium. However, when natural ecological processes are drastically altered, pest and disease species can become out of balance and inflict unsustainable levels of damage upon host species.

Habitat loss and degradation is impacting a range of species with significant roles in the maintenance of healthy ecosystems.

Changes in land cover, such as deforestation or desertification, alters ecosystem dynamics, changing the proximity and interactions between wildlife and livestock and can cause both plants and animals to become increasingly vulnerable to pests and diseases. Land use change can also increase the spread and emergence of zoonotic, vector-borne diseases as wildlife are forced to modify their ranges.

Climate and ecology link all life on this planet, including relationships between pests, pathogens, hosts, and the natural control mechanisms. When dynamics change and systems become unbalanced, health risks and vulnerability are increased and the ability to recover is reduced. Mitigating the negative anthropogenic impacts on ecology and climate as well as restoring ecosystem services and natural process provides a cost-effective natural preventative measure against animal and plant heath emergencies.

Kent County Council recognises the UK Environment and Climate Emergency and will continue to commit resources and align its policies to address this. Animal and plant health considerations are central to this agenda.

Zoonotic Diseases

Zoonotic diseases (or zoonoses) are diseases which spread from animals to humans. Approximately 60% of human infectious diseases are of animal origin, and it is estimated that 75% of all new and emerging diseases are transmitted from animals to humans, i.e., are zoonotic. Examples of zoonoses are anthrax, Ebola virus disease and Covid-19. The global Covid-19 pandemic demonstrates the destructive potential that zoonotic diseases can have on society, well-being, economies, and the environment.

These types of diseases are closely associated with environmental degradation, climate change and human-animal interaction. Disturbance to land and soils is cited as the leading driver of emerging infectious diseases, as germs which are ‘trapped’ in the soil become released into the air and so gain the potential to become infectious.

Land use changes and habitat disturbance also alter species distribution, abundance, movement, and interactions, all of which have implications for immune responses and consequent disease emergence. Other anthropogenic activities are known to influence the emergence of infectious diseases include deforestation; water management processes (e.g., the construction of dams); urbanisation; the use of pesticides; and migration and international travel and trade.

On a grander scale, climate change is also linked with the emergence of infectious diseases. For example, changing weather patterns can shift the geographic range, seasonality and intensity of climate-sensitive diseases, particularly vector-borne diseases. Levels of foreign and invasive species found in the UK are increasing in accordance with hotter temperatures, and this process enhances exposure to new germs which could have adverse impacts on animal, plant, and human health. However, it is important to note that infectious diseases arise from a combination of ecological, social, and economic pressures which merge to amplify disease risk, rather than any individual driver acting in isolation.

Kent County Council recognises the UK Environment and Climate Emergency and will continue to commit resources and align its policies to address this. Animal and plant health considerations are central to this agenda.

For more information: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/zoonotic-diseases-zoonoses-guidance-data-and-analysis

EU Withdrawal

Advice on animal and plant health issues in relation to the UK's withdrawal from the European Union:

- Guidance on importing animals, animal products and high-risk food and feed not of animal origin from the EU and Northern Ireland to Great Britain:
  Import or move live animals, germinal products, animal by-products and high risk food and feed not of animal origin - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

- Guidance on importing and exporting plants and plant products to and from the UK:
  Importing and exporting plants and plant products - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

- EU rules on the importation of plants and plant products from non-EU countries:
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity_en

- EU rules on the importation of live animals from non-EU countries:
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/live_animals_en

- EU rules on animal health and welfare in relation to movement, transporter authorisation and slaughterhouse operations from non-EU countries:
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare_en

- EU rules on the use of veterinary medicine and medicated feeds:
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/health/veterinary-medicines-and-medicated-feed_en

- Statutory instruments relating to animal health under the EU Withdrawal Act (2018): https://www.gov.uk/eu-withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments?parent=&keywords=animal&laid_date%5Bfrom%5D=&laid_date%5Bto%5D=

- Statutory instruments relating to plant health under the EU Withdrawal Act (2018): https://www.gov.uk/eu-withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments?parent=&keywords=plant&laid_date%5Bfrom%5D=&laid_date%5Bto%5D=

- European Medicines Agency guidance on EU exit: https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/about-us/united-kingdoms-withdrawal-european-union-brexit

- National Office of Animal Health guidance on EU exit: https://www.noah.co.uk/focus-areas/brexit/

- British Veterinary Association guidance on EU exit: https://www.bva.co.uk/news-campaigns-and-policy/policy/future-of-the-profession/brexit/

APPENDIX A Partner Agencies Roles & Responsibilities

APHA	• Lead the response to eradicate any outbreaks of exotic notifiable animal disease at a national and local level • Alert the upper-tier Local Authority to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Leading on identifying tracing of the disease source(s) and spread • Notify the commencement of the outbreak stand-down • On scene during an incident • Leading the local disease operation including managing the Central Disease Control Centre (CDCC) which will support Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) • Liaise with upper-tier Local Authority throughout the process • Provide significant input into decisions made at a strategic level and ensure effective communication occurs across Government and delivery partners, including the co-ordination of the tactical level response at the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) • Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist response and recovery decision making and to give operational advice and support • Engagement in Tactical Daily Communications Meeting, providing briefings to all partners • Involvement with press conferences • Advice regarding legislation relevant to animal welfare • Ensure suspect site inspections takes place where samples may be taken by the APHA for testing purposes • Co-ordinating the serving of notices and movement licenses • Notifying KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards of any suspect premises where samples have been sent for testing • Give advice regarding movement of livestock and other animals as required and use powers to ensure transporters are following the rules • Tracing and issuing movement licenses (Animal Transport Certificate) if required

	• Tracing movements of animals in conjunction with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Delivery of enforcement role in partnership with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Provide guidance to KCC and/or Medway Council prior to the issuing of notices or signage • Maintenance of pre-determined strategic grazing locations, contingency premises and equipment stores close to the Port of Dover and/or major transport hubs • Provide advice/support lines to farmers and others regarding the welfare of livestock and other animal welfare matters • Communication with local stakeholders and operational partners to ensure awareness of responsibilities in a disease situation • Work with the British Horse Society in support of equine welfare
Ashford Livestock Market	• Provision of lairage facilities (sheep only) • Halting the movement of livestock out of the market if required • Informing transporters not to travel to the market if required
Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council of notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Supporting Defra and APHA with the dissemination of key operational information to animal health and welfare officers at KCC and/or Medway Council
Borough & District Councils	• Engage with appropriate multi-agency liaison in discussion with UKHSA, KCC and/or Medway Council and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure informed conversations take place on next steps. • Co-ordination of media communications in co-operation with UKHSA, KCC and/or Medway Council and NHS • Engagement with the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams if an inter-authority working arrangement is in place • Participation in creation of cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighboring authorities to enable mutual aid during an outbreak situation • Keeping records of licensed and unlicensed animal establishments within their area
British Horse Society	• Representing businesses affected by a notifiable disease outbreak • Work with the Defra in support of equine welfare
British Trust for Ornithology	• Provision of specialist ornithological advice and assistance

British Veterinary Association	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal health incidents • Liaison with APHA to report concerns about the disease status of a premises • Co-ordination with partners in the case of a notifiable disease outbreak • Provision of expert knowledge to KCC and/or Medway Council about the location of any unregistered animals • Assisting with advice and information to the public
Buglife	• Provision of specialist entomological advice and assistance, encompassing policy research and development and horizon scanning
Defra	• Operational lead for co-ordination, preparing for managing, controlling and response to outbreaks and incidents of notifiable diseases of animals and plants • Joint lead responsibility (with Forestry Commission) on plant health • Overall accountability for dealing with any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak • Establishment of structures and policies required to eradicate disease as outlined in national contingency plans • Forward liaison at scene during an incident • Establishment of Vaccination Zones and Vaccination Surveillance Zones • Informing decision making relating to the closure or restricted access of Local Authority public rights of way • Instigate notification to stand down • Provision of information on response and recovery funding for KCC and/or Medway Council • Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist decision making • Participation and briefing to all partners in Tactical Daily Communications Meeting • Provide operational advice and support • Press team representation within media briefing and involvement with press conferences • Provision of advice/support to farmers and others regarding the welfare of livestock and other animal welfare matters • Advice regarding legislation relevant to animal welfare • Provision of up-to-date information via Defra webpage • Provision of advice regarding movement of livestock and other animals as required • Collation of information on animal transporters caught breaking the law nationally and abroad • Ability to grant, suspend or cancel animal transporter authorisation

	• Provide guidance to KCC and/or Medway Council on the issuing of notices or signage • Work with the British Horse Society in support of equine welfare
Environment Agency	• Regulatory role for certain waste management and disposal activities (disposal of carcasses, animal by-products, manure, and wash-waters) • Monitoring and management of the environmental impacts of a notifiable disease • Provision of expert advice, including on pollution prevention and control measures
Euro Tunnel	• Alerting KCC to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • As a carrier of plants & animals, especially horses, co-operation with all partners is required (e.g., restriction on movement of animals)
Food Standards Agency	• Involvement in initial identification of suspicion of exotic notifiable animal disease during routine ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections • Co-ordination with partners during a suspected or confirmed outbreak to provide relevant support with regards to food safety and hygiene and protecting the overall 'farm to fork' production process • Attendance at the NDCC to provide input on any potential risks to consumers • Designation of slaughterhouses and, as necessary, cutting plants etc. to handled restricted meat and implement enhanced checks
Forest Research	• Provision of specialist tree health advice and assistance, policy research and development including horizon scanning
Forestry Commission	• Shared lead (with Defra) responsibility for the protection of forestry and timber products • Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Co-operation with partners on the tracing and issuing movement licenses
Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant pest and pathogen records • Mapping distribution and trend analysis in relation to pests and pathogens • Maintaining local records and data resources for non-native mosquitoes and other potentially harmful organisms
Kent Downs AONB	• Provide assistance in the evaluation of ongoing impacts of notifiable disease outbreaks • Contribution to the recovery strategy
Kent Field Club	• Provision of scientific advice and assistance, research and development including horizon scanning and early warning interventions

Kent Fire and Rescue	• Co-operation with UKHSA and CDCC to address the public health needs involved in responding to a disease outbreak as part of the LRF • Uphold contingencies and biosecurity measures when working within suspect premises and/or land holdings
Kent Police	• Co-operation with APHA and KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards as enforcement (e.g., pro-active police patrols) • Enforcement of movement restrictions in co-operation with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Provision of intelligence and detailed planning during response • Exchange of intelligence between partners
Kent Showground	• Host resting fields for animals in transit as part of a pre-agreed contractual arrangement
Kent Wildlife Trust	• Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist decision making as required • Provision of assistance and scientific advice as required • Assist with feeding, shelter, penning and the security of livestock, including conservation grazing stock, during an incident
Medway Council	• Engagement with Defra, APHA, UKHSA, KCC and other partners • Engagement with the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams if an inter-authority working arrangement is in place • Co-ordination of media communications in co-operation with UKHSA, KCC and NHS • Participation in creation of cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighboring authorities to enable mutual aid during an outbreak situation • Keeping records of licensed and unlicensed animal establishments within their area
Natural England	• Provision of advice and assistance, particularly upon the impacts of a notifiable disease outbreak on landscape, wildlife, and protected species
NFU	• Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centres to assist with decision making • Provide expertise around the requirements and needs of farmers in an emergency • Disseminate important information to NFU members as required • Represent businesses affected by an animal or plant disease outbreak
NHS	• Liaison with UKHSA on the impact of zoonotic disease on public health • Co-operation with press team, representation within media briefings and involvement with press conferences

	• Participation in multi-agency KRF Invasive and Non-native Mosquito Task Group briefing teleconferences if mobilised in the event of invasive non-native mosquito species incident
Plantlife	• Provision of specialist botanical advice and assistance, policy research and development including horizon scanning
Port of Dover	• Alerting KCC to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • As a carrier of plants & animals, especially horses, co-operation with all partners is required (e.g., restriction on movement of animals)
RSPB	• Representation at strategic and tactical commands to assist decision making as required • Provision of assistance and scientific advice
RSPCA	• Provision of assistance and scientific advice as required • Provision of RSPCA 24-hour help line • Invoke National Crisis Response including the National Control Centre (as required) during the case of evacuations
United Kingdom Health Security Agency	• Act as lead for public health response • Trigger stand up of UKHSA internal incident control structures to co-ordinate human health risk assessments • Co-operation with partners to address the public health needs involved in responding to a notifiable disease outbreak • Assess the impact of zoonotic disease on public health and provide health protection expertise and advice to the public and partners • Involvement with the KRF response • Provision of specialist advice to responding agencies (including scientific, laboratory and epidemiological support) • Attendance at the NDCC at a national level and CDCC / FOBs at a local level • Continued research and sampling of population dynamics and seasonality of exotic mosquitoes at key habitats and across regions
Woodland Trust	• Assisting KCC and/or Medway Council in evaluating the ongoing impact of a plant disease outbreak and contribute to the recovery strategy as required
Zoo Parks & Other Animal Collections	• Liaison with partners on biosecurity and welfare interventions for exotic animal species

APPENDIX B Resting Fields for Animals in Transit

Introduction

Kent's is a key trading gateway between the UK and Continental Europe, with the shortest sailing times to and from the Continent. Livestock, including Equidae, are shipped by carriers operating out of both Port of Dover and Ramsgate. Eurotunnel provides the only fixed link to the Continent and Le Shuttle transports domestic Equidae on its single deck shuttles.

The potential for unforeseen disruption and delay to Channel transport therefore means that animal welfare and associated biosecurity considerations must receive a high priority. Additionally, the domestic movement of livestock may be impacted by any road network disruption, particularly to Ashford Livestock Market, the largest livestock market in the Southeast (see Annex B). Resting fields comprise pre-identified strategically located and appropriately equipped grazing land where livestock can be turned-out in the event of any prolonged or indeterminate delays or under certain circumstances, such as extreme weather conditions.

A sequential approach is practised in Kent, whereby the first preference is that livestock are not put on the road in the first place if there is a significant risk of delay, the second is that if the transporter cannot go on to complete their intended journey within legal time limits/distances and if they do not have any alternative contingency arrangements in place, then if practicable, animals are returned to their place of origin. Only where these previous options are untenable will the resting field option be utilised.

Legislation

European Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations sets out minimum standards for the welfare of animals during transport. The Regulation applies to the transport of all live vertebrate animals for the purposes of economic activity i.e., a business or trade and is implemented in England by The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (England) Order 2006 and by parallel legislation in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. While the EU rules apply to all live, vertebrate animals transported for economic reasons, more stringent elements apply to the transport of farmed livestock. Farmed livestock is made up of cattle; pigs; sheep; goats; domestic Equidae (horses, ponies, donkeys, and mules); poultry (domestic fowl, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea, fowl, quails, pheasants, and partridges); and occasionally camelids (alpacas etc.).

Enforcement

The County Council's Trading Standards service has primary responsibility for enforcing the rules to protect animals during transportation in Kent. Veterinary inspectors from the Animal and Plant Health Authority (APHA) also have powers to ensure transporters are following the rules. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) collects information about any transporters caught breaking the law from local authorities, the APHA and authorities abroad. This information is used when deciding whether to grant, suspend or cancel transporter authorisation.

Rules Governing Journey Length and Duration

Welfare during transport rules require all journeys to be logged (date, time, duration etc.). For journeys up to eight hours involving any species of animal as part of an economic activity, you must have an Animal Transport Certificate (ATC). However, if a journey is over eight hours and involves dispatching and exporting farm livestock or unregistered domestic Equidae to another country, a Journey Log is needed instead. Farmers transporting their own animals under 50 kilometres are exempt from ATC requirements.

Journeys Under 65 Kilometres

Animals transported for less than 65 kilometres do not require vehicles or transporters to be approved or for drivers/handlers to hold certificates of competence. However, an ATC is required, and drivers and handlers must be able to evidence relevant training.

Journeys Over 65 Kilometres (Type 1 Authorisation)

If livestock are transported further than 65 kilometres where total journey times are less than eight hours, you must hold a valid transporter authorisation for short journeys and valid certificates of competence for drivers and handlers.

Journeys Over Eight Hours (Type 2 Authorisation)

If a business or commercial enterprise transports livestock for journeys totalling more than eight hours, they must hold a valid transporter authorisation for long journeys, valid certificates of competence for drivers and handlers and valid vehicle/container approval certificates. For certain long journeys, it's also a legal requirement for the vehicle to have satellite navigation and a tracking system. Vehicles used to transport cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and domestic Equidae for export journeys over eight hours or journeys over 12 hours must have special ventilation and temperature monitoring equipment. The functionality of this equipment must include sensors to monitor and record the temperature within the animal compartment (positioned where conditions are likely to be worst), the ability to maintain the temperature within the animal compartment between 5°C and 30°C (+/- 5°C), a warning system to alert the driver if the temperature in the animal compartment reaches the maximum or minimum limit and a ventilation system with a minimum airflow of nominal capacity of 60 cubic meters per hour per kilo Newton of payload that can operate independently of the vehicle engine for at least four hours. Where livestock's journey times will exceed eight hours (defined as a long journey), transporters must have Type 2 transporter authorisation and will need to provide valid vehicle/container approval certificates if required, details of procedures enabling the tracing and recording of movement of road vehicles under their responsibility, to be able to contact the driver at any time and crucially, details of contingency plans in the event of an emergency.

Journey Logs

Where cattle, sheep, goats, pigs or unregistered Equidae are being transported to or from another country on journeys over eight hours a Journey Log must be completed - part of which needs to be submitted and approved by the APHA Office (or overseas equivalent) before the journey can begin. The purpose of a Journey Log is to ensure

such journeys are properly planned, with the required rest stops along the way, and without exceeding maximum journey times.

Transporting Animals in Extreme Temperatures

The legal obligation to protect livestock from unnecessary suffering includes that caused by extreme temperatures. Animals should have adequate shelter and protection, as defined by the law and the relevant welfare code for that species. Emergency contingency plans must be in place for every journey. Any disruption and delay can quickly become critical in extreme temperatures. High temperature and humidity can pose a major threat to animal welfare, especially when conditions change suddenly. Newly shorn sheep are one of the livestock species most at risk of unnecessary suffering during transportation in cold weather, as well as pigs, which are extremely sensitive to heat stress.

Resting Fields

In the event of a threat to the welfare of animals in transit arising from disruption or delay, especially if extreme hot or cold weather is involved, transporter emergency contingency plans and Trading Standards interventions may require the unloading of animals to resting fields. Resting fields comprise pre-identified strategically located and appropriately equipped grazing land where livestock can be turned-out in the event of any prolonged or indeterminate delays or under specific circumstances. The decision to utilise resting fields may be voluntary and/or negotiated or result from an enforcement intervention by KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards. The practical difficulties associated with cattle and, especially, pigs mean that every effort should be made through targeted communications to ensure that animals are not put on the road in the first place if delays are likely or that animal transporters return animals to their place of origin. Sheep and horses are the most frequently transported animals through the Channel ports and are the likeliest to require resting fields in the event of prolonged delays and disruption affecting the county.

Location of Resting Fields

A pragmatic approach is pursued in Kent, utilising operation of resting fields, to enable animals in transit welfare standards and associated enforcement duties to be met. Predetermined strategically located grazing land, premises and equipment stores close to Port of Dover and major transport hubs are maintained by the APHA for livestock destined for cross-channel export only. Kent County Council operates an agreement with the County Showground for land to be used to provide resting fields for sheep and cattle delayed on domestic journeys. In the case of traffic management for delays at the Channel ports, domestic horse transporters should make their own contingency arrangements with local stables. For un-passported horses, where stables are unlikely to accommodate these animals for biosecurity reasons, KCC has identified separate resting field locations strategically located on the local highway network. Effective containment of livestock through electric fencing and provision of water and potentially field shelters is also required.

Biosecurity and Resting Fields

A precautionary approach must be pursued in relation to resting fields in terms of biosecurity and site remediation following use. However, animal welfare considerations must be the prime consideration with biosecurity accommodated within this context.

APPENDIX C Ashford Livestock Market

Ashford Livestock Market is the southeast's largest auction market, managed by Hobbs Parker Auctioneers LLP. Running every Tuesday and from August to December, every Friday as well, the market sells cattle, sheep, and pigs. The premises has capacity for 10,000 sheep or 5,000 sheep and 900 cattle with lairage facilities. Buyers attend from the Eastern, Southern, South Eastern, South Western and the Welsh border counties and will transport the livestock to and from.

Contact Details:

REDACTED.

APPENDIX D Infected Premise, Protection and Surveillance Zones

This appendix provides an overview into infected premises and restricted zones.

Suspect Premises

A premises will be considered a suspect premises when a farmer or veterinary professional has contacted the APHA to report concerns about the disease status of that premises. A notice will be verbally issued to the premises owner or keeper declaring the premises to be suspect premises.

The APHA will ensure that where appropriate, a site inspection takes place. Many suspect cases are cleared at this stage, though in some cases samples are taken by the APHA for testing purposes.

However, in some cases the notifiable animal or plant disease is confirmed, and the farm is declared an Infected Premise.

The following requirements are likely to be applied to a Suspect Premise:

- Restrictions upon the movement of susceptible animals or plant material;
- Restrictions upon the movement of items likely to transmit disease, including vehicles;
- Publicising suspect infection;
- Possible restrictions upon movement of people; and
- Increased cleansing and disinfection standards.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards should be made aware by the APHA of any suspect premises where samples have been sent for testing, and, depending upon the circumstances, should consider initiation of the KRF Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan.

Infected Premises

Premises where a notifiable animal or plant disease has been confirmed are known as Infected Premises.

The following restrictions are likely to apply to an Infected Premise:

- Restrictions upon the movement of susceptible animals or plant material;
- Subsequently, all susceptible animals or plants are likely to be destroyed;
- Restrictions upon the movement of items likely to harbour disease, including vehicles;
- Restrictions upon the movement of non-susceptible animals;

- Publicising disease infection;
- Possible restrictions upon movement of people;
- Increased cleansing and disinfection standards; and
- Full information to be provided to the APHA in relation to all livestock movements or plant material on and off the Infected Premise.

Contact Premises or Dangerous Contacts

It is likely that all farming premises directly adjacent to the Infected Premises will be named as contact premises. Such premises would undoubtedly fall into the protection zone, and therefore these restrictions would also apply. However, it is likely that the APHA would prioritise inspections and samples from these premises.

The APHA, in conjunction with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards, may begin tracing movements of animals and subsequently discover other Contact Premises. These may not be in the immediate geographic location of the Infected Premise, and therefore would be put under the same restrictions as a Suspect Premises until further testing had been completed.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards may assist with the tracing of livestock movements in relation to the Infected Premise, however this must be restricted to office-based assistance. KCC and/or Medway Council employees should not visit Contact Premises or Dangerous Contacts as this should always be carried out by the APHA.

Temporary Control Zone

Following notification or detection of disease or suspected disease in any part of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may declare a temporary control zone around the suspect or contact premises of a size appropriate to prevent the spread of disease. The restrictions placed on premises within a Temporary Control Zone will be in line with those applied to the Suspect Premise.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing the requirements within a Temporary Control Zone, however, such a zone will only be in place for a limited period and KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards pro-active work is likely to be restricted until formal declaration of a Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone.

Protection Zone

A Protection Zone, itself contained within a Surveillance Zone, will normally extend to a minimum radius of three kilometres around an infected premise. The three-kilometre radius of the Protection Zone may be extended according to a risk assessment. A range of restrictions can be applied within a Protection Zone, depending upon the type of disease and the nature of the outbreak.

Full details of the restrictions will be provided within the appropriate legislation, however, areas considered may include record keeping, movement of animals, stray animals, wild animals in or around the premise, controlling domestic animals, restrictions in relation to animal products and animal by-products and restrictions upon

animal gatherings, increased cleansing and disinfection requirements, movement of vehicles and other things likely to spread disease and possible restrictions on people gathering.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing restrictions within a Protection Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards' enforcement role will be delivered in partnership with the APHA and Kent Police and is likely to involve pro-active patrols with police officers. Intelligence and detailed planning will also be vital to an effective response.

KCC and/or Medway Council are also required to erect appropriate warning and public information signs around the Protection Zone.

Surveillance Zone

A Surveillance Zone will normally extend to a minimum radius of ten kilometres around an infected premise. The ten-kilometre radius may be extended according to the risk assessment.

A range of restrictions can be applied within a Surveillance Zone, depending upon the type of disease and the nature of the outbreak.

Full details of the restrictions will be provided within the appropriate legislation; however, the following areas will be considered:

- Record keeping;
- Movements of all animals or plant material;
- Stray animals;
- Wild animals in or around the premise;
- Controlling domestic animals;
- Restrictions in relation to animal products and animal by-products;
- Restrictions upon animal gatherings;
- Increased cleansing and disinfection requirements; and
- Movement of vehicles and other things likely to spread disease.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing the restrictions within a Surveillance Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards enforcement role will be fulfilled in partnership with the APHA and Kent Police and is likely to involve proactive patrols with police officers. Intelligence will also be vital.

KCC and/or Medway Council are also required to erect appropriate warning and public information signs around the Surveillance Zone.

Restricted Zone

The Secretary of State may declare an area a Restricted Zone.

This is an additional measure that can be put in place where scientific advice suggests that increased restrictions outside the immediate Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone are required.

The conditions that apply within the Restricted Zone are unlikely to be as extensive as those within the Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone and will probably be introduced to increase controls relating to the movement of susceptible species.

Vaccination Surveillance Zone

Vaccination Zones may be established by Defra as a control mechanism in some disease situations. In this event, Vaccination Surveillance Zones, where non-vaccinated animals would be monitored to detect disease, would be declared to a radius of not less than 10 kilometres surrounding the Vaccination Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards and Kent Police may be required to enforce movement restrictions within these areas in a similar way to Protection Zones and Surveillance Zones.

Again, successful partnership work and work with the APHA and Kent Police would be key to effective KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards enforcement. Exchange of intelligence between partners will be vital.

APPENDIX E Notifiable Animal Disease List (and Links)

- African horse sickness: how to spot and report the disease
- African swine fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Anthrax: how to spot and report the disease
- Aujeszky's disease: how to spot and report it
- Avian Influenza (Bird Flu)
- BSE: how to spot and report the disease
- Bluetongue: how to spot and report the disease
- Bovine TB: how to spot and report the disease
- Brucellosis: how to spot and report the disease
- Chronic Wasting Disease: how to spot and report the disease
- Classical Swine Fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious Agalactia: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious Bovine Pleuro-pneumonia: how to spot and report it
- Contagious Epididymitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious Equine Metritis: how to spot and report the disease
- Dourine: how to spot and report the disease
- Enzootic Bovine Leukosis: how to spot and report the disease
- Epizootic Haemorrhagic Disease: how to spot and report it
- Epizootic Lymphangitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Equine Infectious Anaemia (Swamp Fever): how to spot and report it
- Equine Viral Arteritis: how to spot and report the disease
- Foot and Mouth Disease: how to spot and report it
- Glanders and Farcy: how to spot and report the diseases
- Goat plague: how to spot and report the disease
- Lumpy skin disease: how to spot and report the disease
- Newcastle Disease: how to spot and report it
- Paramyxovirus Infection: how to spot and report the disease
- Rabies: how to spot and report the disease in animals
- Rabies in Bats: how to spot it and report it
- Rift Valley Fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Rinderpest: how to spot and report the disease
- Scrapie: how to spot and report the disease
- Sheep and Goat Pox: how to spot and report the diseases
- Sheep Scab: how to spot and report the disease
- Swine Influenza: how to spot the disease in humans and report it
- Swine Vesicular Disease: how to spot and report it

- Teschen Disease: how to spot and report it
- Vesicular Stomatitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Warble Fly: how to spot and report the disease
- West Nile Fever: how to spot and report the disease

APPENDIX F Notifiable Plant Disease List (and Links)

Bacteria

- Brown Rot of Potato
- Fire Blight
- Ring Rot of Potato

Fungi

- Karnal Bunt
- Phytophthora kernoviae
- Phytophthora lateralis
- Phytophthora ramorum and kernoviae
- Potato Wart disease
- Strawberry black spot

Virus/Viroids

- Plum pox

APPENDIX G Notifiable Invertebrate Species List

Coleoptera

- Asian Longhorn Beetle *Anoplophora glabripennis*
- Argentine Stem Weevil *Listronotus bonariensis (Kuschel)*
- Red-necked Longhorn Beetle *Aromia bungii*
- Citrus Long-horned Beetle *Anoplophora chinensis*
- Colorado Beetle *Leptinotarsa decemlineata*
- Spotted Cucumber Beetle *Diabrotica undecimpunctata howardi*
- Lemon Tree Borer *Oemona hirta*
- Pepper Weevil *Anthonomus eugenii*
- Potato Flea Beetle *Psylliodes affinis*
- Red Palm Weevil *Rhynchophorus ferruginrus*
- Wheat Weevil *Sitophilus granarius*

Hemiptera

- Silverleaf whitefly *Bemisia tabaci*
- Sycamore Lace Bug *Corythucha ciliata*
- Banded-winged Whitefly *Trialeurodes abutiloneus*
- Japanese Fruit Scale *Pseudaulacaspis pentagona*

Lepidoptera

- Eggplant Fruit Borer *Leucinodes orbonalis*
- Palm Borer *Paysandisia archon*
- Omnivorous Leafroller *Platynota stultana*
- South American Tomato Moth *Tuta absoluta*
- *Spodoptera* species
- Tomato Pinworm *Keiferia lycopersicella*

Diptera

- Leaf Miner *Liriomyza sp.*

Thysanoptera

- Oriental Thrips *Thrips palmi*

Acari

- Fuchsia Gall Mite *Aculops fuchsiae*
- Goji Gall Mite *Aceria kuko*
- Bald Cypress Rust Mite *Epitrimerus taxodii*

Mollusca

- Apple Snails *Pomacea species*

Nematodes

- Potato Cyst Nematodes *Globodera rostochiensis*
- Stem Nematode on Narcissus and Tulip *Ditylenchus dipsaci*

APPENDIX H Non-native Mosquito Species and Associated Pathogens

Introduction

There are 34 native and naturalised mosquito species known to be resident in the UK, the females of a number of these feed on avian and mammalian blood. However, mosquitoes (particularly males) are also nectar feeders, acting as important pollinators, while in their aquatic larval stage they are filter feeders - removing significant quantities of organic matter and therefore improving water quality. Mosquitoes are also a key food source for other invertebrates, birds and small mammals.

Mosquitos are themselves harmless to humans, however they can be vectors of a number of potentially very harmful diseases. In top priority is to carefully manage and control any disease that may be vectored by mosquitoes, paying particular attention to vaccination and minimising contact between infected, or potentially infected, individuals and any mosquitoes. Effective disease control keeps the vectors harmless.

Risk management and planning for potential invasive mosquitos and potential vectored diseases is managed by United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA).

The Anopheles mosquito (*Anopheles maculipennis*), which is native to Kent, acted as the historic vector for most malaria transmission within Europe. However, improved medical care and treatments have seen malaria eradicated from the UK and the rest of Europe, and reservoirs of the pathogen therefore no longer exist within Anopheles populations. Sporadic locally acquired malaria cases are still reported in Europe, related to either transmission by a local Anopheles mosquito infected by a returning traveller with malaria (i.e., 'introduced malaria') or by an infected mosquito transported by aircraft from a malaria-endemic country (i.e., 'airport malaria').

In addition to our long-established native mosquitoes, new species are increasingly reaching the UK through accidental introductions associated with freight and passenger transport, and as a result of expansions in their ranges as the UK's climate warms. Five species are currently recognised as naturalised. Kent's significance for trans-national trade and passenger transport and its geographical proximity to continental Europe places the county in the frontline of this changing ecology.

Non-native Mosquito Species

There are some 3,500 known mosquito species worldwide. However, relatively few mosquito species are known vectors for disease. For example, only some 30 to 40 species of the 260 which make up the genus Anopheles have been confirmed as transmitting malaria. There is also variation within individual species, with certain strains having an immune response which kills the parasite after it has invaded the Anopheles mosquito. Other species from a range of mosquito genera (i.e., *Aedes, Culex, Culiseta, Haemagogus and Ochleratus*) can act as vectors for other pathogens, but not human malaria.

The following 'watch list' provides brief descriptions for those non-native mosquito species which are known disease vectors and have the potential to extend their ranges into the UK. This list is far from exhaustive and ongoing vigilance and information

sharing is required in relation to identification and achievement of greater understanding of the ecology of other non-native mosquito species which could also pose a future pathogen vector threat in the UK.

Asian Tiger or Forest Mosquito Aedes albopictus (*Stegomyia albopicta*) – This striking species, characterised by white bands on its legs and body, is native to Southeast Asia but has expanded its range to all continents as a result of accidental introduction by man. The Asian tiger mosquito is now present across much of southern Europe and there exist a small number of records for Kent, though it is not known whether this tropical species can overwinter in the UK. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway Asian tiger mosquito to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely.

Public health concerns in relation to this species stem from the fact that it is associated with human settlements, because small temporary water bodies such as water butts, receptacles, tyres and paddling pools are favoured for egg laying and larval development. Within semi—natural landscapes water-filled tree hollows and other small temporary water bodies such as wheel ruts and hoof prints will be utilised by the mosquito for breeding. The reduced competition and predator pressure afforded by such small and ephemeral water bodies can provide an advantage in terms of offspring survival rates, especially where rainfall is reliable. Conversely, prolonged dry periods have a significant negative population impact and rainfall is therefore a key determinant of this species global range i.e., it is virtually absent from more arid regions.

Female Asian tiger mosquito will readily bite humans and in some parts of its range can be a vector for viral pathogens including yellow and dengue fevers, chikungunya and potentially the zika virus. United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) monitor for this species.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species acts as a vector for disease. However, it is likely that sporadic outlier populations will continue to establish in Kent and continued monitoring of population trends and any confirmed overwintering is important. Globally, there is little evidence that response interventions undertaken once breeding populations have become established, such as reducing local egg laying / larval development opportunities and insecticide use, have been successful.

This species can be confused with two of our native mosquito species, the banded mosquito (*Culiseta annulate*) and tree hole mosquito (*Aedes geniculatus*). However, both species are closely associated with woodland and other shaded semi-natural habitats and they are therefore less likely to be found in urban areas than Asian tiger mosquito. It is recommended that expert entomological advice is sought in relation to reports of Asian tiger mosquito to reduce the risk of mistaken identity.

Yellow Fever Mosquito (*Aedes aegypti*) – The yellow fever mosquito is recognizable by white markings on its legs and a pattern in the form of a lyre on the upper surface

of its thorax. Its distribution has expanded from its native sub-Saharan African to all continents aided by commercial and tourist traffic. The species is established on Madeira, where it has been implicated in a large outbreak of dengue fever and has also been recorded in the Netherlands and northern England.

As the common name suggests, Aedes aegypti is the primary vector of yellow fever and can also transmit the dengue fever, zika, chikungunya and mayaro viruses. Like the Asian tiger mosquito this species has a strong association with human settlements and also uses small and temporary water bodies for egg laying. Indeed, where both species are present yellow fever mosquito populations have declined as they are outcompeted by the Asian tiger mosquito.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species acts as a vector for disease. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway yellow fever mosquito to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely.

American Rock Pool Mosquito (*Aedes atropalpus*) – The American Rock Pool Mosquito is a relatively drab animal compared to other Aedes species, with an absence of characteristic markings and a grey-brown colouring. This species is native to eastern North America and is thought to have spread in North America largely via the movement of used tyres. The American rock pool mosquito is a known vector for West Nile fever and La Crosse virus. Individuals and small populations of this mosquito have been historically recorded in association with tyre depots in Italy and France and a population is thought to persist in the Netherlands. Monitoring indicates that the Netherlands population has shown little spread. However, preliminary modelling shows that climatic conditions in the Netherlands are not a limiting factor for further expansion of this species in Europe.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems, especially in relation to the movement of tyres, is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK. The ability of eggs of this species to remain viable even if a water body dries-out before hatching aids unintended introductions though adults may also stowaway within vehicles and trailers as is the case with other mosquito species.

East Asian Bush or Rock Pool Mosquito (*Aedes japonicus*) – A rather drab grey-brown mosquito, with a characteristic bronze lyre-shaped pattern on its thorax, which is native to the Honshu island of Japan but now found across North and Central America, most of Asia and parts of Europe, including the Balkans, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France and Belgium. This species is associated with woodland and other shady habitats, with the larvae being found in water-filled tree hollows and other similar small water bodies rich in fallen leaves and other organic matter. They overwinter as eggs in cooler regions. Studies indicate that the East Asian bush mosquito is reluctant to bite humans, with the female preferring to feed on the blood

of birds, rodents and other small mammals. This species is considered to be a vector of West Nile virus in regions where this disease is present and potentially dengue fever and chikungunya virus.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for entry by this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species can act as a vector for West Nile virus. However, the proximity of breeding populations of this mosquito in France and Belgium makes it likely that the East Asian bush mosquito will eventually expand its range into the UK if it is not already present. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway East Asian bush mosquitoes to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely. Its association with woodland habitat and preference for non-human blood meals reduces any threat to human health arising from this exotic mosquito species.

Aedes koreicus – A relatively large mosquito species with white markings on its abdomen at the joints on its legs and grey stripes on the black thorax. Native to north-eastern China, Japan the Russian Far East and Korean peninsula this species has now become established in Belgium, Italy and Germany. Like the Asian tiger mosquito this species is strongly associated with human settlements, where eggs are laid in tyres and other small water-filled man-made habitats. Within semi-natural habitats this mosquito is associated with water-filled tree holes.

Adult female Aedes koreicus will bite humans, a range of wild mammals and livestock by both day and night. This mosquito is a known vector of Japanese encephalitis virus and canine heartworm and is a potential vector of the nematode worm Brugia malayi, which causes lymphatic filariasis, in regions where these pathogens are present.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for entry by this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species can act as a vector for West Nile virus. However, the proximity of breeding populations of this mosquito in Belgium makes it likely that Aedes koreicus will eventually expand its range into the UK (if not already present). The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway East Asian bush mosquitoes to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely. Its association with woodland habitat and preference for non-human blood meals reduces any threat to human health arising from this exotic mosquito species.

Eastern Tree Hole Mosquito (*Aedes triseriatus*) – A drab grey-brown mosquito native to eastern North America which has been intercepted in France in a shipment of tyres from the United States. The eastern tree hole mosquito is a vector for La Crosse, yellow fever, eastern encephalitis, Venezuelan encephalitis, western

encephalitis virus and canine heartworm in regions where these pathogens are present.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems, especially in relation to shipments from North America, is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK. As this mosquito is not thought to be established in Europe entry through stowing away on vehicles and trailers is considered less likely than for the other species highlighted.

Monitoring

United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) runs the nationwide mosquito surveillance project in collaboration with a range of organisations across the country. UKHSA also run a network of mosquito traps. By sampling mosquitoes at adult, egg and larval stages aim to understand the population dynamics and seasonality of mosquitoes at key habitats and across regions. Local resources such as the Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre and Kent Field Club also maintain local records for mosquitoes and other invertebrates and can provide a useful data resource.

Alerting

Where UKHSA monitoring determines the presence of potentially invasive non-native mosquito species local authorities and other stakeholders are alerted and a determination made as to what if any response is required. The 24/7 on-call Duty Emergency Planning Officer will receive early notification of confirmed records for invasive non-native mosquito species and will initiate and facilitate appropriate multi-agency liaison in discussion with UKHSA, KCC, and/or Medway Council, affected District(s) and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure informed conversations take place on next steps.

Command and Control

KCC Resilience and Emergency Planning Service will work alongside the Kent Health Protection Team to establish and resource an early multi-agency **KRF Invasive and Non-native Mosquito Task Group** briefing teleconference involving key stakeholders (e.g. UKHSA, affected District Councils, KCC, Medway Council, NHS, Animal and Plant Health Agency and specialist entomological advice) to support the Kent Health Protection Team to ensure timely, measured and proportionate response and recovery interventions.

Public Communications

Great care must be taken with the content and evidential underpinning of any public communications in relation to invasive non-native mosquitoes to avoid disproportionate and potentially alarming media and social media coverage. UKHSA, KCC and/or Medway Council, affected District(s) and NHS media professionals will co-ordinate, with appropriate entomological and medical epidemiological advice, all public communications, and responses to media approaches and (where necessary) challenge misleading media and social media coverage. The difficulty inherent in lay identification of mosquito species and potential for misidentification of our native species must inform measured and pragmatic public messaging. Key partners such

as the Channel ports, lorry parks, freight industry bodies, airports, airfields, and freight hubs may require targeted communications strategies

Horizon Scanning

As the planet continues to warm the ranges and populations of invertebrate vectors for human and other animal diseases will continue to change. Increasing temperatures, rainfall and humidity will in a UK context potentially afford optimal conditions for a number of non-native mosquito species. As these insect vectors expand their geographic range, they may expose the UK to new diseases. Increasing international trade and travel, and new trading partners and markets, are all likely to increase the risk of unintentional introductions of a range of non-native species including mosquitoes.

Ecological Considerations for Insecticide and Biological Control use

Our understanding of the effectiveness of response interventions are improving. For example, the University of Southern Mississippi and the Utah State University in the United States have reported on global trends and the practical difficulties inherent in managing mosquito populations, due in part to their growing resistance to insecticides (which is not matched by many of the insects, amphibians and fish species which prey upon them), and direct negative impacts of the insecticides upon their main invertebrate predators. Mosquito predators are longer lived, and their populations are slower to recover and recolonise water bodies.

In addition, broad spectrum insecticides will cause collateral damage to non-target species, harming the wider environment.

More specific insecticides can avoid the problems of reduced predation rates and collateral environmental harm. At the moment this means using Bacillus thuringiensis serotype israelensis (Bti), a bacterium which infects a small range of fly species. Even this biological control pesticide will not differentiate between native and non-native species and may infect closely related invertebrates, such as chironomid midges and crane flies.

Useful Links

The following links provide further background on non-native mosquito species and associated pathogens:

- Distinguishing Aedes albopictus, the Asian tiger mosquito, from native British mosquitoes: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mosquito-surveillance/distinguishing-aedes-albopictus-the-asian-tiger-mosquito-from-native-british-mosquitoes
- Qualitative assessment of the risk that West Nile virus presents to the UK human population: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/724377/HAIRS_WNV_risk_assessment.pdf
- Rapid risk assessment: Local transmission of dengue fever in France and Spain: https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-local-transmission-dengue-fever-france-and-spain

- Rapid risk assessment: Multiple reports of locally acquired malaria infections in the EU: https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-multiple-reports-locally-acquired-malaria-infections-eu
- Aquatic insect predators and mosquito control: https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/11515/1/11515_Shaalan_%26_Canyon_2009.pdf
- Effects of two microbial insecticides on aquatic predators of mosquitoes: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1439-0418.1987.tb00966.x
- Effects of Methoprene and Bti on non-target insects: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00006873
- Environmental effects of mosquito insecticides on saltmarsh invertebrate fauna: https://www.int-res.com/articles/ab2009/6/b006p077.pdf
- APHA review on parasitology horizon scanning: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/parasitology-literature-review-and-horizon-scanning

Public Health England National contingency plan for invasive mosquitoes

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/887925/National_contingency_plan_for_invasive_mosquitoes.pdf

APPENDIX I Notifiable Animal Disease Suspect Form

DATE: _____ TIME: _____

OFFICER RECEIVING REPORT:

_____

Keep calm and reassure the caller – do not be hurried. Make clear and legible notes.

Section 1: Details of the Informant

NAME:

_____

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

_____

ADDRESS:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

HAS THE CALLER NOTIFIED ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT BODY OR VETERINARY PROFESSIONAL?

_____
_____
_____

Section 2: Details of Suspect Case

NAME OF OWNER OF SUSPECT ANIMAL:

_____

ADDRESS OF OWNER OF SUSPECT ANIMAL:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

_____

LOCATION OF ANIMAL:

_____
_____
_____
_____

HOLDING NUMBER (IF KNOWN):

_____

SPECIES TYPE:

_____

FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THE ANIMAL, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WHERE APPLICABLE:

_____
_____
_____
_____

DISEASE SYMPTOMS:

_____
_____
_____
_____

WHAT SPECIES AND QUANTITIES OF ANIMALS ARE KEPT ON THE SUSPECT PREMISE?

_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 3: Veterinary Information

NAME OF VETERINARY SURGEON:

_____

ADDRESS:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 4: Movement Information

HAVE ANY SUSCEPTIBLE SPECIES BEEN MOVED TODAY? YES / NO

PLEASE PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF THE MOVEMENT, INCLUDING HAULIER INFORMATION WHERE APPROPRIATE

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 5: Additional Information

ANY OTHER RELEVANT DETAILS:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 6: Rabies Information

PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS OF ANY OTHER ANIMALS OR HUMANS THAT HAVE BEEN BITTEN OR SCRATCHED BY THE SUSPECT ANIMAL.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

APPENDIX J Equipment List

It is recommended that key KCC and/or Medway Council personnel ensure that they have prompt and ready access to the following Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in anticipation of a notifiable disease outbreak.

Much of the equipment listed is already utilised by animal health and welfare enforcement officers during standard activities. However, KCC and/or Medway Council should review the list to check what additional equipment may be required, and to consider the basic stocking levels that should be maintained in anticipation of a notifiable animal disease outbreak.

Equipment levels and listings should be reviewed on an annual basis at a local level, and in a regional context.

Any additional items of PPE that relates specifically to disease types will be included within the relevant disease annex.

Personal Protective Equipment	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Wellington boots or waders	
Overalls (Disposable or capable of being laundered)	
Waterproof suit or coat and leggings	
Disposable gloves	
Hi-visibility jackets or vests	
Eye protection	
Vinyl gloves	
Safety helmet	
Dust masks	
Bio-security	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Approved Disinfectants (Suitable for the relevant notifiable disease)	
Buckets	
Scrubbing brush	
Pressure sprayer	
Anti-bacterial soap or wipes	
Paper towels	

General	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Identity badge	
Authorisation certificate/warrant	
Camera and film (video camera)	
Torch	
Tape measure	
Rope	
Thermometer	
Marker stick or spray	
Pager / Mobile phone	
Disposable plastic bags (large) with numbered tamper proof seals	

Maps - OS of KCC and/or Medway Council area/road map	
Supply of licences, forms, notices, leaflets, signs, codes etc.	
First aid box	
UV marker pens	
Notebook / pencil / pen	

APPENDIX K Health and Safety

KCC and/or Medway Council should work to carry out a dynamic health and safety risk assessment for any appropriate activities.

KCC and/or Medway Council has in place health and safety risk assessments including risk assessments under COSHH. The following information is intended to act as a reminder of the matters that need to be considered:

Environmental Hazards:

- Handling or inspection of livestock.
- Handling of diseased/suspected animals/carcasses.
- Catching, caging, and crating of animals.
- Handling, tending, and feeding of impounded animals.
- Slaughter of animals.
- Exposure to excessive noise and vibration.
- Exposure to weather especially sunshine, extreme cold and wet conditions.
- Exposure to dust, moulds, and spores; and
- Exposure to violence.

Microbiological and Parasitic Hazards:

- Exposure to zoonosis (diseases transmissible from animals to humans).

Chemical Hazards:

- Use of disinfectants and contact with veterinary products and agrochemicals including pesticides.

It is recommended that KCC and/or Medway Council operational staff at outbreak scenes always carry with them a completed Agriculture Health Carry Card (Ref: IACL 25A) available from HSE publications.

Pre-exposure vaccinations for certain diseases, such as influenza, are available and KCC and/or Medway Council should consider offering these to staff where appropriate.

Individuals should be aware at all times that an incident site is likely to be a hazardous and an imprecise environment and should exercise the same responsibility for health and safety during an incident as they would in the workplace or any other environment.

Each Forward Operating Base will have a named safety professional to provide competent advice at all stages of operations.

Operational staff carrying out enforcement duties in the field must be aware that farmers, family members and any other person directly affected by an outbreak of exotic animal disease may suffer from prolonged and intense periods of stress.

Disinfectants – Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Assessment

Operational staff working at outbreak scenes may come into contact with approved disinfectants. Individual KCC and/or Medway Council staff should carry out COSHH assessments for the disinfectants that are to be used (which will vary according to the specific disease) to ensure that all staff, and in particular those staff unfamiliar with the use of disinfectants, are made aware of the associated risks.

First Aid

Operational staff at outbreak scenes should carry with them a basic first aid kit containing guidance on first aid instructions.

APPENDIX L Key Contacts Directory

KCC: REDACTED.

Medway Council: REDACTED.

Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA):

REDACTED

Website: www.gov.uk/apha - Twitter: @APHAgovuk - Facebook: aphagov

Rural Payments Agency options:

- Register or amend customer details.
- Register or amend bank account details.
- Land and mapping; or
- Applications and all other enquiries.

APHA options:

- Suspicion of disease and urgent welfare concerns.
- TB.
- International trade.
- Registration.
- Animal by-products; or
- Other queries.

The helpline will be staffed from Monday to Friday, 8:30am to 5pm. At other times, callers will be given details of the out-of-hours arrangements for reporting suspicion of notifiable disease or urgent animal welfare concerns.

APPENDIX M Model Debrief Agenda

Kent County Council Animal and Plan Disease Model Debrief Agenda

Incident:

Date of Debrief:

Chair:

Secretary:

Present:

1. Introductions and apologies - Chair / All.

2. Background - Chair.

3. Effectiveness of alerting and mobilisation - Team / Agency.

4. Command and control

- What went well? - Team / Agency.
- What went badly? - Team / Agency.

5. Recovery

- What went well? - Team / Agency.
- What went badly? - Team / Agency.

6. Did any best practice emerge during response and/or recovery? - Chair / All.

7. Are changes required to Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan? - Chair / All.

8. Implications for future training and exercising - Chair / All.

9. Run through and refinement of recommendations arising from Debrief - Chair/All.

10. Outline next steps and close meeting – Chair.

APPENDIX N Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan (Kent County Council Version)

Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan (Kent County Council Version)

National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
Compliance through Coordination

ACTSO
Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers

This guidance was developed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO). It has been specifically developed for local authorities in England and Wales. It is reviewed on a regular basis.

Last reviewed: September 2022

DOCUMENT HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This document has been produced by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and ACTSO. It is classified as **OFFICIAL when completed** as defined by the Government Security Classifications (May 2018) and may only be disseminated to the approved distribution list as detailed below. If dissemination is required outside this list, please contact ACTSO (admin@actso.org.uk) who produced this document.

Approved distribution list -

- All Local Authorities in England and Wales.
- Government Departments and other public authorities with enforcement responsibilities.
- Local Government Association and Welsh Local Government Association.
- Local Resilience Forums.

Version: 007

Contents

This national template provides guidance which local authorities are encouraged to adopt and personalise by inputting additional localised information into the operational section (Part 2).

* Indicates sections that need to be populated with local information.

In addition to this generic contingency plan, there are a number of disease annexes which contain specific information on how a local authority should respond to a particular disease outbreak:

- African Horse Sickness.
- Foot and Mouth.
- African Swine Fever and Classical Swine Fever.
- Glanders and Farcy.
- Anthrax.
- Rabies.
- Avian Influenza.
- Newcastle Disease.
- Bluetongue.
- West Nile Virus; and
- Equine Infectious Anaemia

Review Log

This national contingency plan template and the supporting disease annexes will be reviewed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel (NAHWP) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) on an annual basis in January of each year.

Local authorities should also regularly review their adopted plans to ensure all localised information is correct and up to date.

Version	Date	Amended by	Summary of changes
001	July 2014	-	Original issue – draft template for consultation
002	October 2014	ACTSO	Second draft updated following a consultation during the summer of 2014.
003	February 2015	ACTSO	Third draft with final amendments from Government and the NAHWP + revisions following the AI outbreak in November 2014.
004	February 2016	ACTSO	Annual review. Revisions following outbreaks in 2015, updated contacts and web-links, added new appendices for cross border warrants and outbreak signage.
007	September 2022	ACTSO	Additional information added regarding suggested tasks, overview flow charts for APHA processes with regards to suspected & confirmed cases; and the addition of a detailed Avian Influenza Appendix to inform local authority planning.

Distribution List

1. Local authorities should ensure that all relevant internal departments and external partners have access to this exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan, its supporting disease annexes, and the overarching national contingency plans (GB & NI, England, and Wales) as referenced in **Chapter 2 Introduction**.

Please note: Parts of the operational section of this plan should be populated with localised information before this contingency plan is distributed.

2. These contingency plan templates can be accessed by local authority staff via the following websites. N.B. all of these require previous registration / membership. REDACTED.

3. The following list is a suggested network of distribution. Additional organisations/contact details can be added to this list based on local requirements.

Contacts	KCC	Medway Council
Animal Health and Welfare Enforcement		
Emergency Planning		
Communication and Public Relations		
Highway Services		
Rights of Way & Access Services		
IT (GIS function for mapping)		
Financial Services		
Public Health		
External Contacts		
Local Resilience Forum, which includes Fire and Rescue, NHS, Police	https://www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-details	
Animal and Plant Health Agency	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-andplant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening	
Neighbouring Local Authorities, District, Borough Councils (where applicable)	http://www.kent.gov.uk/about-the-council/how-the-councilworks/district-councils	
Environment Agency / Natural Resources Wales	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environmentagency http://naturalresourceswales.gov.uk	
UK Health Security Agency / Office for Health Improvement and Disparities Public Health Wales (Local Office)	UK Health Security Agency - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) Office for Health Improvement and Disparities - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) http://www.publichealthwales.wales.nhs.uk/	
Industry groups, such as NFU local secretary.		
Charities, such as RSPCA, Cats Protection and Dogs Trust.		

Part 1: Strategic Section

1. Executive Summary

1. An outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease within the UK has a significant impact on the economy, animal, and public health. Disease outbreaks affect the ability to trade globally, the food industry and tourism. They place immeasurable strain on farming communities and have the potential to create significant animal welfare issues.

2. Local authorities play a key role in disease control, having a statutory responsibility to enforce disease control legislation, and it is with consideration to these roles and responsibilities that this exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan template has been produced for local authorities in England and Wales. This plan has been drafted by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel[1] and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) following concerns of the changing landscape and animal health risks England and Wales are currently witnessing. With a significant reduction in animal health experience and resource available within local authorities, any failure to have up-to-date contingency plans will leave local authorities ill prepared for a disease outbreak.

3. Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are identified as high risk in accordance with the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register, as detailed in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. As such, all local authorities in England and Wales are strongly encouraged to read and adopt this contingency plan to ensure consistency across the devolved countries. It is a stark reminder that the overall costs of the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001 to the UK economy were over £8 billion[2] , a cost that would be untenable in the present economic climate.

4. The National Panel and ACTSO gratefully acknowledge and thank the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for their financial support and the Animal and Plant Health Agency for their expert input into the production of these contingency plans. Grateful acknowledgement is additionally given to Trading Standards South East for their original contributions on which this national contingency plan is based.

5. This contingency plan template will be reviewed on an annual basis by the National Panel. Local authorities are encouraged to regularly review their own adopted plan, which will contain additional localised information, in conjunction with their Local Resilience Forum to ensure readiness and resilience.



Stephanie Young — Former Chair of the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel

Graham Ven — ACTSO Chairman

Statements of Support for these Contingency Plan Templates

[1] The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel consists of lead advisers on animal health drawn from local authorities plus representatives from Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland, Food Standards Agency, Rural Payments Agency, Trading Standards Institute, Chartered Institute of Environmental Health.

[2] Anderson Inquiry (2002) 'Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons Learned Inquiry'.

2. Introduction

Local authority statutory duties in an animal disease outbreak

Local authorities[3] have a statutory duty to enforce the rules put in place under the Animal Health Act 1981 to control and eradicate an animal disease outbreak. Article 5 of retained EU Regulation 2017/625 states that competent authorities must have contingency plans in place and be prepared to operate such plans in the event of an emergency. Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are also identified as high risk in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which means local authorities are required to help prepare and coordinate the local multiagency response during an animal disease outbreak. In order to fulfil these duties, local authorities are expected to prepare for an animal disease and put in place a contingency plan, to ensure a rapid and effective response to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.

The Animal Health and Welfare Framework states that, *'Each local authority must have an up-to-date animal disease contingency plan in place, which is shared internally and with partners. Contact details are to be revised as changes happen. The plan should be updated within two years of any changes to the national template'.*

Aim of this Contingency Plan

This contingency plan provides specific information on how and when a local authority should respond to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It aims to:

- Assist Local Authority Animal Health Functions (LAAHFs[4]) prepare for and respond to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. This can be used as a standalone plan or be used to verify / modify existing animal disease contingency / generic emergency plans put in place by the Local Resilience Forum.
- Ensure that LAAHFs understand their role and the wider local authority role preparing for and during a suspect or confirmed animal disease outbreak and can convey this to other local departments and external partners.
- Promote the importance of LAAHFs being prepared for an animal disease outbreak.
- Promote liaise with other local authority services ahead of and during a disease outbreak.
- Facilitate a timely, organised, and co-ordinated multi agency response facilitated through the Local Resilience Forum structures where relevant.
- Share a common understanding of the local authority role in animal disease contingency planning with national policy makers and local delivery partners.
- Encourage a consistent approach to contingency planning and responding to a disease outbreak across England and Wales, as encouraged by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel.

[3] County councils, unitary authorities, London, and metropolitan boroughs.

[4] The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) is the part of a local authority that is tasked with legal duties under the Animal Health Act (and secondary legislation) – usually situated within the Trading Standards or Environmental Health service(s) of county / unitary authorities.

This plan specifically relates to the responsibilities of local authorities at a county / unitary level when responding to a confirmed exotic animal disease case in animals. It does not cover the local authority role in relation to licensing of animal establishments or public health issues as a subsequent issue when animal disease is confirmed in humans.

Definition of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

The term notifiable disease means there is a legal obligation to notify the relevant authority (the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)) if a person suspects disease. Notifiable diseases are named in Section 88 of the Animal Health Act 1981, or an Order made under the Act. A full list of current notifiable diseases and links to disease fact sheets can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/notifiable-diseases-in-animals

A range of information on animal diseases can also be found at:
https://beta.gov.wales/animal-health

The term exotic refers to a disease that is not currently present in the UK e.g., foot and mouth disease. Endemic diseases are those which are already present in the UK e.g., bovine tuberculosis.

APHA and Defra / the Welsh Government lead on responding to any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks.

For information on how to respond to non-notifiable or endemic disease contact the APHA. Contact details for APHA's field services offices can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening

The Local Authority Animal Health Function

The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) is the section or department within a local authority which is tasked with the enforcement of disease control measures and as such is a major operational partner in the response to exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks. The LAAHF is normally situated within the Trading Standards or Environmental Health service of a local authority and would be expected to provide technical advice to its local authority's existing emergency management structure.

The LAAHF plays a key role in the implementation of disease control strategies and should provide an informed link between the wider local authority via the Emergency Planning department, the APHA and the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). In a disease outbreak situation, the LAAHF will additionally provide access to local information and technical advice which will be fundamental in responding to control the outbreak.

How to use this Contingency Plan Template

This document has a two-tier design. Part 1 is a strategic section to provide relevant guidance to elected members and senior management and Part 2 is an operational contingency plan template for use by officers with animal health and welfare duties. Both sections contain information on preparing for and responding to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.

It is acknowledged that individual local authorities and their animal health functions will vary in terms of size, structure, and resource. This national template therefore provides some general guidance which local authorities are encouraged to adopt and personalise by inputting additional localised information into the operational section (Part 2). This will facilitate a timely and more organised response in the event of a disease outbreak. Please refer to the Contents page for further information on which pages can be populated with local information.

In addition to this contingency plan, there are a number of supporting disease annexes which contain specific information on how a local authority should respond to a particular disease outbreak. A list of these annexes can be found on the Contents page. Readers should also refer to the documents listed below for further information on the wider multi agency response to exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks at a national level (Defra / the Welsh Government) or a local level (LRF / local authority). This local authority contingency plan provides a link between these other national and local contingency plans.

- Great Britain and Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals
  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/977017/uk-contingency-plan-notifiable-diseases-animals.pdf

- Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England
  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758789/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

- Welsh Government's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases
  https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-01/welsh-government-contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

- LRF and Local Authority's Generic Incident Response Plans. (Some LRFs may also have a specific exotic animal disease response plan).
  https://www.kent.gov.uk/about-the-council/strategies-and-policies/community-safety-and-crime-policies/emergency-planning

This contingency plan has been designed to be used by a range of local authority staff, some of whom may not have a specific background in animal health and welfare. The document contains a number of acronyms so those less familiar with animal health and welfare work should refer to **Annex B Glossary of Terms** when required.

It should be noted that there is a range of specific legislation that provides for further powers and duties for local authorities in relation to individual diseases. These have been referenced within each specific disease annex. Example notices have not been included in the disease annexes as they will need to be specifically allocated dependent on the circumstances of each individual outbreak. Further guidance would be issued by Defra / the Welsh Government or APHA before local authorities would be expected to issue notices or signage. A collection of example notices and signs will be stored on ACTSO and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on Resilience Direct to try to provide extra assistance to local authorities.

Activation of this Contingency Plan – What to do in an Outbreak

Information on how a local authority should respond to an outbreak at an operational level can be found **in Chapter 9 Notification and Activation of this Contingency Plan** and **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak**.

To summarise, when the LAAHF initially receives notification of a suspect or confirmed case of exotic notifiable animal disease from the APHA this plan should be activated and the relevant Heads of Service with responsibility for animal health and emergency planning must be informed immediately.

The LAAHF is strongly encouraged to establish a good working relationship with its internal Emergency Planning department to support each other in preparing for and responding to any such disease outbreak. Emergency Planning should be involved in the adoption of this plan and consulted before this plan is formally activated in a suspect or confirmed disease situation. In addition, a local authority should be part of a wider multi agency approach to respond to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak via the LRF. Refer to **Chapter 4 Multi Agency Response** for more information.

3. Local Authority Key Responsibilities

This section highlights a local authority's key responsibilities when responding to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It should be read in conjunction with **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak**.

Overall accountability for dealing with any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak is the responsibility of the relevant Government department (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra) or the Welsh Government) and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). Throughout this response process, these agencies will uphold a strong focus on confidentiality and will only share information on a need-to-know basis at the point that local authorities or other multi agency partners are required to react. Local authorities will be expected to work with the relevant Resilience and Operational Manager (ROM) and the Readiness and Resilience Manager (RRM) from their APHA field services office. **The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should not undertake additional**

tasks and responsibilities in relation to the operational response to a disease situation without the APHA's prior knowledge and instruction.

A key element of any animal disease control strategy is the use of declarations or declaratory orders which are issued by the Secretary of State / Welsh Ministers. The focus of LAAHF activities during an animal disease is **working with APHA to enforce the rules imposed by declaratory orders in controlled zones. It is vital that the restrictions and enforcement roles are quickly agreed and understood**. This work might require engaging directly with the public, businesses, and animal owners by providing advice and guidance, signage or engaging directly through visits and foot patrols. During the suspicion phase of certain diseases, a Temporary Control Zone may be declared around any premises under suspicion. If disease is confirmed, declaratory orders are likely to impose a Protection Zone (PZ) surrounded by a larger Surveillance Zone (SZ). Controls within the protection zone are more stringent than those within the surveillance zone to reflect the increased risk of transmission of disease. The distance of these zones can vary, and local authorities should always seek advice from APHA, although typically a protection zone can be 3km in radius around infected premises and a surveillance zone 10km in radius around infected premises.

Some of the key responsibilities for local authorities in responding to a disease outbreak are:

a) The enforcement of animal disease control rules made under the European Communities Act 1972 and the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the 2002 Act). This role is focused on preventing the spread of disease, in conjunction with the APHA. These controls aim to limit the effect on human and animal activities by undertaking tasks such as providing advice on disease control measures, serving restriction notices, and undertaking roadside mobile vehicle checks in conjunction with the Police. All of the above tasks should be done at speed, which in practice will require 24/7 cover.

b) To work with UKHSA / Public Health Wales to protect public health, although the specifics of this are not detailed in this particular contingency plan.

c) To promote and maintain good biosecurity measures and provide guidance on this when required. Biosecurity should be considered at all times but becomes a heightened importance during and immediately after an outbreak to prevent spread or reoccurrence of disease.
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals
https://gov.wales/biosecurity-guidance

d) To consider the local risks and priorities when responding to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Refer to **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak** for more information on this. This work should be completed in conjunction with a local authority's multi agency partners as detailed in **Chapter 4 Local authorities as part of the multi-agency Response**.

e) To keep appropriate records of all checks completed, decisions made, and actions taken to control an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. This information will be needed for any subsequent inquiries.

f) Work to support APHA and local authority communication teams to ensure agreed messages are shared with the animal owners, businesses, and the public.

g) Respond to the needs of local residents and businesses.

The LAAHF does not work in isolation during an animal disease outbreak but is part of a wider local authority response that will involve Emergency Planning, IT, communications, rights of way, mapping and general administration. This guidance and the overall preparation / response to an animal disease outbreak must be discussed with all relevant local services.

4. Multi-agency Response

In some disease situations, the local authority will be part of a multi-agency response under the Local Resilience Forum (LRF).

This animal disease planning and contingency guidance **must** be reviewed with all internal services and LRF plans, processes, and communication structures. LAAHFs do not respond to emergencies in isolation, instead local authorities (including district councils) are required to work with the UK Health Security Agency to protect public health – however, this plan focuses on responsibilities relating to animal disease. Impacts upon public health are covered by other emergency plans and arrangements.

Civil Contingencies Act and Local Resilience Forums

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 outlines the role of local authorities in providing civil protection at a local level and places a statutory duty on them to maintain emergency plans for events or situations likely to cause serious damage to human welfare and the environment, including an outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease.

LRFs are the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Further information on the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-responsibilities-of-responder-agencies-and-others In summary local authorities, the emergency services and NHS bodies are Category 1 responders of LRFs. These organisations are at the core of the response to most emergencies. Category 1 responders may be supported by Category 2 responders such as the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies if an incident affects their own sector.

Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) coordinate the multi-agency response under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. LRFs promote cooperation between organisations in their preparation for responding to a major emergency, such as an exotic notifiable animal

disease outbreak. It provides a forum for the consideration of emergency response issues where there are implications for more than one agency. An exotic notifiable disease outbreak is included in the National Risk Register (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/952959/6.6920_CO_CCS_s_National_Risk_Register_2020_11-1-21-FINAL.pdf) because it is considered to be likely to have a significant impact. LRFs are required to interpret the risks in the National Risk Register and the National Risk Assessment at a local level which forms the Community Risk Register. LRFs will also have a Civil Contingency Plan to outline how its multiple partners would respond to a major incident.

As category 1 responders under the Act, local authorities are required to contribute to LRF meetings and communications when required. Each local authority should ensure that their local animal disease preparation and contingency plan has been discussed with the LRF. The LAAHF must be clear on when to notify LRF partners about a suspect / confirmed animal disease case. The role of the LRF will vary for each outbreak. These aspects may vary depending on timing, extent of the outbreak, risk, disease type and the local profile.

When an outbreak is confirmed, a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) will be convened to support communities to rebuild, restore and rehabilitate following an emergency. Local authorities usually lead the RCG, although this is likely to be a multi-agency group. In addition to this, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be set up to guide the response to the wider impacts of the outbreak. A Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) may be established to ensure that response issues can be addressed jointly, particularly where multiple local authorities within a LRF area are affected. If a SCG / TCG are established, they will usually hand over to the RCG when the incident is contained and there is no immediate risk of escalation.

National Partners

The multi-agency response to exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks at a national level (Defra / the Welsh Government) is outlined -

- Great Britain and Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals.
- Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England.
- Welsh Government's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England / Welsh Government

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra) and the Welsh Government are the government leads for preparing for and managing an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak in England and Wales respectively. They are responsible for establishing the structures and policies required to eradicate disease as outlined in their national contingency plans, which should be considered alongside this document. A series of control strategies accompany these national contingency plans for certain diseases including Foot and Mouth Disease and Rabies:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-in-england and

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/great-britain-and-northern-ireland-contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals

Animal and Plant Health Agency Local / Regional / National structure

APHA is an Executive Agency acting on behalf of Defra and the devolved Governments to lead the response to eradicate any outbreaks of exotic notifiable animal disease at a national and local level. They have significant input into decisions made at a strategic level and plays a fundamental role in ensuring effective communication occurs across Central Government and delivery partners, including the co-ordination of the tactical level response at the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC). APHA deliver the Government response to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. They are responsible for responding to suspect / confirmed cases and have structures in place to lead coordination and communication with partners, provide veterinary and technical advice, carry out epidemiological research and tracing, issue licences, produce maps and lead the practical introduction of control measures in response to a disease. The **Contingency Planning Division** in APHA lead their preparation and response to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.

Partner coordination at a national level is carried out through the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC), which is supported by APHA. The NDCC meets virtually throughout a disease outbreak. The frequency depends on the type of disease, number of cases and stage in the outbreak. For example, at the height of an FMD outbreak the NDCC will hold at least daily meetings but at the end of a HPAI case communication might only take place via email updates. National representatives, including ACTSO, input on behalf of their members and receive the most up to date information about the outbreak. The APHA Central Disease Control Centre provides administrative support during an animal disease outbreak, including issuing licences through the Customer Service Centre (CSC) when required.

United Kingdom Health Security Agency / Public Health Wales

During an outbreak United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) / Public Health Wales (PHW) assess the impact of zoonotic disease on public health and provide health protection expertise and advice to the public, NHS professionals, directors of public health in local authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The term zoonotic means a disease that can be transmitted from animals to humans. (Not all exotic notifiable animal diseases are zoonotic.)

UKHSA / PHW would be involved in the disease response at a very early stage and, where appropriate, they would attend the NDCC at a national level and the FOBs at a local level. If the exotic disease has zoonotic potential, UKHSA / PHW would stand up its internal incident control structures to co-ordinate human health risk assessments. UKHSA / PHW have the lead responsibility for public health response and depending on the novelty and magnitude of threat, would provide specialist advice to responding agencies in order to minimise impacts on human health. This may involve the provision of scientific, laboratory and epidemiological support.

Food Standards Agency

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) work with Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA during a suspect or confirmed outbreak to provide relevant support with regards to food safety and hygiene and protecting the overall farm to fork production process. In practice this would involve attendance at the NDCC to provide input on any potential risks to consumers as a result of the suspect or confirmed outbreak. At an operational level, FSA staff may be involved in the initial identification of suspicion of exotic notifiable animal disease during routine antemortem and post-mortem inspections. Any concerns would immediately be referred to the APHA.

For diseases which may pass to other animals from disease contaminated meat or animal by-products, the FSA are required to designate slaughterhouses and as necessary cutting plants etc. to handled restricted meat and implement enhanced checks. Where meat plants are under the control of local authorities, local authorities may need to approve those processing plants which have elected to put in place the necessary controls to be designated as treatment centres.

Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (DLUHC) Resilience Team and the Chair of the relevant LRF will be notified of a suspect or confirmed outbreak by APHA. Dependent on the situation this is likely to trigger a local multi agency response via the LRF as briefly summarised at the start of this chapter. DLUHC would attend the NDCC and the relevant LRF would attend the CDCC.

Environment Agency / National Resources Wales

During an outbreak the Environment Agency (EA) in England or Natural Resources Wales (NRW) focus on ensuring the environmental impacts of an outbreak are managed. The EA / NRW provide expert advice and have a regulatory role for certain waste management and disposal activities, including disposal of carcases, animal by-products, manure, and wash-waters. The EA / NRW provide advice on pollution prevention measures (for example in relation to the use of disinfectants and biocides for biosecurity and cleansing and disinfection purposes) and monitor the environmental impacts of an outbreak.

Local Government Association / Welsh Local Government Association

The Local Government Association (LGA) and Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) would be responsible for leading the local government media response at a national level, supporting council media teams, producing briefing materials for local authorities and Councillors, and for representing local authorities at Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meetings and NDCC meetings. If the LGA / WLGA are not in attendance at NDCC meetings, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) would represent local authorities on their behalf. The WLGA would also attend the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) if it was activated. (Further information on these communication meetings is available in the next chapter.)

During an outbreak the communications teams of affected local authorities should liaise closely with the LGA / WLGA's communications team. The LGA / WLGA would take a proactive role in high profile outbreaks to help protect the reputation of individual councils, and local government as a whole.

Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers

In an outbreak situation ACTSO support and represent animal health and welfare officers and managers in local authorities in England and Wales. They work with Defra, WAG and APHA to identify and resolve practical issues on behalf of local government and support effective communication. ACTSO will assist in identifying appropriate contacts in local authorities and will attend NDCC meetings.

Regional / Local Partners

Animal and Plant Health Agency (Field Services Office)

At a local level, the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are encouraged to maintain a good relationship with their APHA field services office, in particular the Resilience and Operational Managers (ROMs) and Readiness and Resilience Managers (RRMs). Contact details for the APHA field services offices can be found at:https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening. APHA Field Services Office are responsible for leading the coordination and delivery of local controls in response to animal diseases. This includes the provision of veterinary resources, coordinating partners and overseeing the controlled disposal of carcasses and waste. It is also advisable that key LAAHF staffs are signed up to receive information alerts from APHA's subscription service. Refer to **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak - Point 8(g)** for more detail on this.

APHA Resilience & Technical Advisors (RATAs) are the key liaison point for local authorities and other partners during preparation and in response to a suspect / confirmed animal disease. Local authorities may also be contacted by the APHA duty vet during an animal disease outbreak. APHA may introduce Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) on a virtual or physical basis. Physical FOBs are used to provide a presence close to the Infected Premises (IP). FOBs provide a base for field staff and can be used to store equipment, exchange information, liaise with partners, return physical paperwork and provide a briefing hub ahead of shifts. APHA will use premises in the Defra / APHA estate for FOBs, but they may engage with the LRF if more convenient premises are required.

Local authorities must maintain a close relationship with APHA to receive up to date information and ensure there is an effective delivery partnership. APHA may request action from the local authority based on their legal duties, local knowledge and technical expertise.

UKHSA / Public Health Wales (Local Office)

The Local Health Protection Teams of UKHSA / PHW and the local authority's Director of Public Health would work closely with the APHA via the CDCC to address the public health needs involved in responding to a disease outbreak. They would also input into a LRF's response.

Local Resilience Forum

As detailed in Defra's national contingency plan "the LAAHF provides an informed link between the APHA, local authorities and the local resilience forums". This plan must link with LRF emergency planning procedures to ensure that multi agency partners are appropriately alerted to suspect and confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease. Refer to **Chapter 9 Notification and Activation of this Contingency** Plan for further information.

To aid a co-ordinated multi agency response, it is recommended that the LAAHF works with their local authority's emergency planners and other multi agency partners to create a specific LRF exotic notifiable animal disease response plan, which would sit alongside this local authority contingency plan. This LRF plan should provide an overview of the role of partner agencies, the local disease control priorities, and the agreed triggers on how and when partners will be alerted of a suspect or confirmed outbreak.

Neighbouring Local Authorities

Local Controlled zones will frequently cross over local authority boundaries and therefore coordination and consistency between authorities is essential. Local authority officers do not have automatic jurisdiction in other counties regional cross border warrants ahead of a disease situation can prove invaluable to the effective use of resources. Forms for completing these agreements are held and filled in by local authority Trading Standards Services. In addition, county councils may want to work closely with district councils to share intelligence, technical knowledge, and resources.

5. Command Structures and Communications in an Outbreak

Communications are an integral part of responding to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It is paramount to handle communications effectively during suspect and confirmed disease outbreaks to ensure all relevant agencies are aware of the unfolding situation and that they are receiving and responding to the most up-to-date information.

Equally communications must be handled carefully to manage the wider impact of the situation in terms of what information is released to the general public and the subsequent effect this could have on the agricultural industry, local and national commerce.

Detailed information on the alert processes for suspicion of disease and command structures, if disease is confirmed, are available in Defra's and the Welsh Government's national contingency plans. Some of the key points discussed in these documents are summarised below:

Key events when an outbreak situation arises

a) **Suspicion of Disease** – there is a legal duty on any person who suspects that an animal may have a notifiable disease to report their suspicion to the Secretary of State / Welsh Ministers via the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). If the report leads APHA to suspect disease may be present, an investigation will be carried out by a Veterinary Inspector and the APHA Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit (VENDU) will be informed that an investigation is underway.

b) **Premises Placed Under Restriction** – the premises where disease is suspected may be placed under restrictions preventing any movement on or off the site. If disease cannot be ruled out by the investigating vet, samples may be taken for laboratory testing. At this stage disease could be confirmed based on clinical grounds, although this is only likely to happen if there is an ongoing outbreak and a known epidemiological link to confirmed disease. In theory, local authorities should be informed about the concern of potential disease at the point when samples are taken, however, these timelines may vary dependent on the judgement of the local APHA office and the circumstances of each individual situation. The need for early notification to an affected local authority is something that the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and ACTSO continue to campaign for to maximise the preparation time a local authority must respond, if required.

c) **Notification within Central Government** - VENDU is responsible for initially notifying various officials if there is sufficient concern about a suspicion of disease. This will include the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for all devolved administrations, Government officials and APHA senior management. Following this notification, a series of case conferences may be held to discuss the emerging issues and to consider whether an amber teleconference should be triggered by the CVO UK's office. A standard alert system is used to indicate the disease status:

- White – disease is not present or suspected in the UK.
- Black – risk of disease is higher than normal e.g., disease may be suspected or confirmed in a nearby EU member state.
- Amber – strong suspicion of the presence of disease on a particular premises based on clinical picture, following a veterinary investigation; and
- Red – disease confirmed or that an operational response has been initiated.

d) **Amber Teleconference** – If suspicion of disease is strong and its presence cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds, an amber alert teleconference will be held to assess the risk of the situation and agree on the next steps required to respond to the situation. This is chaired by the CVO UK. The relevant CVO may decide to confirm disease (raising the alert from amber to red) or specify what further evidence, such as test results, would be needed. If a veterinary risk assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting for laboratory test results, the CVO may take the decision to move to red alert without waiting for those results which could result in a pre-emptive cull of affected animals (slaughter on suspicion).

e) **Disease Confirmation** – If disease is confirmed by positive laboratory test results, or the relevant CVO makes a decision to confirm disease at the amber teleconference

stage, command and control structures are put in place to direct and co-ordinate the disease control response. The lead agencies for co-ordinating this response are Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA.

Command Structures for an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

The response levels for reacting to exotic notifiable animal disease are defined as:

- Strategic Direction and Commissioning Level – The national government response is co-ordinated through strategic direction from Ministers and senior officials. In addition, and depending on the outbreak, COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) may be convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
- Tactical Level – the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) is led by the CVO UK. A Central Disease Control Centre (CDCC) will be activated by APHA. In Wales the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) may also be activated.
- Operational Level – APHA will establish and coordinate Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)

Further information on command structures in Great Britain can be found in **Annex C**. It is acknowledged there are differences in opinion regarding command structures and the different levels of command between the animal health and emergency planning communities. As Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA are the lead agencies for co-ordinating responses to exotic notifiable animal disease incidents, their command structure (as depicted in Annex C) would be used, and it is important that LRF emergency planning arrangements recognise these differences and plan accordingly.

During an outbreak, the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) command structures of LRFs will primarily liaise and be briefed by the CDCC. If a disease is zoonotic close liaison would also take place with United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) / Public Health Wales (PHW).

The NDCC and the CDCC operate around a set battle rhythm which is outlined in Table 1 for England and Table 2 for Wales below. This provides a structure for the management of the outbreak to enable a co-ordinated multi agency response, although a battle rhythm would be proportionate dependent on the disease and the perceived level of risk i.e., a decision may be made to operate a more or less condensed version.

As part of this battle rhythm, the NDCC and CDCC hold regular bird-table meetings to ensure effective communications and a co-ordinated response between all policy, operational and communications functions involved. Local authorities, SCGs and TCGs should be mindful of this schedule and aim to arrange internal briefings after key NDCC and CDCC updates to enable sharing of the latest information on the situation and avoid scheduling conflicts. Local authorities would be involved in inputting into the CDCC bird-table meetings and ACTSO or the LGA / WLGA would input into amber teleconferences and NDCC bird-table meetings. ACTSO maintain

regular communication with affected local authorities during an outbreak so these local authorities would also have an in-direct input into NDCC bird-tables via ACTSO.

Table 1: Battle Rhythm from Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	**Strategic**	**Daily Strategic Stock take**
	Operational	**FOB operational management teleconference**
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting **– APHA / Defra brief all parties involved**
1000 – 1100	**Strategic**	**National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) – NSC (THRC)**
1130 – 1200	**Strategic**	**Defra Media Briefing**
	Operational	**Media Briefing**
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
1400 – 1430	**Tactical / Operational**	**CDCC Management Teleconference**
1500 – 1600	**Strategic**	**NSC (THRC)**
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
Ad-hoc	**Strategic**	**Animal Disease Policy Group**
	Tactical	**National Experts Group / Outbreak Advisory Group**
	Operational	**Disease Emergency Response Committee (DERC)**
2100 approx.	**CDCC Management Information and Reports Team**	**Daily report compiled and circulated – to provide a comprehensive situation report on all aspects**

Table 2: Battle Rhythm from the Welsh Government's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	**Strategic**	**Daily Strategic Stock take**
	Operational	**Daily Management and Communications Meeting**
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting
0930 – 1000	**Tactical**	**Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales) (CVO(W)) Daily Review**
1000 – 1100	**Strategic**	**National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) – NSC (THRC)**
1000 – 1030	**Tactical**	**Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC(W)) Bird-table**
1130 – 1200	**Strategic**	**Defra Media Briefing**
	Operational	**Media Briefing**
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
1230 – 1300	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) Bird-table**
1300 – 1330	**Tactical / Operational**	**CVO(W) / Outbreak Director Wales / Policy Adviser catch-up**
1400 – 1430	**Tactical / Operational**	**CDCC Management Teleconference**
1500 – 1600	**Strategic**	**NSC (THRC)**
1700 – 1730	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) Bird-table**
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	FOB Bird-table
1800	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) situation report sent to Outbreak Co-ordination Centre Operations Team**
Ad-hoc	**Strategic**	**Animal Disease Policy Group**

	Tactical	**National Experts Group**

At the commencement of an outbreak, APHA's Corporate External Communications Liaison Manager will make contact with the affected local authority's communications team, who will be involved in the daily communications meeting at 9.00am, as detailed in Tables 1 and 2.

During an outbreak ACTSO will disseminate relevant messages from Defra / the Welsh Government to all local authorities in England and Wales, as agreed at amber teleconferences, communication meetings, and NDCC bird-table meetings. This information will be shared via email immediately following these briefings and will be circulated to Heads of Service and lead animal health contacts, as previously identified to ACTSO. It is therefore important to inform ACTSO of any staff changes by emailing admin@actso.org.uk.In addition, Defra / the Welsh Government's websites will be a key source of information for accessing up-to-date information.

Internal Local Authority Communications

The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF), Emergency Planning and Communication departments should establish effective processes for sharing the latest information on the outbreak situation. This is important for ensuring all local authority staff are making decisions based on the most up-to-date information, particularly for staff working out in the field, and to encourage an organisation-wide effective response.

Elected members will be interested in an exotic notifiable animal disease situation and may face direct queries from members of the public and stakeholders. The Communications department would take the lead in proactively engaging with elected members, however, direct contact with the LAAHF and Emergency Planning would also support this relationship e.g., providing a joint briefing session from these departments. It is vital that immediate verbal responses provided by elected members only relay information already publicly issued by the local authority.

Releasing Information to the Public

During an outbreak affected local authorities will be expected to release warning and informing communications. The upmost care must be taken when releasing any written or verbal information into the public domain. Local authorities will need to ensure that communications to the media and public follow the national briefing line but also include local emphasis. **Local authorities should only release specific information about the disease outbreak to the public which has already been publicised on Defra / the Welsh Government's website.**

Whilst media reports need to be honest, caution must be exercised to prevent the spread of scaremongering stories that could be harmful to the agricultural industry and its recovery in terms of export trade and public confidence. That said, local authorities should aim to be proactive with releasing information updates to prevent the release of misleading or unhelpful stories. This should be done in liaison with Defra / the Welsh Government's press office and may involve setting up a media

briefing room close to the source of an outbreak. Ideally representatives from the press team of the local authority, Defra / the Welsh Government, APHA and the police should be involved at press conferences. Additionally, social media will be an important tool in communicating with the public.

It will be advisable for communications teams in the affected authorities to liaise closely with the Local Government Association (LGA) / Welsh Local Government Association's (WLGA) communications team who can provide advice and support, as well as APHA's press office.

Further guidance on specific operational communications tasks is also listed in Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak.

Scaling Down After a Suspect or Confirmed Incident

At a national level stand down procedures only commence upon notification from Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA, and in tandem with the official stand down of the national animal disease contingency plan. This will only be considered once there has been an acceptable period after the last disease confirmation, and upon consideration of veterinary opinion.

Some local authorities may be able to engage in a range of recovery activities before the national disease contingency plan has been officially stood down if the local area has not received a new disease confirmation for a period of time. It would be important for a local authority to discuss this matter with APHA before any recovery activities are commenced. Additionally, a local authority should refer to any stand down procedures in its generic emergency response plan and to any LRF recovery plans which may be in place.

It is recognised that local contingency plans may be stood down at a different time to the national plans, for example there could be an isolated, confirmed case of Avian Influenza within a local authority area and all controls are completed well ahead of the whole country being disease free.

Local authorities should consider any LRF processes for standing down after an animal disease outbreak, both in relation to timing and lessons learned. It would also be important for a local authority to discuss this matter with APHA before any recovery activities are commenced.

Lessons learned should be undertaken and any relevant findings shared with APHA.

6. Resources

In the operational section of this contingency plan, the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are asked to consider and populate information on local risks and priorities, including a profile of all animal premises, and the staff and equipment resources required to response to an outbreak situation. Refer to Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak for more information.

In addition to this, senior management of a local authority should consider the financial forecasting implications when preparing for and responding to suspect or confirmed cases of exotic notifiable animal disease. This should be done in conjunction with the Emergency Planning and Finance departments. Local authorities may be able to apply for EU reimbursement / Bellwin funding to recoup some of the costs associated with responding to an outbreak situation, where appropriate. Any such information on funding will be made available by Defra / the Welsh Government or the Local Government Association / Welsh Local Government Association at an appropriate time. ACTSO and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel will help ensure that any such information is communicated to all local authorities.

7. Health and Safety

The health and safety of staff during an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak should be considered in line with a local authority's existing health and safety and occupational health policies, with particular attention being drawn to the need for risk assessments, COSHH (control of substances hazardous to health) specifically in relation to the use of disinfectants and zoonotic diseases.

All staff must promote and practice effective biosecurity measures to minimise the risk of further disease spread or reoccurrence. Further information on biosecurity can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals and https://gov.wales/biosecurity-guidance

During an outbreak the risks will vary dependent on the type of disease. Further information on health and safety can be found in the disease annexes that support this contingency plan, for example the provision of precautionary vaccinations during a rabies outbreak. Alternatively, a local authority may wish to contact the Health and Safety Executive or UKHSA/ Public Health Wales for further advice.

Part 2: Operational Section

Introduction to the Operational Section

This operational section of the contingency plan has been designed for use by local authority officers with animal health and welfare duties. Local authorities are encouraged to input additional localised information into this section to facilitate a timely, more organised response in the event of an exotic notifiable disease outbreak. The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are encouraged to undertake this planning with their internal Emergency Planning department.

8. Preparing for an Outbreak

Local Authority Key Responsibilities

A local authority's key responsibilities in a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak are already listed in the strategic section of this plan. Please refer to Chapter 3 Local Authority Key Responsibilities.

Local Risks and Priorities

The LAAHF are encouraged to populate information about risks, resources, and local premises in this section to assist officers in making quick informed decisions when responding to an outbreak. Some templates have been included to prompt ideas on the type of information that could be captured, although, local authorities may wish to re-design this section dependent on their specific needs and priorities or to ensure that reporting functions are readily available to generate this type of information at short notice from the LAAHF's databases.

This type of information can be very useful when making decisions during the initial response to a suspect or confirmed outbreak and it will assist local authority officers attending the Central Disease Control Centre (CDCC) and other response meetings.

Additionally, some local authorities may wish to do a more detailed SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) on how they would respond to a suspect or confirmed outbreak in their local area.

Table 3: Profile of Animal Premises in the Local Area

1) OVERVIEW OF PREMISES	
Premises Type	**Number of premises**
Livestock markets	1
Abattoirs	6
Slaughterhouses – red meat	0
Slaughterhouses – white meat	0
Cattle premises	782
Horse premises	143 (probably more than this)
Pig premises	627
Poultry premises	832 (probably more than this)
Sheep and goat premises	1691
Potential animal import premises	Unknown
Dog kennels	Unknown
Racecourses	0
Stables	Unknown
Processing plants	1 (Cat 3)
Knackers yards	0
Renderers / Incinerators	0
Livestock hauliers	11
Veterinary practices	Unknown
Other (please specify)	0
2) LOCAL RISKS IDENTIFIED *e.g., impact on local businesses if markets are cancelled, is it an intensive agriculture area?*	
Ashford animal market – significant regional impact on trade if closed.	
3) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS *e.g., unique geographic characteristics like large areas of wetlands*	
Romney Marsh – low lying area, heavily farmed for sheep, N downs.	

Suggested Tasks – Contingency Planning

Preparation is key to effective prioritisation, resource management, data management, communication, IT support and delivering disease controls.
The LAAHF should carry out the following activities to ensure they are prepared for an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak, regarding contingency planning, resource management, communication, equipment and understanding of risk. **It is recommended these are reviewed on an annual basis.**

Preparation - Contingency planning			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
1	**Review ACTSO / NAHWP contingency guidance with relevant local authority services** to adopt plan in full or update existing plan / processes.		
2	**Review and update contact details in local plan on an annual basis**, including contacts for relevant local services such as LAAHF, emergency planning, communication, IT and senior management. Consider out of hours contacts and ensure it is clear how to contact each service. See **Annex A** for possible contact list.		
3	**Share the agreed local disease contingency plan with local partners**, ensuring the relationship with the LRF and any multi-agency plans is clear. The role of the LRF will vary at a local level and this should be discussed and agreed. Contact details will need to be recorded, use **Annex A** for possible contact list.		
4	**The timing of notification within the local authority and to LRF partners of suspect / confirmed cases should be agreed in advance, including formal activation of the plan.** This may vary depending on local / national risk, timing of the case, disease type.		
5	**Contingency arrangements can be tested under local or regional exercises.**		

Preparation - Resource management			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
6	**Ensure local authority animal health officers are aware of the exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan and understand the role** required of them, including providing training and mentoring where required.		

7	Consider ongoing **training and competency** requirements for animal health and welfare officers on the local authority role in a notifiable animal disease outbreak.		
8	Under Section 52 of the Animal Health Act 1981 a local authority shall appoint as many inspectors and other officers as it believes is necessary for the enforcement of this Act. As part of the contingency planning process, local authorities can populate **Annex I** to **map the staff that can potentially be available to respond to an animal disease outbreak and the activities they can carry out.**		
9	**Establish local authority services that can contribute to the animal disease response, including those that can provide additional resource**. This will include HR, IT, Communications, Management, Emergency Planning, Procurement and Resource to carry out basic administration / call handling. Consideration needs to be given to smaller isolated outbreaks, such as AI, to what would happen in a larger outbreak / multiple / ongoing outbreaks. These might be included in generic emergency planning instructions, so these should be checked. See **Annex I** to support discussions about the which services to contact and what resources that the LAAHF might require. **Request a list of volunteers that can be used in an outbreak or put in place a process to quickly request these from relevant services.**		
10	**Ensure local processes are clear about what local authority services and external partners to contact in a disease outbreak, including out of hours arrangements. This should include details on whether to notify at suspect or confirmed stage, which may vary depending on risk, timing, disease type.** Notification could reach a non-AH service in the first instance; therefore, all local services must be clear to contact the LAAHF in the first instance. This might be included in generic emergency planning instructions.		

11	Discuss resources at a regional level and consider where **cross border warranting** is viable. See **Annex C** for template.		

Preparation - Communication			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
12	Ensure **that contact details on the Local Authority Animal Health Function Contact List are up to date**. This list is used by APHA and ACTSO to notify local authorities of suspect animal disease cases in their area. If a LAAHF does not provide an out of hours service, this may be covered by the local authority's emergency planning department / organisation wide out of hours contact service, a multi-agency partner, or even a neighbouring authority.		
13	**Build relations with the local APHA Resilience and Technical Advisors (RATAs)** and have relevant contact details to hand for animal disease situations.		
14	**Sign up to the APHA animal disease alert service**. This provides animal disease updates to the public.		
15	**Work with local communications team to identify key internal / external partners** and establish contact details for each. Map what communication tools each might use to reach communities. Consider the role of community groups and hubs (such as schools and libraries), industry, parish / town councils, charities. This can be shared with LRF.		
16	**Identify senior managers / elected members to respond to media queries.** Consider if template briefings are appropriate.		

Preparation - Equipment			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
17	**Annex D** provides **an indicative guide of the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak**. **Local authorities should decide what equipment and what levels need to be kept in stock.** Equipment needs will vary depending on the type of disease, so		

	disease specific annexes may also need to be reviewed.		
18	Local authorities will need to consider how equipment stores will be **maintained and a system is in place to log equipment use / availability**. Ideally agreements should be put in place with suppliers to facilitate a swift response to an outbreak. Agree effective process for deployment and retrieval, ordering and stock takes.		
19	**Review road sign requirements for key animal diseases** to ensure the local authority is able to produce and erect these in a timely fashion. This might require stores of signs, a ready list of contractors that can supply at short notice or a coordinated regional response. See **Annex G** for further guidance.		
20	**Discuss voice / data equipment with IT service**, including phones, laptops, tablets, printing, maps, access to systems and out of hours support. Consider process to log equipment in and out of the office where appropriate and how to access data / systems when out of the office.		

Preparation - Understanding risk			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
21	It is recommended that the **LAAHF have ready access to an overview of animal premises and risks in their area in the event of a disease outbreak.** This type of information can be very useful when making decisions during the initial response to a suspect or confirmed outbreak and it will assist local authority officers attending the Forward Operations Base (FOB) and other response meetings. The LAAHF are encouraged to populate information in **Annex J** about risks, resources, and local premises in this section to assist officers in making quick informed decisions when responding to an outbreak. This can be adapted to reflect local processes, data, and needs. It should be updated annually.		
22	**Ensure data records on livestock premises are up to date.**		

Resources to Respond

Following activation of this contingency plan, a local authority should consider its available resources when planning a short, medium- and long-term response to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Local authorities are a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and this may have already been considered through a local authority's business continuity management arrangements.

Defra / the Welsh Government and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) categorise outbreaks as follows:

- Category 1 – Single disease. 1 Infected Premises (IPs). No complex factors involved (i.e., a simple disease case to deal with). Duration is likely to be only a few months, including lessons learned exercise. Little political, public and or media interest after the initial announcements.

- Category 2 – Single disease. More than 1 IPs mainly within the same control zone, in the same close geographic area or with clear business links between IPs or are within the same company structure (geographic spread of IPs may indicate a category 3 outbreak). End to end duration up to six months, including lessons learned exercise. Greater political, public and or media interest at the initial announcements, but reduces quickly.

- Category 3 – Two concurrent diseases. Up to 20 IPs with a geographic spread and few business links between IPs. End to end duration of 6 - 12 months which could involve an external inquiry.

- Category 4 - Three or more concurrent diseases. More than 20 IPs with geographic spread and few business links between IPs or not within the same company structure. End to end duration of more than 12 months. Likely to involve one or more external inquiries. High level of sustained political (COBR involvement), public and or media interest.

Staff Resources

Under Section 52 of the Animal Health Act 1981 a local authority can appoint as many inspectors and other officers as it believes is necessary for the execution and enforcement of this Act. As part of the contingency planning process, KCC and/or Medway Council has the following staff roles that can potentially be available to respond.

Table 4: Local Authority Staff Resource Log

Roles	LAAHF Team	Other LA Staff	Partner agencies
Trained LA Inspectors ***With enforcement powers***	26 staff (6 PTSO. 20 TSO)		
Untrained LA Inspectors ***No enforcement powers***	0		
Other field staff ***No enforcement powers***	2 Accredited Financial Investigators		
Admin Support	10		
Other Staff	5 (managers – 1 head of service, 4 Operations Managers)		
Staff required for business as usual activities	15 PTSO / TSO and 2 or 3 OM's		

Equipment Resources

Annex D provides an indicative guide of the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak. It should be noted that equipment needs will vary dependent on the type of disease and further information on this is available in the relevant **disease annex**.

The preparation, maintenance and accurate logging of equipment stores are vital peacetime activities i.e., not during an outbreak. Local authorities must ensure this work is regularly completed and that there are established links, and ideally agreements, in place with suppliers to facilitate a swift response to an outbreak. Equipment checks should be recorded in the **review log** of this document and damaged equipment must be replaced immediately.

9. Notification and Activation of this Contingency Plan

Receiving Notification of Suspect or Confirmed Disease

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) regularly investigates suspect disease, and such investigations should be seen as routine. For suspect cases where disease cannot be ruled out and samples are taken, APHA will contact the relevant Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) by telephone to inform them that they have placed the suspect premises under restriction.

If the LAAHF receives information regarding a suspect case from any source other than the APHA, they should <u>immediately</u> contact APHA.

APHA will notify the LAAHF via telephone using the pre-agreed contact numbers as detailed in the alerting flowchart overleaf. APHA will share a copy of the premise's restriction notice (NDI 1 form) with a LAAHF, however, this can only be sent to a secure email account. If the disease in question is zoonotic (i.e., it can be transmitted from animals to humans) APHA will also contact UKHSA / Public Health Wales.

APHA operate a 24-hour continuous service all year round. It is the LAAHF's responsibility to ensure the APHA field services office is aware of it's out of hours emergency contact procedures and relevant phone numbers. This information should be recorded in the **Contact List in Annex A**. (If a LAAHF does not provide an out of hours service, this may be covered by the local authority's emergency planning department / organisation wide out of hours contact service, a multi-agency partner, or even a neighbouring authority.)

Activating this Contingency Plan

When the LAAHF initially receives notification of a suspect or confirmed case of exotic notifiable animal disease from the APHA, the relevant Head of Service and Emergency Planning department must be informed immediately. It is advisable that this plan should be activated at this stage, although this should be discussed in line with a local authority's existing internal arrangements. A decision should also be made on whether other key partners should be notified, such as LRF partner agencies.

The LRF is the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. To allow a measured and appropriate response to suspect exotic notifiable animal disease it is important to ensure that LRF partner agencies and any other key partners of the LAAHF are alerted in line with pre-agreed triggers. The principles of an initial notification process have been demonstrated in the flowchart below. The specific triggers and emergency contact procedures should be agreed locally for both suspect and confirmed disease and considered alongside information in **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak.**

When agreeing this notification process, it should be agreed which exotic notifiable animal diseases are likely to have a larger impact on the local region and should therefore be classified as a higher priority that would trigger an earlier notification to the LRF. Putting this in the context of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), this would be which disease are likely to meet the definition of an emergency under the CCA. If a LAAHF receives notification of suspect or confirmed disease that has not been classified as high priority, they will liaise with the Emergency Planning department and Director of Public Health (if applicable for zoonotic disease) to monitor the situation and will only trigger a full LRF alert if this is deemed necessary as over-alerting can prompt false alarm and unnecessary preparations. It is important to stress the need for confidentiality and limiting the circulation of this type of sensitive information, which should only be shared on a need-to-know basis.

Diagram 1: The Initial Notification Process

The notification process for suspect and confirmed outbreaks must be agreed locally and the relevant contact details inputted into this template. Contact should be made by phone wherever possible.



10. Responding to an Outbreak

10.1 Overview of a Suspect Disease Case

- There is a legal duty on any person who suspects that an animal may have a notifiable disease to report their suspicion to the Secretary of State / Welsh Ministers via the APHA. If the LAAHF receives information regarding a suspect case from any source other than the APHA, they should immediately contact APHA.

- If the report leads APHA to suspect disease may be present, the following activities will be undertaken –



- If suspicion of disease is strong, in certain circumstances the CVO may call a **national amber alert teleconference** to assess the risk of the situation and agree on the next steps required to respond to the situation.

- The CVO has the option to **slaughter on suspicion** where the veterinary assessment on site and epidemiological factors indicate that disease is highly likely to be confirmed. This is only likely in an ongoing disease outbreak.

10.2 Responding to an Outbreak

1. Following notification of a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal outbreak from the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) needs to ensure that the Heads of Service for their department and the Emergency Planning department are informed of the situation immediately, if they are not already aware.

2. Particular consideration needs to be given to the following points, which have been grouped into suggested tasks during the suspicion phase and suggested

tasks if disease is confirmed. Local authorities may wish to populate these tasks into a tabular format to monitor progress made against individual tasks and identify staff responsibilities.

Local Authority Check List – Suspected Case

1. The hours between notification of suspicion of disease and confirmation of disease can be vital to the initial response. Depending on the type of disease, likelihood of confirmation and timing of the suspect case, local authorities can begin to consider data, IT, resource, mapping and communication priorities and the impact on services that deliver these. During suspicion the LAAHF should review its contingency plans and monitor the situation, in liaison with the APHA and the local authority's Emergency Planning department, to establish whether a short, medium- or long-term response is anticipated. Initial preparations are vital at this stage and dependant on the disease the following aspects may need to be considered.

Suspect Case - Contingency Planning			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
1	These actions do not duplicate those already required in the 'preparation' section; therefore, you may also need to **check all of the 'preparation' actions have been completed and are up to date.**		
2	If samples have been taken, **the LAAHF should email the relevant Head of Service and Emergency Planning** department. Managers can begin to consider how to notify other services in line with a local authority's existing internal arrangements and whether to notify the LRF / activate the contingency plan as agreed. Consider whether the disease is a high priority / high risk and may take more resource.		
3	During suspicion the LAAHF should check its contingency plans and monitor the situation, in liaison with the APHA and the local authority's Emergency Planning department, to **establish whether a short-, medium- or long-term response is anticipated**.		
4	A decision should also be made **on whether other key partners should be notified**, such as LRF partner agencies. This will depend on the likelihood and type of animal disease. It is important to stress the need for confidentiality and		

	limiting the circulation of this type of sensitive information, which should only be shared on a need-to-know basis		
5	**Review contingency check list and relevant KHub guidance**.		

Suspect Case – Animal Disease Control			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
6	**Confirm APHA liaison points** and out of hours contact.		
7	Depending on the likelihood of confirmation**, ask APHA whether additional FOB premises will be required.**		
8	**Take direction from the APHA on expected timescales for laboratory results and likely result.** Whilst planning, remember the relevant CVO has the option to approve slaughter on suspicion ahead of laboratory test results.		
9	**Confirm with APHA what enforcement controls may be required in the temporary control zones** and how these might change if disease is confirmed.		
10	APHA will map disease control zones, but these can be anticipated by the local authority to **establish any risks in zones. Risks may be related to farming industry or specific premises, but also geographic features or the built environment.**		
11	**Check records on the infected premises together with any associated premises** such as those linked under the 10-mile rule. Any relevant history or record should be forwarded to APHA.		

Suspect Case - Communication			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
12	**Consider notifying communications team and relevant services that interface with the public**, in line with local processes. This may need to consider the specific disease,		

	likelihood of confirmation, timing, public interest.		
13	**Consider alerting neighboring LAAHF's**, if appropriate, using the Local Authority Animal Health Function Contact List.		
14	**Check public access to guidance, legislation and forms. Check services receiving queries directly from the public know where information is available**. Consider liaison with IT to support this.		
15	**Consider creating or obtaining a disease summary document** to relay important information to the local community / senior managers.		

Suspect Case – Resource Management			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
16	Consider what **resources and funding** are required to respond to the outbreak based on preparatory work. This will include LAAHF resource for disease controls, IT, communications, management, HR, emergency planning, procurement, and resource to carry out basic administration / call handling. **See Annex I.**		
17	Consider how staff can be **contacted out of hours** if disease is confirmed and what out of hours resource might be required. Weekend support from a manager / officers might be required, depending on the timing.		
18	**Ensure LAAHF have access to voice / data equipment and IT support** as agreed in preparation.		
19	Review any **health and safety considerations** specific to the potential disease. Refer to the disease annexes for more information and if the disease is zoonotic and contact the local UK Health Security Agency / Public Health Wales centre for guidance.		

Suspect Case – Equipment			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**

20	**Undertake a quick equipment stock check to ensure there are sufficient biosecurity and equipment supplies** available. **See Annex D.** Consider what other services within a local authority may have reasons to visit livestock premises and ensure biosecurity guidance is relayed to them.		

Suspect Case – Risk Assessment			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Remarks**
21	**Update the profile of the animal premises** in the local area and identify which businesses are likely to be affected. See **Annex J.**		
22	**Establish horizon scanning procedures** to identify potential operational / logistical problems and appropriate solutions, in liaison with emergency planning.		

10.3 Overview of Confirmed Animal Disease Stage

If **disease is confirmed by positive laboratory test results**, or the relevant CVO makes a decision to confirm disease at the amber teleconference stage, command and control structures are put in place to direct and co-ordinate the disease control response. The lead agencies for co-ordinating this response are Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA.

The local authority with Infected Premises (IP) will be formally notified by APHA. Where possible ACTSO will forward relevant ND1 forms where suspect.

It is likely that a declaratory order will be put place to introduce a **Surveillance Zone (10km around the IP) and a Protection Zone (3km around the IP),** which will introduce movement controls. For some diseases, movements, gatherings, exports or hunting / shooting might be banned on a wider basis.

At a tactical level, the **National Disease Control Centre (NDCC**) is led by the CVO UK and brings together strategic and tactical level functions in close collaboration. The frequency of teleconference is decided at the start of the outbreak, it may be more frequent until the extent and severity of the outbreak is understood. ACTSO attend this on behalf of local authorities, along with other national agencies, Government departments and industry bodies.

At an operational level, APHA coordinates operational activities taking place at the **Forward Operations Base (FOB) and permanently operating Customer Service Centres (CSC).**

APHA will share details of controls to local authorities and liaise about the enforcement and communication approach, including risks, priorities, resources and activities require to ensure controls are adherred to.

- At a strategic level, the national government response is co-ordinated through strategic direction from Ministers and senior officials. In very serious outbreaks **COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room)** may be convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. This is unusual.

Local Authority Check List on Confirmation of Animal Disease

Upon confirmation of an exotic notifiable animal disease in the local area, the local authority should consider -

Confirmation - Contingency Planning			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
1	These actions do not duplicate those already required in the 'preparation' and 'suspect case' sections; therefore, you may also need to **check all of the 'preparation' and 'suspect' actions have been completed and up to date.**		
2	The relevant **Head of Service and Emergency Planning department must be informed immediately, and plan activated**. Other services should be told as per internal processes. Notification may vary depending on the specific disease, local risk profile and public interest.		
3	**Notification to LRF partners as per agreed processes and plans**.		

Confirmation – Animal Disease Control			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
4	**Liaise with APHA to confirm priorities for disease control and local authority role enforcing restrictions and movement controls.**		
5	**Set up clear communication channels with APHA.** This will normally be done via the LAAHF to the RATAs but may also include attendance at FOB meetings (in person or via teleconferencing). If a control zone covers multiple local authority borders or there are infected premises in multiple local authorities, it is advisable that local authorities coordinate resources to support effective communication with APHA and across the local authorities involved.		
6	**Ensure APHA have provided up to date, detailed and accurate maps on the controlled zones.** Declaratory orders can be checked on the APHA website. Liaison with local authority		

	mapping teams may be required if APHA maps are late, inaccurate or lack detail.		
7	**Assist in the identification of otherwise unknown livestock holdings,** updating records and risk profile as necessary. Depending on the disease, this may include door to door enquiries, social media or communication through local authority community links.		
8	**Monitor cleansing and disinfection (C&D) requirements and serve notices were necessary.** Defra, APHA and the Environment Agency have produced joint guidance on the disposal of disinfectant wash water from C&D activities.		
9	Establish approach to **recording and analysing intelligence** to uphold movement controls and investigate infringements, including liaison with APHA and the Police as appropriate.		
10	Discuss whether there is likely to be a requirement to **close footpaths and roads around infected premises** and other suspected premises upon request by the APHA, though in most disease situations this is **unlikely**. Refer to **Annex H** for further guidance.		
11	**Ensure all staff and operational managers have awareness of / access to relevant legislation and local authority powers**.		
12	**Discuss and agree potential Field Office Based (FOB) requirements with APHA**, including proximity to the IP, IT, staffing, cost.		
13	**Retain an electronic log of key events, decisions made, and actions taken**. Oversight should be maintained by nominated managers.		

Confirmation - Communication

It is paramount to handle communications effectively during suspect and confirmed disease outbreaks to ensure all relevant agencies are aware of the unfolding situation and that they are receiving and responding to the most up-to-date information.

Equally information that is released to the general public needs to be managed effectively because of the effect this could have on the agricultural industry, local and national commerce. **Official communications must mirror those lines out by Defra and APHA**.

	Task	Date Completed	Notes
14	Ensure relevant staff are signed up to receive animal disease information alerts from the **APHA Disease Subscription Service.**		
15	APHA operate a 24-hour continuous service all year round.		
16	During an outbreak **ACTSO will disseminate any relevant messages from Defra / the Welsh Government that need to be sent to all local authorities in England and Wales.** This information will be emailed to Heads of Service and lead animal health contacts, as previously identified to ACTSO.		
17	**Provide appropriate communication with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), including meetings where relevant and** based on local processes.		
18	Working with Emergency Planning and Communication departments, the LAAHF should confirm there is an effective process for sharing the latest information on the outbreak situation within the local authority. **Ensure timely, targeted, and appropriate updates are provided** to the LAAHF team (in the office and out in the field), elected members, other internal departments, borough and district councils, neighbouring local authorities (if applicable) and other key partners.		
19	Elected members will be interested in an exotic notifiable animal disease situation and may face direct queries from members of the public and stakeholders. The local authority may want to **ensure that elected members**		

	and senior managers have agreed communication lines that reflect the national position.		
20	Ensure that all LRF partners have agreed public communication lines based on Defra / APHA position.		
21	Work with LA communications team to agree how national lines and information on local controls, as agreed with APHA, will be shared. Information can be targeted based on risk and local area. This could include: • **Local authority website and social media.** • **Local radio, television, and newspapers.** • **Leafleting at community hubs, such as libraries, schools, parish / town councils.** • **Setting up a dedicated helpline / email.** • **Text messages and social media.** • **Mail shots.**		
22	**Ensure an effective first point of contact is in place within the LAAHF** to handle enquiries and updates from partners, the farming community and the public receive via the local communications team.		
23	**Ensure IT and website requirements are identified**. Consider identifying a liaison point in the LAAHF for the local authority communications team to check the technical aspect of briefings, confirm priorities and ensure that information can be released in a timely fashion.		

Confirmation – Resource management			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
24	**Confirm staff required to effectively enforce disease control legislation** and provide advice. See **Annex I.**		
25	**Verify officer authorisations are up-to-date** and appropriate for all tasks including the serving of notices where required.		

26	**As per agreed processes, verify resource other relevant local authority teams for non-enforcement activities**, such as administration, call handling and filtering requests for advice.		
27	Ensure Health and Safety officers are contacted, and appropriate **risk assessments are in place for disease control**, including relevant COSHH assessments and infection control policies for zoonotic disease risks. If the disease is zoonotic contact the local UK Health Security Agency / Public Health Wales centre. **Relevant training and PPE** must be given to staff as needed.		
28	Ensure that a LAAHF retains records for **financial forecasting / reporting**. This should be established immediately and maintained in line with local processes.		

Confirmation - Equipment			
	Task	**Date Completed**	**Notes**
29	Continue to ensure the required quantities and types of **personal protection equipment is available for all staff** and that Defra / the Welsh Government approved disinfectant is available for the type of disease. Government guidance on use of approved disinfectants and the list of approved disinfectants are available on the Defra website. See **Annex D** for equipment list.		
30	Consider what **road and footpath signs are required** to raise awareness of disease control measures in liaison with APHA. The local authority will need to consider the legal duty to erect signs, but also the practical benefit and veterinary risk assessment. Verify local process for deployment and retrieval, ordering and stock takes. Refer to **Annex G** for guidance on outbreak signage. Plan resource to erect and remove in liaison with Highways.		

31	**Ensure LAAHF staff have necessary IT equipment** and processes in place to handover where required.		

Annex A - Contact List

Please ensure the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have up-to-date contact information for the Lead Animal Health Officer and out of hours contact arrangements. All contact lists should be reviewed on an annual basis.

1) Local Authority Out of Hours Emergency Contact Procedures

Department	KCC Emergency Contact Number	Medway Emergency Contact Numbers
Animal Health and Welfare		
Emergency Planning		
Communications		
Highways, public footpaths, and rights of way		
Other		

2) Local Authority Internal Contact List

Roles	Kent Contacts	Medway Contacts
Head of Service responsible for Animal Health and Welfare		
Lead Officer for Animal Health and Welfare		
Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager		
Head of Service for Paid Services		
Head of Service for Communications		
Head of Service for Highways, Footpaths and Public Rights of Way		
Head of Service for Public Health		
Head of Service for Human Resources		
Head of Service for Finance		

3) Local / Regional Partners

Organisation Name	**Contact Name**	**Telephone numbers** *(include mobile no)*	**Email**	**Website**
APHA Field Services Office				
Kent Resilience Forum	Via the Duty Emergency Planning Officer			
District / Borough Councils				
Neighbouring Local Authorities				
Environment Agency				
Kent Fire and Rescue Service				
NHS England				
Police				
UKHSA				
Quarantine Carriers				
Local veterinary practices				
Farming industry trade bodies e.g. NFU				

4) National Partners

Organisation Name	**Telephone numbers** *(include mobile no)*	**Email**	**Website**
Defra			https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs
Natural Resources Wales			www.naturalresourceswales.gov.uk
Animal and Plant Health Agency			https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency
Assoc. of Chief Trading Standards Officers			www.actso.org.uk
Local Government Association			www.local.gov.uk
Welsh Local Government Association			www.wlga.gov.uk
Environment Agency Incident Helpline			https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environment-agency

It is advisable to keep a note of the contact details that have been previously shared with APHA and ACTSO here:

Lead Officer for Animal Health	
Contact Name	
Job Title	
Email Address	
Mobile Number	
Emergency Contact (out of hours only)	
Emergency Contact Mobile Number	
Remit of this emergency contact cover? E.g., Civil Contingency Unit, whole local authority etc.	

Annex B - Glossary of Terms

ACTSO	Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers
AH&W	Animal Health and Welfare
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AI	Avian Influenza
APHA	Animal and Plant Health Agency
ASF	African Swine Fever
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
CDCC	Central Disease Control Centre
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
COSHH	Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Covid-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DARDNI	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (England)
DLUHC	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
EA	Environment Agency
ECC(W)	Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FSA	Food Standards Agency
GIS	Geographic Information System
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IP	Infected Premise
LA	Local Authority
LAAHF	Local Authority Animal Health Function
LGA	Local Government Association
Livestock	All animals (including poultry) susceptible to exotic notifiable disease
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
NAHWP	National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NFU	National Farmers Union
NHS	National Health Service
NRW	Natural Resources Wales
NSC (THRC)	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience & Contingencies)
OIE	Office International des Epizooties (World Organisation for Animal Health)
OV	Official Veterinarian
PHW	Public Health Wales
PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
PZ	Protection Zone
RCG	Recovery Co-ordinating Group
RFM	Regional Field Manager (APHA)
ROM	Resilience and Operational Manager (APHA)

RPE	Respiratory Protective Equipment
RRM	Readiness and Resilience Manager (APHA)
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SoS	Secretary of State
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
SZ	Surveillance Zone
TCG	Tactical Co-ordinating Group
TCZ	Temporary Control Zone
TSSE	Trading Standards South East
UKHSA	United Kingdom Health Security Agency
VENDU	Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit, part of APHA
VI	Veterinary Inspector
WG	Welsh Government
WLGA	Welsh Local Government Association
WNV	West Nile Virus

Annex C - Command Structures in Great Britain



To be considered alongside the information in Chapter 5 Command Structures and Communications in an Outbreak.

Annex D - Suggested Equipment List

An indicative guide to the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak. Equipment needs will vary dependent on the type of disease, further information on this is available in the relevant disease annex.

Equipment Item	**Amount**	**Location**	**Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation of equipment** *Include phone and email*	**Supplier details for ordering extra equipment** *Include contact details and website where appropriate*
Personal Protective Equipment				
Steel toe capped wellington boots or waders				
Overalls (preferably disposable)				
Breathable waterproof suit or coat and leggings				
Disposable gloves				
Hi-visibility jackets or vests				
Eye protection (goggles or visor)				
Vinyl gloves				
Safety helmet				
Dust masks				
Respirators				
First aid kit				

Equipment Item	**Amount**	**Location**	**Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation of equipment** *Include phone and email*	**Supplier details for ordering extra equipment** *Include contact details and website where appropriate*
Biosecurity				
Approved Disinfectants				See link for further guidance, disinfectant needs vary dependent on type of disease: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defraapproved-disinfectant-when-and-how-touse-it
Buckets				
Scrubbing brush				
Long handled brush				
Pressure sprayer				
Anti-bacterial soap or wipes				
Paper towels				
Container carrying clean water				
Red and white barrier tape				
Signage for the public				

Annex E - Disease Summary Sheet – Glanders

This type of document could be used to communicate information to the local community. Local authorities would need to populate the information highlighted in yellow. Further examples are available on the Knowledge Hub and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on ResilienceDirect.

Following an outbreak of Glanders in XXX the following restrictions have been placed on any premises containing horses within a 3km zone as indicated in the adjacent map.

Insert map of the infected premises / any subsequent control zones.

Glanders is a highly contagious disease of equines caused by the bacteria, Burkholderia mallei (burk-hol-dare-EE-ah MAL-EE-eye). Glanders primarily affects horses, mules, and donkeys. Infection can also occur in dogs, cats, goats and camels. The disease can also be severe for hamsters and guinea pigs.

It is vital that all the controls are complied with to ensure that this disease can be quickly eradicated. If your premises are within the above zone below is a summary of the rules that you must comply with.

1) If you suspect that any horse or carcase is affected with disease it must be isolated from all other horses and reported to your local Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) office.

2) You must apply for a licence from the APHA before you move any horse or carcase to or from your property.

3) You must apply for a licence from the APHA before you move any fodder, manure, bedding, vehicle, equipment, or other thing used or intended to be used for or in connection with horses, off your property.

4) You must ensure that any person entering or leaving your premises does so in accordance with the biosecurity guidance as detailed overleaf.

5) You must ensure that no horses are allowed to stray from your property.

6) If any horse dies on your property, the carcase must be isolated, and you must contact the APHA immediately.

A notice indicating that your property contains horses and is under restriction must be erected at any entrance to it.

Any alleged breaches of the above requirements should be reported to Insert Council Name on Insert Telephone Number. Full details of the full controls can be found on the Defra website at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs

Commonly asked Questions

1) How does Glanders affect my animal?

The most common sign of infection in animals is yellow-green nasal discharge and ulcers on the nose. The horse may have enlarged lymph nodes and nodules on the skin. In some cases, they may look like long, hard ropes, under the skin. Severe coughing can also occur. Long term infections can occur in horses, which may last for several years. Disease in mules and donkeys can start rapidly (acute) and can lead to death in 1 to 2 weeks after exposure.

2) How can my animal get Glanders?

Horses get Glanders by close contact with other infected horses, especially through shared water and feed troughs as well as by nuzzling. The bacteria can also be spread by clothing, vehicles and equipment such as brushes, halters or harnesses. Carnivores, especially cats, can get Glanders after eating contaminated meat.

3) Can I get Glanders?

Yes. People can get Glanders by having direct contact with infected animals or contaminated objects. Entry of the bacteria occurs through the skin (wounds, cuts) or through surface of the eyes and nose. People in close contact with horses (veterinarians, farriers, other animal workers) are at greater risk for getting Glanders. In people, the disease can affect the skin, lungs, or the entire body. Signs may include fever, chills, muscle aches, and chest pain; pneumonia can rapidly develop. Nodules or ulcers may occur in the skin or the nose, eyes, or mouth.

4) Who should I contact, if I suspect Glanders?

In Animals – Contact the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) on 03000 200 301 immediately.

In Humans – Contact your doctor immediately.

5) How can I protect my animal from Glanders?

There is no vaccine available for Glanders, however, early detection of any spread of this disease will ensure that this outbreak can be quickly controlled and eradicated.

6) How can I protect myself from Glanders?

Prevention for people involves identifying and eliminating the disease in the animal population. If you see the signs or symptoms of Glanders in a horse, mule or donkey, call your veterinarian immediately and avoid contact with the animal. Wearing gloves and hand washing after contact with infected animals can greatly minimize your risk.

Biosecurity Guidance

Any horse keeper situated within the 3km control zone as indicated in the map over leaf must undertake the following biosecurity measures:

1) You must maintain a footbath containing disinfectant as specified by the APHA in a convenient position at every exit from your property which is renewed on a daily basis.

2) Any person entering or leaving any area on your property to which horses have access must wear overall clothing and boots which are disposable or capable of being disinfected.

3) Any person entering or leaving any area on your property to which horses have access must wash their hands and either thoroughly cleanse and disinfect their overall clothing and boots (with an approved disinfectant) or remove them before leaving your property.

4) Vehicles that are kept or used in areas of your premises that contain horses can only be moved off in compliance with an APHA licence, however, vehicles kept separately from horses may be moved off once all wheels have been cleansed and disinfected.

Although there are no legislative controls outside of the zone all horse keepers within Insert name of the local area are being encouraged to undertake the above precautions to stop any potential spread of this disease.

For further information or advice regarding Glanders, please visit the Defra website at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs or call the Defra helpline on **03459 33 55 77**.

If you require any further information on the controls in Insert Council Name, please call on Insert Telephone Number.

Annex F - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

Guidance for local authorities preparing and responding to an animal disease outbreak

Annex B – Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

This must be read in conjunction with the Guidance on preparation and planning for a Generic Exotic Animal Disease

This annex was last reviewed in November 2022.

Version 3

DOCUMENT HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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Approved distribution list -

All Local Authorities in England and Wales

Government Departments and other public authorities with enforcement responsibilities

Local Government Association and Welsh Local Government Association.

Local Resilience Forums.

1. How To Use The HPAI Contingency Planning Annex

This Annex aims to provide a summary of a Local Authority Animal Health Function's (LAAHF) key roles and responsibilities during an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). It **must** be read alongside the Generic guidance to support local authority planning and response to an animal disease outbreak.

2. What is Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)?

Avian influenza is a highly infectious viral disease affecting the respiratory, digestive and / or nervous system of many species of birds.

Avian influenza is not air-borne, except over very short distances by aerosol. It is spread by movement of infected birds or contact with respiratory secretions and in particular faeces, either directly or through contaminated objects, clothes and vehicles.

The severity of disease depends upon the strain of the virus and the type of bird infected. Some strains known as 'Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza' (HPAI) viruses have the potential to cause severe disease in poultry, associated with a high death rate (up to 100%). The disease can develop so rapidly that birds may die without showing any previous signs of disease.

Prevention and control of HPAI is critical to the health and welfare of animals, the economy and international trade.

Other strains known as 'Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza' (LPAI) viruses usually result in milder, less significant disease, however, certain LPAI viruses can mutate into highly pathogenic strains.

3. Public / Employee Health and HPAI

Humans and other animals can be infected through close contact with live infected birds. The cases of this occurring are extremely limited and the risk to human health is normally negligible.

Local authority staff should not enter premises with suspect or confirmed HPAI unless agreed / requested by APHA or if there is a specific enforcement need. Local authority staff visiting premises that might have poultry may want to read the HSE guidance document 'Avoiding the risk of infection when working with poultry that is suspected of having H5 or H7 notifiable avian influenza'.

Local authorities can also liaise with UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) / Public Health Wales (PHW) for advice on public health and managing any zoonotic risk directly or through the Local Resilience Forum. Local authority staff that have definitely been exposed to or may be at risk of exposure to avian influenza must seek medical advice immediately.

4. Control Measures for HPAI

Defra have published an Avian Disease Control Strategy. It aims to outline the measures for monitoring / preventing avian diseases and control measures for confirmed cases to minimise further spread.

Defra publish all legislation relating to HPAI and list declaratory orders in response to suspect / confirmed cases.

4.1 Measures to Prevent HPAI

Avian disease prevention measures include -

- Poultry Register. Premises with 50 or more birds must register.
- Movement records.
- Licensed bird gatherings.
- Surveillance sampling for H5 and H7 in wild and kept birds, as required under EU legislation.
- Import controls.

Seasonal measures may be used during the months that HPAI is more likely to occur in wild birds. This might include a national requirement to **house all poultry / kept birds**, **movement restrictions** on birds / people / equipment and / or increased **bio security** measures.

4.2 Control Measures for Confirmed Cases of HPAI In Kept Birds

If a case of HPAI is confirmed in kept birds, then the Government issue a declaration to implement control measures. The control measures put in place consider whether HPAI is confirmed in poultry, other captive birds and whether the disease occurs at a farm, slaughterhouse, or border inspection post.

Control measures for in response to suspect / confirmed HPAI include –

- A **veterinary inquiry.**
- **Samples** are taken if disease cannot be ruled out.
- Upon confirmation of HPAI, **culling of diseased poultry and poultry exposed to infection** or suspected of being infected. Eggs must also be destroyed.
- Controlled **disposal of carcasses, animal by-products** and other potentially infectious materials.
- **Movement controls** for poultry, birds, eggs, poultry meat and meat products and by-products such as litter and manure.
- **Cleansing and disinfection** of infected premises and vehicles.
- **Restrictions applied to movement of poultry / captive birds and hatching eggs within Protection Zone (PZ) and Surveillance Zone (SZ).**
- **Prohibitions on gatherings** of poultry / captive birds.
- Cleansing and disinfection requirements.

Further information can be accessed within the control strategy, individual declaratory orders and relevant legislation.

4.3 HPAI in Wild Birds

The Government has published a mitigation strategy for HPAI in wild birds to reduce the risk to kept birds.

The Government do not routinely sample wild birds or carcasses for HPAI. Carefully planned surveillance sampling is undertaken to ensure the prevalence of HPAI in wild birds. is considered in Government policies designed to prevent and control the spread of HPAI. Statistics are published about HPAI cases in wild birds from the surveillance activity.

Positive cases of HPAI in wild birds do not trigger the same control measures as HPAI in kept birds.

The public may be concerned about individual dead birds from HPAI or the overall impact on the local bird population. A separate briefing on HPAI in wild birds is available as **Appendix F:1** to support communication with senior managers, elected members and the public about this sensitive issue.

5. Summary of Local Authority Key Role During HPAI Outbreak

Control measures / investigations on premises with suspect and confirmed cases of HPAI are the responsibility of APHA. Local authority staff should not enter these premises.

It is recommended that any visits to known poultry keepers included on the Poultry Register (50 and above birds) are visited by APHA where resource permits. This position may need to be remain flexible depending on the severity of the outbreak, but any decision to change this will be led by APHA.

If HPAI is confirmed in kept birds, then Government issues a declaration imposing a Protection Zone (PZ) and Surveillance Zone (SZ) around the Infected Premises (IP). **The focus of the local authority role is** –

- **Locate backyard flocks** not on the poultry register.
- **Enforcement of controls** within the PZ and SZ.
- Foot patrols / communication are required to **ensure that kept birds are housed** within the controlled zones.
- Foot patrols / communication to **build data on kept birds**.
- Promote **bio security**.
- Erecting **signage**.

Most of the activities required by the LAAHF to prepare for and respond to a confirmed case of HPAI are included in the generic animal disease contingency guidance, therefore this must be used in with this annex. The following activities are in addition to those listed in the generic guidance –

5.1 Local Authority Check List to Prepare For HPAI

Preparation for HPAI - Communication			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
1	Ensure the local authority has the necessary **data sharing agreements in place to access Poultry Register data**.		
2	APHA should provide detailed and accurate maps of controlled zones during an outbreak, however, there have been some delays during large scale outbreaks of HPAI. It would be advisable to **liaise with the local authority mapping team** to understand what maps can be produced locally should these be required.		
3	**Consider whether the template HPAI briefings for elected members / senior managers** about the local authority role in an outbreak and wild birds should be localised ready for a confirmed case of HPAI. **Appendix F:1** provides further information about wild birds and **Appendix F:2** provides a template HPAI summary for senior managers / elected members.		
4	Prepare a **short briefing that can be handed out to backyard flock keepers** during foot patrols. Basic information on housing, bio security and registration.		

5.2 Local Authority Check List For A Suspect Case Of HPAI

Actions required at the suspect stage of an HPAI outbreak align with those covered in the general guidance for local authorities preparing and responding to an animal disease outbreak (section 10.2).

	Suspect case for HPAI		
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
1	**Review APHA (or local maps) of likely controlled zones** to consider approach required for identifying poultry, checking on housing and promoting bio security measures. Consider the role of foot patrols and other forms of communication, including potential resource implications and support required from other local authority services such as IT, mapping, and communication.		
2	**Review the HPAI Local Authority field officer guidance.**		

5.3 Local Authority Checklist For A Confirmed Case Of HPAI

Reference should be made to generic animal disease contingency plan for activities related to resource management, communications / IT and risk.

Confirmed case of HPAI – Resource management and delivery of animal health controls. Liaise with APHA to confirm a risk-based approach to the following activities -			
	Action	**Date completed**	**Notes**
1	**Enforce and offer advice on movement controls** detailed in the HPAI legislation and relevant declaratory orders. The prohibited and licensable movements are extensive and relate to live poultry, other birds, mammals (in certain specific cases), eggs, carcasses, poultry meat and meat products and by-products such as litter and manure.		
2	**Locate backyard flocks.** Work quickly with APHA to identify a risk-based approach to collecting data about poultry keepers within the controlled zones. The aim is to – • Gather information about poultry keepers, focusing on those with less than 50 birds that are not legally obliged to register on the Poultry Register. • Identify any poultry keepers with more than 50 birds that are not registered on the Poultry Register. • Remind poultry keepers of any housing order and additional movement restrictions within the controlled zones. • Provide bio security / housing guidance *(see below).* APHA will focus on premises known to have poultry, but this may change based on risk, resource and any enforcement action required. The LAAHF needs to work with APHA to establish a risk-based approach to data collection and the role of foot patrols. This could consider the number of cases, distance from waterfowl, type of housing, urban / rural mix, intelligence, and complaints. include door to door survey work and other communication, including telephone, email, local press, online, community groups, industry, and charities. Contact parish councils. Foot patrols cannot always take place in adverse weather conditions. Have printed material on bio security, housing ready and registration ready to hand out on foot patrols. Ensure foot patrols consider impact on the welfare of staff. Rotation required and volunteers may be required.		
3	**Housing of kept birds and bio security-** Work with APHA to agree a risk-based approach to visits and communication required to ensure that housing and bio security requirements are met in the controlled zones.		

	This can be combined with data collection communication *(detailed above).* ***The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No. 2) Order 2006 & Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (Wales) (No 2) Order 2006 contains requirements to house or otherwise separate poultry and other captive birds from wild birds on suspect and infected premises and all premises where birds are kept within the different zones.*** Defra has issued guidance on biosecurity considerations, including the separation of domestic birds from wild birds		
4	**Erection of road signs -** Article 79 of the Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No. 2) Order 2006 & Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (Wales) (No 2) Order 2006 places duties on the local authority in relation to erection of signs. Local authorities will need to liaise with APHA on this, particularly with regards to where road signs are best placed and erecting signs where footpaths and rights of way cross suspect / infected premises. Any signs need to effectively inform the public, be an effective use of resource and consider the public response. Further guidance on signage is available in the guidance to support local authority planning and response to an animal disease outbreak.		

6. Stages of HPAI and Controls / Information Flow In A Flow Diagram

Diagram(s) to show the various stages of an avian influenza outbreak, and the restrictions applicable under both The Avian Influenza & Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No2) Order 2006 and The Avian Influenza & Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (Wales) (No2) Order 2006.


Notification
All birds suspected of being affected with AI must be notified to APHA
Suspicion
An inspector to
Serve a Schedule 1 notice on the occupier/person in charge of suspect premises.
The Secretary of State (S of S) or Welsh Ministers must if necessary:
Declare a Temporary Movement Restriction Zone (RZ) and a Temporary Control Zone (CZ)
Notice requiring suspect premises to comply with Schedule 2
Require veterinary inquiry to be commenced
Confirmation of AI
Veterinary Inspector to serve a notice on the infected premises imposing the requirements of Schedules 1 & 2
Controls
The S of S or Welsh Ministers must
Declare a 3Km PZ and apply Schedule 4.
Declare a 10Km SZ and apply Schedule 5.
May declare a RZ of such size as necessary and declare the measures that apply.
Lifting Restrictions
Restrictions continue to apply until a specified date or revocation of a declaratory Order.
The S of S or Welsh Ministers may declare a PZ ended but in certain cases 21 days must have elapsed since completion of prescribed C&D measures.
On the ending of a PZ it is a part of the SZ.
The S of S or Welsh Ministers may by declaration end a SZ but in certain cases 30 days must have elapsed since completion of prescribed C&D measures.
Measures on suspicion or confirmation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in regulated places and vehicles (Part 5)
A notice served on occupier of a slaughterhouse where HPAI is suspected/confirmed and a veterinary inquiry carried out.
In relation to vehicles a veterinary inquiry will be carried out. May detain or direct the birds to such premises as the inspector requires. A vehicle must undergo C&D.
Regulated places must undergo C&D.
Provisions relating to poultry meat and by-products in slaughterhouses.
Reintroduction of poultry and other birds only after confirmation by an inspector that the specified C&D is completed.
Schedule 1 - Measures where avian influenza suspected on premises
Maintain record of poultry to include deaths and clinical signs
House or isolate birds
Prohibit movement of birds, mammals, persons and vehicles
Prohibit movement of other things incl. carcases, utensils, droppings
Restrictions on movement of eggs
Set up C&D points at entrances and exits
Schedule 2 – Measures on Premises Where AI Confirmed
Killing of birds and seizure of any thing under Diseases of Animals (Seizure) Order 1993
Measures to minimise risk of spread to wild birds
Disposal of carcases and eggs
Tracing of any thing liable to transmit AI
C&D of premises
Restrictions on restocking
Schedule 3 – C&D of premises, other than regulated premises, and of any thing, including vehicles on those premises
Part 1 – General procedures
Part 2 – Specific procedures for IP
Part 3 – C&D of litter, manure and slurry
Schedule 4 – Measures in the Protection Zone (PZ)
Housing or isolation of birds
Prohibition on bird gatherings
Prohibition on game release
C&D of vehicles
Records
Restrictions on movements
Disposal of carcases
Biosecurity measures
Licenced disposal of manure
Schedule 5 – Measures in Surveillance Zone (SZ)
Housing or isolation of birds
Prohibition on bird gatherings
Prohibition on game release
C&D of vehicles
Records
Restrictions on movements
Disposal of carcases
Biosecurity measures
Licensed disposal of manure
Measures to reduce risk of spread to other species
The S of S or Welsh Ministers must test pigs at premises where AI is confirmed.
Pigs and other mammals can be killed to prevent the spread of influenza.
Movements off the premises are restricted while tests are carried out
These measures may also be applied at contact premises
The S of S or Welsh Ministers may require surveillance for influenza of avian origin in mammals, and may declare an Avian Influenza (Restrictions on Mammals) Zone


Confirmation/Suspicion
If H5N1 suspected or confirmed in a wild bird or carcase of a wild bird Secretary of State (S of S) or Welsh Ministers may -
• Declare a Wild Bird Control Area (WBCA) of at least 3Km.
• Apply Schedule 1 and other measures considered necessary in WBCA, may include separation of domestic birds from wild birds.
• All poultry premises in this area must be identified and a Veterinary Inspector must visit.
• Declare a Wild Bird Monitoring Area (WBMA) of at least 10km.
• Apply Schedule 2 and other measures considered necessary, may include separation of domestic birds from wild birds. All poultry premises in this area must be identified.
• The measures in Schedule 3 also apply.
Schedule 1 - Measures in the Wild Bird Control Area
• Prohibition on bird gatherings
• Prohibition on release of game birds
• Restrictions on movements of poultry and birds to and from premises within and through the area
• Poultry moved to a slaughterhouse must be slaughtered without delay
• Restrictions on the movement of hatching eggs, SPF eggs, controlled meat, bird by-products and poultry manure
• Controlled meat must be separated
• Meat must be marked
• Hunting of wild birds must be licensed
Schedule 2 – Measures in the Wild Bird Monitoring Area
• Prohibition on bird gatherings
• Prohibition on release of game birds
• Restrictions on movement of poultry and birds from premises within the area for first 15 days
• Poultry moved to a slaughterhouse must be slaughtered without delay
• Restrictions on movements from premises that have received poultry
• Hunting of wild birds must be licensed
Schedule 3 – Biosecurity measures in both Areas
• Premises where poultry or other captive birds kept must have a means of disinfection at entrances and exits to premise, and to buildings housing birds
• Person leaving premises where poultry or other captive birds kept must not have dirty clothing
• Vehicles entering or leaving premises where poultry or other captive birds kept must be C&D
Ending of Areas
• WBCA remains until S of S or Welsh Ministers declares it becomes a part of WBMA, or until revokes Declaration.
• WBMA remains until S of S revokes the Declaration.

Appendix F:1 – Avian Influenza in Wild Birds

AVIAN INLFUENZA IN WILD BIRDS

This note is designed to advise county / unitary authorities about the handling cases of avian influenza in wild birds.

Avian influenza is predominantly spread by wild birds and therefore the sight of widespread ill or dying wild birds can be relatively common during an avian influenza season. This is of understandable concern to the public.

APHA do carry out surveillance work to understand the extent and spread of avian flu in wild birds and have published mitigation strategy for avian flu in wild birds that provides details of how the disease is monitored in wild birds, preventative controls and what actions to take if there are concerns about avian influenza in wild birds.

However, **avian influenza in wild birds is NOT a notifiable disease and therefore is not part of the local authority / APHA disease control response**.

Since avian influenza in wild birds is not notifiable, suspect cases are dealt with as a public health or nuisance matter. **In two tier areas, this statutory responsibility for these areas lies with the District Councils.**

The Defra mitigation strategy states that, *'Our **general advice to the general public is to not touch or pick up any dead or visibly sick birds that they find**.'*

It goes on to state, *'In general, **we do not recommend that wild bird carcasses are removed**. If removal is warranted it is the landowner's responsibility to safely arrange disposal of the carcasses. Landowners are responsible for any costs associated with removal and disposal of dead wild birds.'*

The mitigation strategy gives recommendations on how to determine whether carcasses are suspected of dying from avian influenza. For example, where kept poultry might have access to them, if children might come into contact with them, five or more birds in one location, avian influenza is known to be circulating in wild birds or the carcasses are near public footpaths.

The mitigation strategy goes on to state, ***'where dead birds are on public land, and where a decision has been made to remove and dispose the carcasses, it is the local***

authority's responsibility to safely dispose of the carcasses as ABP Category 1 material.'

The carcasses of wild animals, other than wild game, are exempt from the animal by-product (ABP) rules in the UK. Unless it is suspected that the animals were infected with a disease which can spread to people or animals such as avian influenza, the carcasses must be disposed of as a category 1 ABP. Government guidance is also available on the disposal of animal by-products

Derogations from the rules governing ABP disposal of wild birds suspected of being infected with avian influenza may be available in a very limited set of situations, including disposal in remote areas. Derogations must be approved by APHA and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For further information contact the APHA ABP team at csconehealthabp@apha.gov.uk. Additional authorisations from the Environment Agency, Natural England, NRW and other relevant agencies may also be required dependant on the situation.

Ahead of collecting any wild bird carcasses, local authorities must work with Public Health England to carry out a health and safety assessment, considering PPE and bio security measures required to protect staff and the public. Government guidance is available to support this assessment.

The transport of the waste should be considered as hazardous waste – a class 6.2 infectious waste. This is requirement is covered by "ADR" and is implemented by the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Act Waste 2009 legislation. Public Health England will need to be involved to ensure that appropriate advice and health surveillance can be arranged. These are the protocols that APHA require companies dealing with waste are required to comply with.

APHA have received an derogation from the DfT that allows them to carry small quantities of carcasses in their own vehicle direct to a disposal point with some relaxations from full ADR requirements. The derogation applies to operational partners as well so could be used by local authorities in these circumstances.

Government information to the public on wild bird risks and controls.

Appendix F:2 – HPAI Briefing Template for Senior Managers and Elected Members

Insert local authority logo here

Briefing on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) For Senior Managers And Elected Members

Date

1. Avian Influenza Status in *(local authority name)*

On *(date)* a case of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) was confirmed in a flock of *(number) (species)* at a premises in *(location)*. All infected and at-risk birds at the premises have been or will be culled and disposed of along with infected material. Full cleansing and disinfection will take place before re population is permitted. A protection zone (PZ) of 3km radius has been put in place around the premises and a 10km surveillance zone (SZ) is also in-force.

This Briefing will provide more information about the disease and explain the role of the local authority in addressing this situation along with a range of partners.

2. What is Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza?

HPAI is a highly infectious viral disease affecting the respiratory, digestive and / or nervous system of many species of birds. It can have mortality rates of up to 100%.

The virus occurs naturally among wild birds worldwide, particularly waterfowl that often may not present symptoms from the virus. It can easily spread to domestic birds via saliva, mucous and faeces. Cases of HPAI in kept birds across GB have become prevalent in Autumn / Winter due to the migratory paths of wild birds. *(National seasonal disease control measures are already in place, including a countrywide requirement to house birds kept outside and a ban on bird gatherings.)*

Humans and other animals can be infected with HPAI through close contact with live infected birds. The cases of this occurring are extremely rare and the risk to human health is normally negligible.

3. Impact of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

Confirmed cases of HPAI in poultry (including game) impact on -

- **The trading status of GB.** All cases of HPAI in poultry must be reported to the OIE. This means GB loses its disease-free status until certain restrictions have been applied. A large number of infected premises or lack of effective control measures could result in trade restrictions across the GB poultry / egg industry.
- **Local businesses.** All poultry businesses in controlled zones around the IP face costly restrictions that prevent them from operating normally until control measures have been completed.
- **The health and welfare of birds.**

- **Creates a potential risk of disease in other animals and humans.** Disease in domestic birds presents a direct risk to keepers of the infected birds and uncontrolled disease has an increased chance of mutating to present greater risk to humans and other animals.

(Local authority) has a role in implementing control measures that minimise the impact of HPAI on the public and businesses.

4. Local Authority Role and Resources

Local authorities[5] have a legal duty to enforce the rules put in place to control and eradicate HPAI. Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are also identified as high risk in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which means local authorities are required to help coordinate the local multiagency response to an animal disease outbreak.

APHA[6] vets are responsible for controls on the infected premises and deal with a range of activities including culling birds. They will also monitor the health of other commercial poultry flocks in the controlled zones. Using APHA guidance on risk and priorities, **the focus of the local authority role during an outbreak of HPAI is** –

- **Enforcement of controls** within the PZ and SZ.
- Foot patrols / communication on the controlled zones to **ensure that kept birds are housed**.
- Foot patrols / communication to **build data on kept birds**.
- Promote **bio security**.
- Erecting **road signs and public information signs where relevant**.
- **Guidance** for local businesses and the public on the impact of controls.

These activities may require resource from *(Trading Standards / Environmental Health)* **with support from communication / IT / mapping / footpaths / administration / emergency planning services.**

5. Why is the Local Authority Role Important?

While there is a control zone around the Infected Premises, local businesses may be subject to movement controls on their birds / food products. This costs businesses money and restricts their ability to trade.

The control zone can only be lifted when birds on the IP have been slaughtered, the premised cleansed, when data has been gathered about backyard flocks and checks have been made to ensure housing measures are being followed and there is evidence that the disease has not spread. **The majority of the evidence to lift controls is obtained through local authority and APHA communication with residents, however, local authority foot patrols remain an essential tool in higher risk areas to ensure that trading restrictions can be lifted.**

6. Public Interest

Wild birds - Avian influenza in wild birds is **NOT** a notifiable disease and as such is not part of the local authority / APHA disease control response. Concerns about HPAI in wild birds or dead wild birds are dealt with as a public health or nuisance matter, which is the statutory

[5] County councils, unitary authorities, London and metropolitan boroughs under the Animal Health Act 1981.
[6] Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) – Defra agency

responsibility of District Councils in two tier areas, who may consider putting in place collection and disposal arrangements particularly for larger wild birds like waterfowl found on public land. It remains the duty of landowners to address wild-bird carcases on private land.

Public Health - Humans and other animals can be infected with HPAI through close contact with infected birds. The cases of this occurring are very rare and the risk to human health is normally negligible**.** UKHSA / Public Health Wales advise anyone at risk from exposure to HPAI or confirmed cases in humans.

Backyard Flocks – The national housing requirement put in place as part of the seasonal control measures will apply to all birds kept outdoors, including backyard flocks. The local authority animal health function can provide guidance on national requirements and any additional controls required from confirmed cases of HPAI.

Footpaths – In all animal disease outbreaks the Government aim to ensure that all aspects of the economy can operate as normal. It is therefore extremely unlikely that there will be a wholesale closure of footpaths because of the impact on tourism. APHA will review the risk presented by any footpaths running through or adjacent to the Infected Premises.

Roads – The local authority may be required to erect road signs at the edge of controlled zones around the IP to advise those moving poultry that restrictions are in place. The location of these is based on disease risk and discussed with APHA. Signs will be removed as soon as restrictions have been lifted.

Appendix F:3 – Avian Influenza Outbreak Response Letter from Chief Veterinary Officer November 2022

Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs

Animal & Plant Health Agency

16th November 2022

Dear Chief Executive

Avian Influenza outbreak response

As you are aware, the latest Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak is at unprecedented levels and continues to challenge the way in which we deal with the control of this disease.

The Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA) works closely with our local authority colleagues to implement control measures that minimise the impact of AI on the public and businesses.

However, it has been recognised that due to the scale of this outbreak new ways of working are needed to try an alleviate the pressures on local authority resources whilst still enabling APHA to access the essential data that is required to lift zones.

To that effect, earlier this year a 'hybrid approach' was introduced to trial using different methods of collecting data through mailshots to residents in conjunction with 'foot patrols'. This proved successful in reaching high density, urban areas quickly.

With the on-going challenges faced by both local authorities and APHA in the coming months, it has been agreed with Defra Policy colleagues, that in England the primary focus is on compiling a census of premises containing susceptible species within a protection zone (3km of an IP) as soon as possible – not the method by which it is gathered. Local authorities can determine the most appropriate means available to facilitate how the data is gathered, ensuring it is collated and returned to APHA in a timely manner to allow surveillance activity to be completed, assuring disease clearance, which enables both local and international trade to resume. It is recommended that local authorities continue to discuss at the outset with APHA colleagues their proposals which can be a combination of foot patrols, mailshots or use of social media.

The main requirement is that any unregistered commercial, non-commercial poultry and other captive bird premises within a protection zone are identified, and details provided to APHA within 10 days of disease confirmation.

Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are also identified as high risk in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which identifies the key role that local authorities have in helping to coordinate the local multiagency response to an animal disease outbreak.

APHA are responsible for controls on the infected premises (IP) and deal with a range of activities including culling and disposal of birds. They will also monitor the health of other commercial poultry flocks in the controlled zones.
A control zone can only be lifted when birds on the IP have been culled, the premises cleansed, and data gathered about any susceptible birds in the zone to enable the completion of a veterinary risk assessment to confirm that there is an absence of disease.

It is important that these activities are completed swiftly due to the impacts these zones have on:

- **The trading status of UK.** HPAI in poultry must be reported to The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH formerly known as the OIE). This means UK loses its disease-free status and could result in trade restrictions across the GB poultry / egg industry. Trade is also restricted from these zones.

- **Local businesses.** All poultry businesses in controlled zones around the IP face costly restrictions that prevent them from operating normally until control measures have been completed.

- **The health and welfare of birds.** Delays in lifting zones restricts the speed in which APHA staff can deploy to other IP/control zones.

- **Creates a potential risk of disease in other animals and humans.** Disease in domestic birds presents a direct risk to keepers of the infected birds and uncontrolled disease has an increased chance of mutating to present greater risk to humans and other animals.

APHA has records of commercial producers, but the majority of the evidence on smaller backyard and hobby flocks, required to lift controls is obtained through local authority communication with residents. Previously, the reliance has been on local authorities conducting ‘foot patrols’ to gather the data required by APHA.

I would also like to take this opportunity to alert you to the mandatory housing measures for all poultry and captive birds that were introduced to all areas of England from 00:01 on Monday 7th November 2022.

Avian influenza: Housing order to be introduced across England - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

The housing measures legally require all bird keepers to keep their birds indoors and to follow stringent biosecurity measures to help protect their flocks from the disease, regardless of type or size.

We recognise the continued challenges and, as always, appreciate the significant contribution made by local authority colleagues to the response to disease outbreaks and with the enforcement of controls.

We will always be happy to work with you on resolving issues that may arise and, if we can provide advice or support, then do let us know.

Yours sincerely



UK CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICER **CEO, APHA**

Appendix F:4 – Avian Influenza Prevention Zone Field Officer Guide (15-11-22)

Avian Influenza Prevention Zone Field Officer Guide (15-11-22)

This guide is designed to assist local authorities with the provisions of the Avian Influenza Prevention Zone The guide has been drafted by colleagues in Suffolk County Council and ACTSO would like to thank Suffolk for all its work in producing this guide.

Index

1. Summary

Latest situation

The UK is facing its largest ever outbreak of bird flu with over 200 cases confirmed across the country since late October 2021. As a result, mandatory housing measures for all poultry and captive birds were introduced in December 2021, lifted in the early summer and then re-introduced to all areas of England from on Monday the 7th of November 2022.

These housing measures legally require all bird keepers to keep their birds indoors and to follow stringent biosecurity measures to help protect their flocks from the disease, regardless of type or size. The measures will remain in place until further notice and will be kept under regular review as part of the government's work to monitor and manage the risks of avian influenza.

Currently the risk of HPAI H5 in wild bird across Great Britain has increased from high to very high. The risk of poultry exposure to HPAI H5 with stringent biosecurity remains at medium and high where there are substantial biosecurity breaches and poor biosecurity. The risk to poultry with poor biosecurity is still considered high. Together with the mandatory housing requirements all bird keepers must follow enhanced biosecurity measures at all times to prevent the risk of future outbreaks.

Outbreaks continue and as such please refer to https://www.gov.uk/animal-disease-cases-england for the latest situation.

As a result of multiple outbreaks during Autumn 2022 an Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) which included mandatory housing measures came into force in force in England from on Monday 7 November until further notice see: https://www.gov.uk/animal-disease-cases-england/avian-influenza-prevention-zone-aipz-including-housing-measures-the-whole-of-england.
This prevention zone replaced the regional rules imposed in the Southwest and Southeast of England.

Check if you are in a disease control zone on this interactive map.

For details of these cases and the measures that apply in the disease control zones, see the avian influenza: cases and disease control zones in England for guidance and links information on movement licenses.

Avian influenza (bird flu) is a notifiable animal disease. If anyone suspects any type of avian influenza in poultry or captive bird's, they must report it immediately by calling the Defra Rural Services Helpline on 03000 200 301. In Wales, contact 0300 303 8268. In Scotland, contact your local Field Services Office. Failure to do so is an offence.

2. Wild birds

Please refer to the strategy below for details of the approach to avian influenza in wild birds and what actions land managers, ornithologists and the general public can take to mitigate the impact of avian influenza on wild bird populations whilst protecting public health, the wider environment and the rural economy.

Mitigation strategy for avian influenza in wild birds in England and Wales.

APHA carries out year-round avian influenza surveillance of dead wild birds submitted via public reports and warden patrols. When the report of a dead wild bird is received through the GB dead wild bird surveillance helpline, APHA will triage the information available and, where appropriate, will arrange for a contractor to collect some of the birds for testing. *It should be noted that not all birds will necessarily be collected.*

The purpose of the surveillance and testing of wild birds is to capture information on the location and strains of avian influenza that might be prevalent in the UK. This data then helps government build up a picture of the current risks, and shapes how they then respond. This surveillance information is an important element in deciding whether to introduce Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) controls across GB.

Local Authorities may not be directly alerted when wild bird tests prove positive, however a notification process can potentially be agreed via local resilience forums. Details of wild bird positive surveillance tests can be found via a report findings of HPAI in wild birds in Great Britain which is regularly updated.

Defra will then potentially collect some of these birds and test them to help understand how the disease is distributed geographically and in which type of bird. If a member of the public reports that they have come in to contact or handled a dead or live bird that may have been suffering from avian influenza, they should be advised to contact their local NHS for consideration of any follow up advice.

Any persons exposed to confirmed Avian Influenza in avian species will receive health advice from a local health protection team. PHE also advises that the risk to the public's health from the virus strains which have been found in GB during 2020/2021 (H5N2, H5N1, H5N5, H5N3) is very low.

Members of the public must be advised not to touch or pick up any dead or visibly sick birds if they find them. For further information see advice to the Public.

In summary if the following numbers/type of dead or visibly sick birds are found you should call the Defra helpline (03459 33 55 77):

- one or more dead bird of prey or owl
- 3 or more dead gulls or wild waterfowl (swans, geese and ducks)
- 5 or more dead birds of any species

The Food Standards Agency has said that based on the current scientific evidence, avian influenza poses a very low food safety risk for UK consumers. Properly cooked poultry and poultry products, including eggs, are safe to eat. Public Health England advises that the threat to human health is very low and as such the Prevention Zones do not prevent officials accessing premises to undertake regulatory visits. **Further specific advice for local authorities on how to deal with dead wild birds can be found in Annex A.**

3. Avian Influenza Prevention Zone Controls

Local Authorities have the responsibility to ensure compliance with any Avian Influenza Prevention Zone Measures (AIPZ). Failure to comply with the AIPZ Declaration is an offence under section 73 of the Animal Health Act 1981 and keepers that fail to comply with these rules could be subject to an unlimited fine on summary conviction and up to 6 months' imprisonment per offence.

3 (a) Minimum bio security rules that apply to all poultry keepers (Schedule 1)

The following minimum biosecurity measures apply to all poultry keepers in all parts of the Avian Influenza Prevention Zone that requires mandatory housing.

Any keeper of poultry (including game birds and pet birds) or other captive birds irrespective of how they are kept, must take appropriate and practicable steps, that can be demonstrated to an inspector on request, to ensure that:

1) precautions must be taken to avoid the direct or indirect transfer of virus contamination onto and between premises from anything liable to spread infection such as clothing, including effective cleansing and disinfection of equipment, vehicles, and footwear.

2) all bird keepers must place foot dip containing Defra approved poultry disinfectant at the correct dilution rate at strategic points including at the entry and exit of all houses or outdoor areas where birds are kept, and footwear must be cleaned using the dips on entry and exit or alternatively disposable over-shoes or footwear should be changed when moving between bird and non-bird areas.

3) feed, water and bedding must be stored undercover, and steps are taken to prevent access by wild birds, in particular their droppings and to minimise the risk of virus contamination. Any straw used for bedding must be covered and access to it by wild birds and rodents prevented.

4) anseriformes including ducks and geese should not be kept in the same pen or building as other poultry species (other than in a zoo).

5) there is no direct contact with poultry or other captive birds on other neighbouring premises.

6) effective vermin control is carried out in any part of the premises where poultry or other captive birds are kept.

7) birds of prey are not fed anything that may have been exposed to virus, this includes wild waterfowl.

8) the movement of people (other than in a zoo), vehicles or equipment to and from the part of the premises where poultry are kept is reduced to only essential movements for looking after their welfare, collecting eggs, and feeding or movements for official or inspection visits.

9) records are kept (other than in a zoo) of all vehicles that enter any part of the premises where poultry are kept and of all people who come into any direct contact with the poultry and other captive birds.

10) records of all poultry, captive birds, egg movements and deaths must be kept and made available to an inspector or veterinary inspector on demand and must include:

- the quantity and description (including species of bird or type of egg) transported or marketed.
- the date of the movement off the premises.
- the premises of destination (if known);
- the name and address of the person to whom ownership or possession is being or has been transferred.
- date of any death and clinical signs
- date of disposal and location of animal by product disposal facility

- the name and address of the person to whom eggs or other poultry products have been sold or gifted.

11) records of all poultry and other captive bird deaths and disposal must be kept and made available to an inspector or veterinary inspector on demand. Records should include the date of death any any clinical signs and the date of disposal and location of animal by-product disposal facility

12) bird keepers must immediately report to the Animal and Plant Health Agency any increased morbidity or mortality or significant drop in egg production or, where relevant, feed or water intake, or other relevant information relating to the production of eggs on the premises.

13) buildings that house the birds are maintained and any defects that allow water ingress or other contamination to enter the building are rectified without undue delay.

3 (b) Enhanced biosecurity measures for premises with over 500 poultry or other captive birds (schedule 2)

In addition to the(schedule1) measures above any keeper of more than 500 poultry must also apply the following enhanced biosecurity measures in the three specific parts or areas of premises detailed as live bird areas, ancillary areas and bio-secure barrier areas as *detailed below:*

Live bird areas

Measures that apply to areas to which live kept poultry or captive birds have access:

a) access must be restricted to essential authorised personnel only.

b) keepers must operate effective barrier hygiene, including changing clothing and footwear, before entering and exiting from the live-bird part.

c) only essential equipment and vehicles are permitted to enter the live-bird part.

d) the exterior of any vehicles, including fork-lifts and pallet trolleys (particularly wheels and wheel arches) and equipment which enter or leave the live-bird part of the premises must be cleansed and disinfected on both entry and exit; and

e) thorough cleansing and disinfecting (based on industry best practice) of housing and equipment must be undertaken at the end of a production cycle and before new birds are introduced; and

f) records must be kept of vehicles and personnel entering and leaving the live-bird part.

Ancillary use areas

Measures that apply to ancillary parts of premises where live birds do not have access but that may contain live bird waste, deadstock or equipment used in the live bird area/part.

a) access must be limited to essential personnel only, and full biosecurity practices should be adopted on entry and exit to this part of the premises.

b) The Ancillary parts of a premises should be fully separated from the live-bird part with clear demarcation.

c) Any waste or fallen stock must be held in appropriately bio secure facilities in this part of the premises with clear separation between both the live bird part and the restricted access bio-secure barrier part; and

d) The exterior of any vehicles (focussing on wheels and wheel arches) which enters or leaves the ancillary part must be cleansed and disinfected on both entry and exit.

e) Egg producers should ensure that the packing, handling, and storage of second quality eggs / farm seconds undertaken in the ancillary area is a managed in a bio secure manner. Plastic egg trays must be cleansed and disinfected before use and records of this must be maintained as detailed in Schedule 1 (6).

Bio-secure barrier areas

The following measures apply to any parts of a premises used for example as an office or for general storage but that live birds do not access and does not contain poultry deadstock, any poultry waste or equipment from live bird areas.

a) access by the public should be controlled and only essential workers or contractors should enter this bio-secure barrier part; and

b) non-essential vehicles must not enter this bio-secure barrier part.

c) Keepers must regularly inspect the fabric and structural integrity of any building used to house poultry for holes and leaks, with particular emphasis on roofs, gutters, and downpipes. Any holes and leaks must be repaired without undue delay as many recent cases of avian influenza have been linked to water ingress and flooding.

d) Wild game birds should not be fed within 500m of the restricted access part of the premises where this area is under the control of the keeper.

3 (c) Requirements for kept poultry and other captive birds to be housed or otherwise kept separate from wild birds (Schedule 3 rules)

Any keeper of poultry (including game birds and pet birds) or other captive birds located within the Prevention zone must ensure they are kept in accordance with one or both measures set out in paragraphs 3(c)1 and 3(c)2.

Poultry or other captive birds within the Prevention zone must be kept housed in accordance with the following conditions:

a) the buildings must be suitable for the purpose, and it is the obligation of the keeper, or such authorised person nominated by the keeper to check/inspect regularly that they continue to be;

   i) any openings must be covered with suitable mesh or netting which should be of a maximum size of 25mm mesh to prevent ingress from wild birds.

   ii) feed and bedding must be kept indoors.

iii) measures are in place to ensure that wild birds are not attracted to areas under the control of the keeper, in particular to watercourses, reservoirs, ponds or other standing water.

iv) there is regular cleaning and disinfecting of all concrete walkways, paths and similar surfaces to which poultry or other captive birds or wild birds have access.

3 (d) Where it is not possible to house birds, poultry, or other captive birds they must be kept in fully enclosed or netted in outdoor areas as detailed below:

a) any outdoor area must be fully enclosed with wire mesh, netting or other material which is capable of preventing ingress of wild birds. Any mesh or netting should be of a maximum size of 25mm.

b) Open or permanent standing water must be restricted by fencing off ponds, standing water, or waterlogged land to prevent poultry or other captive birds having access.

c) there must be no direct contact or potential access with poultry or other captive birds on other neighbouring premises.

d) feed and bedding must be kept indoors.

e) feed and water must be provided under cover where wild birds cannot gain access; and,

f) any carcases of wild birds must be removed from the outdoor fenced range areas

g) regular cleaning and disinfecting must be undertaken of all concrete walkways, paths and similar surfaces to which poultry or other captive birds, or wild birds have access.

h) any range area must be regularly inspected to ensure it is not contaminated with feathers or faecal material from wild birds and reasonable steps must be taken to remove such contamination that may be present as soon as is practicable.

i) before placing any new structures or enclosures on land for the purpose of keeping poultry or other captive birds outdoors, the keeper must arrange for the inspection of the relevant site for feathers and faecal matter from wild birds and, if such material is discovered, remove such material.

j) Proactive measures (for example, bird scarers, foils, streamers) must be taken to discourage wild birds being attracted to the vicinity of any outdoor range area (in particular gulls, corvids and wild waterfowl) and from entering it.

k) measures must be put in place to ensure that wild birds are not attracted to areas under the control of the keeper, in the vicinity of the outdoor area, in particular to any watercourses, reservoirs, ponds or other standing water.

l) proactive measures (for example, bird scarers, foils, streamers) must be taken to discourage wild birds, (in particular gulls and wild waterfowl), from entering the fenced outdoor areas or congregating in the vicinity of the outdoor range area, in particular to open or standing water.

m) keepers must ensure there is regular inspection of the site and consideration that these conditions continue to be met, minimising the risk of contact with wild birds.

In all cases keepers must ensure they meet the needs of their birds in compliance with the Animal Welfare Act 2006.

3 (e) Keepers of anseriformes, ratites or poultry kept for restocking of game (or the occupier of the premises where such birds are kept), where the housing/netting measures detailed in 3(c) and 3(d) are impractical and/or likely to have a negative effect on the welfare of the birds' keepers must:

(a) In consultation with a private veterinarian, by the 21st of November 2022, set out in writing a statement signed and kept by the keeper which details the biosecurity measures which are being taken together with the biosecurity measures which are not being taken, with the reasons why the requirements set out in Schedule 3 cannot be met.

(b) This statement must be signed and dated by the keeper of the birds, or the occupier of the premises where the birds are kept. This is statement must be retained for twelve months from the date of signature and must be available for inspection upon request by a veterinary inspector.

In all cases keepers must ensure they meet the needs of their birds in compliance with the Animal Welfare Act 2006.

3 (f) Zoos/Aquariums (Schedule 4 rules)

A keeper of poultry or other captive birds kept at a premises licensed under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981, may, as an alternative to Schedule 3, take reasonable and practicable measures to prevent potential disease spread including–

a) isolating groups of other captive birds not housed or fully enclosed in outdoor areas from all other poultry and other captive birds.

b) assessing the risk of public access to indoor kept bird enclosures.

c) controlling entry to outdoor kept bird enclosures including limiting to essential staff.

d) requiring staff, keepers and volunteers to wear suitable personal protective equipment, in particular if they have direct contact with the birds.

e) disinfectant mats must be installed at all points of entry and exit at the zoo that are for use by visiting members of the public, if members of the public are to be admitted to areas of the zoo in which poultry or other captive birds are kept.

f) handwashing facilities must be made available to visiting members of the public if the public are to be admitted to areas of the zoo in which poultry or other captive birds are kept; and

g) in consultation with a private veterinarian, producing robust justification for any deviation and to demonstrate the zoo/aquarium has measures in place to minimise any disease spread from such un-netted outdoor enclosures.

3 (g) Rules on release of Racing Pigeons, Doves and other Columbiformes

a) Notwithstanding the requirements of Schedule 1 and 3, a keeper of racing pigeons, doves or other columbiformes may:

i) Temporarily let their birds out briefly before feeding each day to meet bird's welfare requirements for up to an hour. Lofts/bird houses must not be left open for several hours for the birds to come and go as they please. Contact between the racing pigeons, doves or other Columbiformes either directly or indirectly with wild birds must be minimised wherever possible.

ii) Pigeons from the same loft/pigeon house may also be transported to a point some distance from the home loft/pigeon house and released/liberated and allowed to return to the loft/pigeon house as part of a training and conditioning programme. The vehicle and baskets/boxes must be cleansed and disinfected using a government approved disinfectant.

iii) Provided the gathering is registered with APHA and the conditions of the General Licence are complied with, pigeon racing and multi-loft training are permitted whilst the AIPZ is in force. Birds may be basketed, marked and transported to a liberation site and released to fly back to their home loft/pigeon house. The vehicle/transporter and baskets/boxes must be cleansed and disinfected using a government approved disinfectant.

iv) Pigeons, doves and other Columbiformes may be transported to another location and released to fly free at functions and events provided the birds are either gathered again and returned to their home premises as soon as practical or they fly to return to their home premises. Care should be taken to avoid locations where there are large numbers of wild birds or domestic poultry. Events where birds from more than one premises are present is a bird gathering and must be registered with APHA and meet the conditions of the general licence for bird gatherings.

3 (h) Rules for the Flying from hand of birds of prey and other species (excludes anseriformes and galliformes) (Schedule 6)

a) Notwithstanding the requirements of Schedule 1 and 3, a keeper of birds of prey or other species of bird trained to fly from hand may:

i) Temporarily let their birds out and fly them from hand each day to meet bird's welfare requirements for up to an hour each day. Lofts/bird houses must not be left open for the birds to come and go as they please. Contact between these birds either directly or indirectly with wild birds must be minimised wherever possible.

ii) Transport a bird of prey used for pest control to another place some distance from the home premises provided that place is not within a disease control zone and flown from hand for the purposes of pest control. The vehicle and baskets/boxes/transport must be cleansed and disinfected using a government approved disinfectant.

iii) Provided the gathering is registered with APHA and the conditions of the General Licence are complied with, gatherings other than anseriformes and galliformes are permitted whilst the AIPZ is in force. The vehicle/transporter and baskets/boxes must be cleansed and disinfected using a government approved disinfectant.

iv) Birds of prey and other species (excluding anseriformes and galliformes) may be transported to another location and released to fly from hand and events provided the birds are either gathered again and returned to their home premises as soon as practical or they fly to return to their home premises. Care should be taken to avoid locations where there are large numbers of wild birds or domestic poultry. Events where birds from more than one premises are present is a bird gathering and must

be registered with APHA and meet the conditions of the general licence for bird gatherings.

v) If during any free-flying from hand visual contact with the bird is lost for more than a minute or the bird catches another wild bird, the bird must be isolated and closely monitored for a period of 14 days before being allowed to free-fly from hand again.

4. Definitions, powers and data sharing summary

Key definitions

"The Act" means the Animal Health Act 1981 (1)

"Poultry" means a bird reared or kept in captivity, for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, or of other products, for restocking supplies of game or for the purposes of any breeding program for the production of such categories of birds.

"Other captive bird" means a bird kept in captivity which is not poultry and includes a pet bird and a bird kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions, breeding or for sale.

"wild birds" means birds which are not covered by the definitions of poultry or other captive birds above.

"**racing pigeon"** means any pigeon transported or intended for transport from its pigeon house so that it may be released and freely fly back there or to another destination;

"keeper" means any person responsible for birds or animals, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, but does not include a person responsible for them solely because he is transporting them.

"occupier" means the person in charge of premises.

"premises" includes any land, building or other place.

"inspector" means a person appointed to be an inspector for the purposes of this Act by the Minister or by a local authority, and, when used in relation to an officer of the Ministry, includes a veterinary inspector;"

"veterinary surgeon" means a person who is registered in the register of veterinary surgeons maintained by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons or in the supplementary register maintained by the College.

"zoo" means a zoo/aquarium or premises within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 which is operated under the authority of a licence under that Act or is subject to a dispensation, in a direction under section 14(1) of the Act, that the Act shall not apply to that zoo.

"Covered area" as is as defined in Schedule 1, Part 2, paragraph 4 of the declaration and means the area where feed and water are placed which must be covered to prevent it being accessed or contaminated by wild birds. Placing feed on the ground or in uncovered troughs to which wild birds can gain access is not permitted.

"**range**" for the purposes of this declaration means any outdoor areas where poultry and captive birds are allowed access at any time.

"Vehicle" includes:

a) a trailer, semi-trailer or other thing designed or adapted to be towed by another vehicle

b) a detachable part of any vehicle; and

c) a container or other structure designed or adapted to be carried on a vehicle.

Below is a summary of power's under The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No.2) Order 2006

General powers of inspectors under article 82.

1) An inspector executing this Order may require the detention and isolation of any vehicle, equipment, or other thing, by serving a notice on the occupier of the premises where it is kept, or on the person in charge of it.

2) A veterinary inspector executing this Order, or an inspector acting under his direction, may:

   a) cleanse and disinfect any premises and anything.

   b) require the cleansing and disinfection of anything, by serving a notice on the occupier of the premises where it is kept, or on the person in charge of it.

   c) require the cleansing and disinfection of any premises, by serving a notice on the occupier of the premises.

   d) require, by notice, the occupier of any premises or the keeper of any animal or bird.

   e) to keep or isolate the animal or bird in a specified place; and (ii) to separate the animal or bird from any other animal or bird.

3) For the purposes of section 65A of the Act, a controlled zone is a designated area until it ceases to be a controlled zone.

Powers of inspectors in case of default

83.(1) If any person fails to comply with a requirement of this Order or of a declaration, licence, notice or designation under it, an inspector may take the steps he considers necessary to ensure the requirement is met at the expense of that person.

(2) An inspector's powers under paragraph (1) include powers to:

(a) direct any person to take or refrain from specified action in respect of any place, animal, bird, vehicle, or other thing; and (b) seize and detain anything.

1) An inspector performing a function under these Regulations may:

   (i) mark any bird or other thing for identification purposes; and

(ii) require, by notice, the person in charge of any vehicle or equipment to cleanse and disinfectant.

Data sharing between APHA and local authorities

There is not a formal data sharing agreement currently between APHA and local authorities however ACTSO's current opinion is that the following exemptions may (specific to each case) provide a legal gateway without such an agreement.

- it is for the economic well-being of the UK (due to the livestock trading/import/export issues),
- it is in the public interest (given we have declared notifiable disease outbreaks that require managing)
- it is for the prevention/detection of crime (in relation to compliance with animal health legislation and disease related restriction orders).

It will be for each local authority and APHA to assure itself that one of the above exemptions applies in the specific circumstances they are in.

5. Bird Gatherings and game birds

Gatherings include (but are not limited to) bird fairs, markets, shows, sales, exhibitions and some premises used for dealing or internet sales. In addition, vehicles used to transport live birds where the birds are brought together from multiple premises (so called many-to-one or many-to-many activities) are also considered gatherings.

From 8 November 2021 no gatherings of poultry, galliforme birds or anseriforme birds are permitted. Galliforme birds include pheasants, partridge, quail, chickens, turkeys and guinea fowl.

Gatherings of all other types of birds except poultry, galliforme and anseriforme birds are permitted (including in the Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ)), provided that the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) has been notified of the gathering at least 7 days before the event and that the gathering meets all the requirements of the general licence.

Definitive requirements for allowed bird gatherings are set out in the bird gatherings general licence. This general licence is in force from 00:01 on the 8 November 2021 until further notice.

Game Birds

Once game birds have been released, they're classed as wild birds for bird flu rules and the person who released the game birds is no longer classed as the keeper of the birds. However, they can continue to feed and water the released game bird, except within 500m of a premises where poultry or other captive birds are kept. The person feeding or watering the wild game birds should also make reasonable efforts to minimise the chance of other wild birds accessing their feed and water, by placing it under cover.

Keeper must not release game birds into the ***wild in all disease control zones or in an Avian Prevention Zone with mandatory housing***.

Within a AI Prevention Zone Common pheasants or red-legged partridges (which can only be released under licence) cannot be fed or given water within 500 metres of kept poultry buffer

zone. Outside of the 500 metre buffer zone keepers should take measures to minimise the risk of wild birds accessing this feed and water. These species may only be released under licence.

Catching up game birds- You cannot catch up gamebirds from the wild outside the shooting season for the species. Once caught up, previously wild game birds are classed as poultry and deemed to be kept poultry.

For further guidance visit the bird flu advice from the Game Farmers' Association site.

6. Poultry isolation/separation improvement notice (appendix B)

On rare occasions some keepers may be unwilling to comply with verbal or written advice and so the use of a notice may be necessary. In such circumstances a notice requiring improved isolation or separation of poultry can be issued under section 82 of The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No.2) Order 2006. **However, under this legislation an article 82 notice (appendix A) can only be issued by a local authority inspector under the direction of a veterinary inspector as summarised below.**

A veterinary inspector executing this Order, or an inspector acting under his direction, may serve a notice on the occupier of any premises or on the keeper of any animal or bird requiring that they:

a) keep or isolate any animal or bird in a specified place.

b) or that they separate any animal or bird from any other animal or bird.

Any person that fails to observe or do any notice without lawful authority or excuse, proof of which shall lie on him commits an offence under section 73 of the Animal Health Act 1981.

As such before an article 82 notice can be issued a local authority officer must contact an APHA vet via the Defra Rural Services Helpline and e-mail a copy of the proposed notice (preferably with photographs of the poultry/housing in question).

Once a veterinary inspector has assessed the notice, they should email it back to the local authority stating whether they approve of the suggested improvements (or amend them as deemed necessary) so that this can be evidenced if required.

This process will ensure that veterinary inspectors can agree or amend any suggested housing improvements detailed within a notice to ensure they are sufficient to ensure adequate separation from wild birds in a manner that does not compromise welfare. In some circumstances this process may require a visit by a veterinary inspector to enable a full assessment of the situation if this cannot be adequately conveyed by any other manner.

7. Protection and Surveillance Zones

When avian influenza is confirmed in poultry or other captive birds at an individual premises, 3km Protection and 10km Surveillance Zones are declared to prevent the spread of disease beyond the area around the infected farm. Keepers of poultry or other captive birds kept within a Protection Zone or Surveillance Zone (or temporary control zones or other low pathogenic restricted zones) must comply with the biosecurity requirements declared specifically for such zones. This does not remove the obligation to comply with the additional biosecurity measures required by the Prevention Zone Declaration.

Keepers of poultry or other captive birds located within a Protection Zone declared around infected premises must comply with housing requirements for a Protection Zone.

Nothing in the PZ Declaration removes obligations on keepers of poultry or other captive birds from existing animal welfare requirements, and private veterinary advice should be sought by a keeper who is concerned about the suitability of housing conditions.

8. Local Authority Role and enforcement response guide

Local authorities should work with the Animal Plant Health Agency (APHA) to promote and encourage poultry keepers to comply with the Prevention Zone Measures without the need for proactive enforcement unless there is reported and persistent non-compliance. Additional inspection visits are not anticipated but where risk-based enforcement can be undertaken as part of business-as-usual activity this would be encouraged.

Avian Influenza enforcement guidance.

Complaints with regards to the compliance with the above rules should be responded to in a proportionate and risk assessed manner. Ask complainants to provide address details and contact numbers if possible and advise them as below.

Local authorities work in partnership with the APHA to assess all such complaints and will respond if deemed necessary based on the specific circumstances and the potential risks that the alleged breach present'.

Complaints involving over 50 birds or that suggest commercial poultry under 400 metres away from the alleged non-compliance are more likely to require a phone call/letter or a visit, dependant on the type of poultry, the circumstances, and the potential risks of the alleged breach. For assistance in England call the Defra Rural Services Helpline on **03000 200 301**.

AI measures enforcement response guide

If information is received clearly demonstrating that the applicable measures have not been implemented, below is a quick reference guide that may help officers reach a decision on how to respond.

	Action
L1	In most cases a simple level L2 letter as below can be sent, however in some cases the detail of the complaint may not be very conclusive and so you can just record the complaint if deemed appropriate.
L2	Call or send L2 letter of advice with no request for the keeper to call and confirm keeper details and measures taken.
L3	Call or send L3 letter requesting a call back to confirm ownership numbers and measures taken
L4	Contact by phone or if this is not possible send L3 letter and visit when next in area if no response at that time.
L5	Contact by phone and confirm details of measures taken and poultry kept. If unable to contact send L3 letter and visit ASAP.

Complainant type: Zone codes: Protection = p Surveillance = s Prevention = pv	**Under 10 birds**				**Over 50 birds**				**Over 500 birds**				**Over 50 birds & 500 bird commercial poultry within 400m**				**Over 3 complaints for same property.**				**No response to level 3 letter**			
Zone type	**pv**	**s**	**p**		**pz**	**s**	**p**		**pv**	**s**	**p**		**pv**	**s**	**p**		**pv**	**s**	**p**		**pv**	**s**	**p**	
Anon	L1	L2	L4		L2	L3	L5		L3	L3	L5		L3	L3	L5		L3	L4	L5		L4	L4	L5	
Passer by	L1	L2	L4		L2	L3	L5		L3	L3	L5		L3	L3	L5		L3	L4	L5		L4	L4	L5	
Neighbour	L2	L3	L5		L2	L4	L5		L4	L4	L5		L3	L4	L5		L4	L5	L5		L4	L4	L5	
Commercial keeper	L3	L3	L5		L3	L4	L5		L3	L5	L5		L4	L5	L5		L5	L5	L5		L4	L5	L5	
Agency	L2	L3	L5		L2	L4	L5		L4	L5	L5		L3	L4	L5		L4	L5	L5		L5	L5	L5	

9. Signs of the Avian Influenza

The disease spreads from bird to bird by direct contact or through contaminated body fluids and faeces and poultry affected may show the following symptoms:

- swollen head
- blue discolouration of neck and throat
- loss of appetite
- respiratory distress such as gaping beak, coughing, sneezing, gurgling, rattling
- diarrhoea
- fewer eggs laid.
- increased mortality

Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) is usually less serious. It can cause mild breathing problems but affected birds will not always show clear signs of infection.

10. Housing Guidance (summary)

Due to an increased risk of incursion of Avian Influenza to domestic poultry and wild birds within you must take all appropriate and practicable steps to ensure that your birds are housed, or otherwise kept separate from wild birds. Chickens and turkeys are especially susceptible to Avian influenza, and it is expected that all keepers will house their birds. Housing your birds is the most effective way to minimise direct contact with wild birds, provided that the housing does not have entry points that can be exploited by wild birds. Housing of birds on its own is not a substitute for the best practice biosecurity measures described above.

Total netting or full enclosure can be deployed as an alternative to housing birds that cannot easily be housed; for example, ducks and geese may be kept in fully netted areas, even if this means netting a smaller area than they currently occupy. Netting of fenced areas can also reduce the risk of disease, providing wild birds cannot gain access to the enclosed area and steps are taken to make the area unattractive to wild birds.

Further guidance on housing and additional biosecurity measures of birds may be found in the following DEFRA Biosecurity and preventing disease in captive birds (publishing.service.gov.uk)

11. APHA Alerts Subscription Service

The APHA Alerts Subscription Service provides registered users with the latest news on exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks in Great Britain. Alerts may also be sent outside of a disease outbreak https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apha-alert-subscription-service

12. Reporting and handling dead wild birds

a) Dead wild waterfowl (swans, geese, or ducks) or other dead wild birds, such as gulls or birds of prey, should be reported to the Defra helpline (03459 33 55 77 – please select option 7)

b) The public should be advised not to handle dead wild birds. If asked how to do so the following guidance can be given:

(i) **Avoid touching the bird** with your bare hands.
(ii) If possible, wear disposable protective gloves when picking up and handling (if disposable gloves are not available see 7).
(iii) Place the dead bird in a suitable plastic bag, preferably leak proof. Care should be taken not to contaminate the outside of the bag.
(iv) Tie the bag and place it in a second plastic bag.
(v) Remove gloves by turning them inside out and then place them in the second plastic bag. Tie the bag and dispose of in the normal household refuse bin.
(vi) Hands should then be washed thoroughly with soap and water.
(vii) If disposable gloves are not available, a plastic bag can be used as a make-shift glove. When the dead bird has been picked up, the bag can be turned back on itself and tied. It should then be placed in a second plastic bag, tied, and disposed of in the normal household waste.
(viii) Alternatively, the dead bird can be buried, but not in a plastic bag.
(ix) Any clothing that has been in contact with the dead bird should be washed using ordinary washing detergent at the temperature normally used for washing the clothing.
(x) Any contaminated indoor surfaces should be thoroughly cleaned with normal household cleaner.

13. Poultry Register

If you own, or are responsible for, poultry flocks of 50 or more birds (not necessarily of the same species) and even if your premises are only stocked for part of the year, then you must, within one month of their arrival at your premises, register your flocks.

For poultry flocks of fewer than 50 birds, whilst law does not require you to register them, we still encourage you to do so as this means we can contact you quickly if there is an outbreak of disease. Further information and links to the relevant registration forms are available from *www.gov.uk/guidance/poultry-registration*

14. Biosecurity advice for officials visiting poultry premises or areas where captive birds or wild waterfowl may be present

Disease can be spread through:

a) Direct contact with an infected animal.

b) Airborne spread from an infected animal.

c) Indirect contact with infected material carried on: vehicles, wheels, and wheel arches; people; footwear and clothing (such as material creases, pockets, treads of footwear, inside of boots); sheepdogs; scavenging animals; vermin; machinery and any other equipment

Avoid contamination.

a) Only enter a commercial poultry premises if it is essential to your job. Take the minimum people and equipment needed to do the job safely and effectively.

b) If it is necessary to take a vehicle onto premises containing poultry, please ensure it is cleansed and disinfected with an approved disinfectant on entry and exit, if it comes into contact with areas that present a risk for contamination or transmission of disease.

Entering premises or other locations

a) Clothing, equipment, and footwear must be capable of undergoing full cleansing and disinfection (C&D). Take all reasonable precautions to avoid transferring contamination between premises by cleansing and disinfection of equipment, vehicle's, and footwear. If appropriate, consider use of disposable clothing.

b) Where possible, avoid the use of equipment that cannot undergo C&D, e.g. mobile phones, laptops, etc. while you are in buildings containing livestock or you are in areas where there is any risk of contamination.

c) If it is necessary to enter premises containing poultry where C&D facilities are not available and there is a risk of contamination or the transmission of disease , please ensure you take your own equipment with you, e.g. bucket, brush, water, fresh disinfectant so that you can cleanse and disinfect with an approved disinfectant on entry and exit.

Leaving premises or other locations

a) Effective C&D must be performed before leaving a premises – take care to ensure that nothing becomes contaminated again.

b) Clean off debris – avian flu viruses may be protected from the effects of the disinfectant by organic material.

APPENDIX A

APHA Guidance for Local Authorities Dealing with Dead Wild Birds

1. Introduction

Avian influenza is generally a seasonal disease that enters the UK in the winter period. Outbreaks are most often linked to the arrival of migratory wild birds – although there are other routes by which the disease can enter the country. In general, it should be assumed that any dead wild bird could be infected with the disease, regardless of the season. Simple biosecurity measures can be applied to prevent the onward transmission of the disease and to reduce the risks to personnel who may deal with wild bird carcases.

This guidance document has been drafted by the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) to provide Local Authorities and their operatives advice and information about how to deal with dead wild birds – especially in the face of an outbreak of avian influenza. Operatives must still conduct their own dynamic risk assessments in line with their own employer's policies and instructions and in line with other government department guidance.

Examples include, but are not limited to:

- HSE Guidance
  - https://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/diseases/avianflu.htm
  - https://www.hse.gov.uk/agriculture/zoonoses-data-sheets/avian-influenza.pdf

- Public Health Advice
  - https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/avian-influenza-guidance-data-and-analysis

For the most up to date information about the current avian influenza situation, please refer to the "avian influenza landing page" on GOV.UK:

- https://www.gov.uk/guidance/avian-influenza-bird-flu

Further information about the approach to dealing with avian influenza can be found in the Great Britain Avian Disease Control Strategy:

- https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notifiable-avian-disease-control-strategy

The Government has published a mitigation strategy for HPAI in wild birds to reduce the risk to kept birds.

2. What is avian influenza?

Avian influenza (bird flu) viruses can be classified according to their ability to cause severe disease (pathogenicity) as either highly pathogenic or low pathogenic. Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) can cause severe disease in susceptible birds and low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI) generally cause mild disease or no disease at all. HPAI is the more serious type. It is often fatal in birds. LPAI is usually less serious. It can cause mild breathing problems but affected birds will not always show clear signs of infection. The severity of LPAI depends on the type of bird and whether it has any other illnesses.

3. What is the difference between high and low pathogenic avian influenza?

Avian influenza is a virus that causes disease in birds. Poultry, captive birds and wild or migratory birds, such as ducks, can become infected with the virus. There are two forms of the virus: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI). Pathogenicity indicates the severity of the disease if the bird contracts the virus. Low pathogenic avian influenza can mutate into a highly pathogenic strain and therefore swift action must be taken as quickly as possible to stop the disease spreading.

4. Are wild birds affected?

Yes, wild birds can be affected and can pass the disease to poultry and other captive birds. Low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses of various strains are likely to be circulating in wild birds globally. The risk of introduction into domestic poultry/other birds will depend on the prevalence and pattern of shedding in wild birds, the level of biosecurity in place on poultry holdings/bird premises and other factors.

It is especially important that any operatives that own their own poultry or birds ensure they practice appropriate personal biosecurity if they have dealt with dead wild birds.

5. How is the disease spread?

Avian influenza isn't an airborne disease. The disease spreads by movement of infected birds, and from bird to bird by contact with contaminated body fluids and faeces, either directly or through contaminated objects and surfaces. Simple measures – such as washing contaminated surfaces – such as boots or shoes – preferably with clean water and disinfectant (but soap will do too) can prevent the onward transfer of the disease.

The avian influenza virus changes frequently creating new strains and there is a constant risk that one of the new strains may spread easily among people. However, there is no evidence that any recent strain of avian influenza has been able to spread directly between humans.

6. Dead Wild Birds and APHA's Surveillance Programme

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) carries out year-round avian influenza surveillance of dead wild birds submitted via public reports and warden patrols.

Dead wild waterfowl (swans, geese or ducks) or other dead wild birds, such as gulls or birds of prey, should be reported to the Defra helpline (Tel: 03459 335577– select option 7).

APHA contractors may then collect some of these birds and test them to help us understand how the disease is distributed geographically and in different types of bird, not all birds will be collected.

Where dead birds are not required for surveillance purposes it is the landowner's responsibility to safely dispose of the carcases as animal by-products.

Where dead birds are on public land it is the local authorities' responsibility to safely dispose of the carcases as animal by-products.

7. How should dead wild birds be disposed?

The carcasses of wild animals, other than wild game, are exempt from the animal by-product (ABP) rules in the UK. However, if it is suspected that the animals were infected with a disease which can spread to people or animals such as avian influenza, the carcases be disposed of as a category 1 ABP https://www.gov.uk/animal-by-product-categories-site-approval-hygiene-and-disposal

Where dead birds are on public land it is the local authorities' responsibility to safely dispose of the carcases as animal by-products. See our guidance on how to report a dead or injured animal available at https://www.gov.uk/report-dead-animal

Collection of dead wild birds/carcasses

There is a possibility that you will be handling dead wild birds/carcasses infected with AI during this work. Therefore, exposure to AI viruses may occur, although the risk of becoming infected yourself is very low. Transmission is by inhalation or ingestion of faeces and/or mucus secretions.

Reduce the Risk of Infection

Always wear protective clothing – disposable overalls, Wellington boots, disposable FFP3 face piece respirator for which you have been face fit tested (alternatives are available if not clean shaven), goggles, disposable gloves.

How to handle dead wild birds

When the dead wild bird has been picked up, the bag can be turned back on itself and tied. It should then be placed in a second plastic bag, tied and disposed of as an animal by product. Gloves should be carefully removed and disposed of safely.

Hands should be thoroughly washed with disinfectant soap and water after handling dead wild birds. Any clothing that has been in contact with the dead bird should be washed using ordinary washing detergent at the standard manufacturer's recommended temperature.

Maintain a high level of personal hygiene.

Cover all cuts and abrasions with waterproof dressings before starting work. Always wash thoroughly after work – use anti-viral hand-wash/wipes. Wash any injuries - especially cuts - immediately, cover with a waterproof dressing. Always wash your hands and exposed skin before eating, drinking, smoking or preparing food.

Handle carcasses correctly

Approach with caution and confirm the bird/animal is dead before attempting to handle it. Double bag the carcase in heavy duty PVC sacks and transport it in a sealed leak-proof container.**Health restrictions**

If you have any of the following you should not collect carcasses until you have sought further advice from your H&S or Occupational Health representative:

- Pregnant or breast feeding
- Renal/kidney conditions
- Severe lung conditions (e.g. bronchitis; emphysema; cystic fibrosis)
- Immune system disorders
- Known severe allergic (anaphylactic) reactions to egg products, seasonal influenza vaccines, anti-viral medications.

Other risks

Chemicals used for cleaning & disinfection can irritate your skin and lungs. Only use these chemicals according to instructions and wear your protective equipment.

There may be manual handling risks involved with moving large, heavy birds, e.g. swans. Use good manual handling techniques. Do not attempt to lift any large carcasses if you have existing medical conditions that may be aggravated.

Take account of ground conditions, water hazards, weather etc. when assessing accessibility of carcass. DO NOT ENTER UNSAFE AREAS.

Members of the public

Members of the public should be advised not to handle carcasses or live/injured birds.

Defra Approved Disinfectants

Please see this link for information about how and when to use disinfectant:

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defra-approved-disinfectant-when-and-how-to-use-it

Contacting APHA

If you have further questions or issues, please contact your local APHA office.

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening

APPENDIX B - **The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No.2) Order 2006**

Article 82 notice requiring the isolation or separation of any animal or bird from any other animal or bird (including wild birds).

Name: ……

Address: ……

……

Being the occupier of any premises or the keeper of any animal or bird at the following premises

……

……

You are hereby required to keep or isolate any animal or bird in any specified place or to separate any animal or bird from any other animal or bird as detailed below:

Signed: ……... Date: ……’

Name:(Block Capitals) …… Time: ……..…

Being an authorised inspector performing a function under this order and acting under the direction of the veterinary inspector as detailed below:

……Date……

Powers of inspectors in case of default.

If any person fails to comply with a requirement in or under this order, an inspector may take such steps he considers necessary to ensure the requirement is met, at the expense of that person.

Definitions

“keeper” means any person responsible for birds or animals, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, but does not include a person responsible for them solely because he is transporting them.

“occupier” means the person in charge of premises.

“other captive bird” means a bird kept in captivity which is not poultry and includes a pet bird and a bird kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions, breeding or for sale; “poultry” means a bird reared or kept in captivity for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, or of other products, for restocking supplies of game or for the purposes of any breeding programme for the production of such categories of birds.

“premises” includes any land, building or other place.

“inspector” means a person appointed to be an inspector for the purposes of this Act by the Minister or by a local authority, and, when used in relation to an officer of the Ministry, includes a veterinary inspector;”

“veterinary surgeon” means a person who is registered in the register of veterinary surgeons maintained by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons or in the supplementary register maintained by the College.

“Poultry” means a bird reared or kept in captivity, for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, or of other products, for restocking supplies of game or for the purposes of any breeding program for the production of such categories of birds.

“Other captive bird” means a bird kept in captivity which is not poultry and includes a pet bird and a bird kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions, breeding or for sale.

“wild birds” means birds which are not poultry or other captive birds.

“Covered area” as is as defined in Schedule 1, Part 2, paragraph 4 of the declaration and means the area where feed and water are placed (this must be covered to prevent it being accessed or contaminated by wild birds. Placing feed on the ground or in uncovered troughs to which wild birds can gain access is not permitted).

Any person that fails to observe or do any notice without lawful authority or excuse, proof of which shall lie on him commits an offence under section 73 of the Animal Health Act 1981.

Failure to comply with this notice could result in imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to an unlimited fine or both.

Annex G - Outbreak Signage Guidance

Animal Disease Outbreak Signage Guidance for Local Authorities
(Roads, footpaths, and bridleways)

October 2016

1. Local authorities have a duty in certain circumstances to erect signs to indicate animal disease control zones[7] during a suspect or confirmed outbreak of some exotic notifiable animal diseases. Signage is used to raise awareness of an outbreak situation, to encourage local keepers and the public to search for further information on how an outbreak may affect them, and to identify an area/zone which is subject to animal disease movement controls. Signs may also be used to restrict access to certain land in order to prevent the risk of spreading the disease to other places. Initially a local authority's primary focus will be on road signs but there may be an additional need to consider footpaths and bridleways dependent on the location and type of disease.

2. The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have developed this guidance and a new generic animal disease outbreak sign in partnership with Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), the Department for Transport (DfT), the Welsh Government and the National Police Chiefs' Council to encourage a consistent approach on this matter. Signage is, however, only one method of informing the local community about animal disease restrictions and the extent of control/restriction zones. Local authorities are encouraged to use additional communication methods such as leaflets, posters, the media, internet, social media and Defra's interactive map and alerts subscription service.

Planning and Deployment

3. **A Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should discuss signage with the APHA as soon as they become aware of a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.** The signing of zones is a key regulatory function and helps to fulfil our warning and informing obligations under relevant disease control legislation. As part of the multi-agency contingency planning process the LAAHF should also discuss the creation, deployment, and potential storage of outbreak signage with their Emergency Planning and Highways departments.

4. Signs should be deployed as quickly as possible after the declaration or declaratory order imposing the control zones is made by a relevant government Minister to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.

5. It is acknowledged it may not be economically viable for individual local authorities to hold a pre-prepared store of outbreak signage, however, it is hoped that the introduction of a generic sign for all disease outbreaks will encourage the re-use of signs and/or neighbouring authorities to consider establishing joint or regional stores. Local authorities are also encouraged to have an arrangement in place with a traffic sign manufacturer as part of their contingency plans.

[7] Further information on control zones is available in Section 3.3 of the Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan.

Design and Manufacture

6. The new animal disease outbreak sign adheres to transport legislation requirements and is located in Annex 1. Under the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 No.362 animal disease can be classified as a civil emergency and a temporary traffic sign can be erected for as long as the outbreak exists in accordance with Schedule 13, Part 9.

7. Always liaise with your Highways department before ordering road signs. The DfT and Welsh Government have provided the following additional guidance:

- Temporary signs must conform to the regulations for permanent signs which includes having a reflectorized material when they are required to be read during the hours of darkness.
- Signs should be in upper case white legend on a red background with a white border.
- An x-height (height of lower-case letter 'x') of 50mm would be suitable for traffic signs on 30mph roads, 75mm for 40mph, 100mm for 50mph, 150mm for 60mph and 200mm for 70mph. The overall size of the sign will vary according to the character height. Where the verge of footway width limits size, the next lower x-height increment may be used.
- For safety reasons traffic signs should not contain telephone numbers, website addresses or email addresses as this may divert a driver's attention away from the road. Commercial names must not be used on the signs; however, government agencies or local highway authority names are compliant.
- In Wales the signs will need to be bi-lingual.

8. Further information on the use of temporary traffic signs can be accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-white-on-red-signs-at-road-works and Using temporary traffic signs for special events (TAL 04/11) - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Location of Signs

9. It is best practice to position outbreak signage on, or as close as possible to, the borders of the relevant control zones to advise road users that they are entering or leaving a control zone. Local authorities should always liaise with the APHA or use the interactive map to ensure their mapping systems accurately identify the most up-to-date control zones. N.B. Defra's online interactive map service is only activated during outbreaks and can be accessed via the relevant disease homepage on the gov.uk website e.g., for avian influenza this would be http://www.gov.uk/guidance/avian-influenza-bird-flu.

10. Signs should as a minimum be deployed on all major roads (excluding motorways). It is acknowledged that it will not always be possible to place signage on every road or lane and local knowledge should be used to identify minor roads which may be used by keepers of the susceptible species involved e.g., access to feed mills, animal gatherings or slaughterhouses.

11. Best practice would include the provision of additional signs to provide drivers with advance notice that a control zone is approaching - the word "ahead" could be added to the sign in Annex 1. Practically this may not be possible in the initial days of a zone being declared, given the need to deploy road signage as rapidly as possible.

12. The Highways department of a local authority are normally tasked with deploying outbreak signage and should have their own guidance on this. If further information on

the design and positioning of warning signs is required, this can be found in Chapter 4 of the Traffic Signs Manual: Traffic signs manual - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Removal / Review of Signs

13. The location of animal disease controls zones can quickly change, be merged or removed once disease spreads or when it is controlled or eliminated. It is important to conduct regular reviews to ensure outbreak signage accurately reflects the control zones. Changes should be made promptly to avoid misinformation.

Other Types of Outbreak Signage

14. **Footpaths** - Defra/the Welsh Government is responsible for making decisions relating to the closure or restricted access of public rights of way. It is unlikely that a policy decision would be made to close footpaths unless they run through an infected premises or adjacent to the boundary of a premises infected with either Foot and Mouth Disease, Swine Fever, or Avian Influenza. The LAAHF should liaise with the APHA and their Rights of Way department on this matter. Annex 2 provides a suggested format for footpath closure signs. These are normally printed on A4 paper, laminated, and attached to existing posts.

15. Bridleways – It may be necessary for APHA to warn against use of bridleways dependent on the type of disease (e.g., Equine Infectious Anaemia) and if a bridleway runs close to an infected premise. APHA may also ask the local authority to place such warning signs on bridle paths or other public rights of way used by horse owners where they run close to an infected premises – see Annex 3. The same advice as footpaths applies.

16. Infected or otherwise Restricted Premises – APHA are responsible for serving restrictions on infected places (where livestock have tested positive for a disease) and the placement of restricted premises signs and warning tape. An example is shown in Figure 1.


NOTICE
Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended)
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (England) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Scotland) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Wales) Order 2006
FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
INFECTED PLACE
(Statutory Disease Control Measure)
By order of the:
Secretary of State for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Scottish Ministers
Welsh Government
EXD72(FMD)
This poster will last longer if enclosed in polythene


ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE ENDS
NOTES:
1. The legend is from the Transport Medium alphabet at the x-heights shown.
2. The tile outlines do not form part of the sign.
3. COLOURS:
Background.....RED
Legend & Border.....WHITE
4. DIMENSIONS:
x-heights are in millimetres, other dimensions are in stroke widths. (4sw = x-height)
1.5
2.5
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE
x–ht
40 min
200 max
1.5
2.5
2.5
1
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE ENDS
Department for Transport
TEMPORARY SIGN
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE

Drwg. no.

Notes: –

1. The legend is from the Transport Medium alphabet at the 'x'–heights shown.
2. The outlines of the tiles do not form part of the sign.
3. The colours are as follows: –
   Legend & border ——— White
   Background ——— Red
4. The illumination of the sign must accord with the requirements of the current 'Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions'.
5. The 'x'–heights shown are given in millimetres, all other dimensions are given in stroke widths (i.e. 1s/w = 1/4'x'–height).

PARTH RHEOLAETH
CLEFYD ANIFEILIAID
ANIMAL DISEASE
CONTROL ZONE

DIWEDD Y
PARTH RHEOLAETH
CLEFYD ANIFEILIAID
ANIMAL DISEASE
CONTROL ZONE
ENDS



REVISIONS	

Before using this drawing, confirm with RNM3 Division that it has not been superseded.

Drn. H.G.	Appd.
Chkd.	Appl. date 26.05.16
Issue: 26.05.16	
Scale: Photo–reduced	

Title

Temporary Signs

ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE

WELSH GOVERNMENT

Drwg. no.

NOTICE

Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended)

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (England) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Scotland) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Wales) Order 2006

THIS FOOTPATH IS CLOSED ON ACCOUNT OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

(Statutory Disease Control Measure)

By order of the: Secretary of State for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Scottish Ministers Welsh Ministers

EXD71(FMD)(4/08)

This poster will last longer if enclosed in polythene

Annex H - Warning Notice for Bridal Paths and Other Rights of Way

Notice to Equine / Horse Owners using this Right of Way

Disease Precautions – Equine Infectious Anaemia

Please do not use this section of path for exercising horses.

Equine Infectious Anaemia (a disease of horses, with no risk to humans) has recently been found in a horse that was kept in this area. The disease is being dealt with and the infected animal has been removed.

There is a low risk that the infection could be spread to horses in the immediate area by the bite of certain fly species.

Animal & Plant Health Agency and XXXX County Council respectfully ask that owners of horses do not use this right of way for exercising their horses, until further notice.

This right of way is NOT closed and there is no risk to human health. There is no risk of spreading Equine Infectious Anaemia through persons, dogs, or transport using this right of way and no specific precautions are necessary before going onto other equine premises.

Annex I - Resource and Support Planning

1. Delivering of animal disease controls and advice

Roles	**Insert number of officers, job titles and / or specific contact details. Consider out of hours resource.**
Competent animal health inspectors, *with AH authorisation***.**	
Other competent regulatory (TS/EH) field inspectors, *without AH authorisation but experienced in other regulation delivery / enforcement.*	
Office based regulatory support staff able to provide advice. *No authorisation / field experience**.***	
Possible administration support from other services. Identify services to be contacted in priority order.	

2. Wider local authority support

Local Authority Service	Discussion points
Emergency Planning	• Primary contact for LAAHF and APHA (including out of hours).
Communication / Public Relations	• Primary contact for LAAHF and APHA (including out of hours). • Verify that local authority communication must follow APHA / Defra lines. • Verify process and contact (including out of hours) for press queries, social media, letter drops, website updates, data returns, community groups, town / parish councils. • Establish timescales for media releases, social media / website updates, letter drops. • Discuss approach to sharing guidance. • Discuss liaison with charities and industry groups.
IT	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Out of hours technical support. • Equipment required to support in office LAAHF and field staff, including phones, laptops, tablets, printers. Access to data systems and printers from out of office and out of hours.
Facilities	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Agree access to buildings, particularly out of hours. • Storage and access to signs, PPE, disinfectant. • At suspect stage consider if access is required to alternative offices for LAAHF and / or APHA staff.
Mapping	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Timescales for mapping support if APHA delays or lack detail / up to date information.
Rights of Way	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Discuss any potential footpath closures at suspect stage. Likely to be through or adjacent to Infected Premises. • Understand approach to additional signage should it be required (such as about wild birds near watercourses).
Highways	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Procurement process for road signs, including timescales and cost. • Understand storage approach for signs and access to these. • Discuss resource to erect / retrieve road signs, including timescales.
Finance	• Primary contact for LAAHF (including out of hours). • Establish corporate procurement and recording processes. • Contact to escalate any finance issues.
Administration	• Discuss corporate resource for initial phone calls / emails and administrative tasks to support LAAHF.

Annex J - Local Profile / Risk Assessment Options

Profiling / risk assessment of local animal health activities and premises

1) OVERVIEW OF PREMISES	
Premises Type	**Number of premises**
Livestock markets	Insert data
Abattoirs	
Slaughterhouses – red meat	
Slaughterhouses – white meat	
Cattle premises	
Horse premises	
Pig premises	
Poultry premises	
Sheep and goat premises	
Potential animal import premises	
Dog kennels	
Racecourses	
Stables	
Processing plants	
Knackers yards	
Renderers / Incinerators	
Livestock hauliers	
Veterinary practices	
Other (please specify)	
2) LOCAL RISKS IDENTIFIED *e.g. impact on local businesses if markets are cancelled, is it an intensive agriculture area?*	
3) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS *e.g. unique geographic characteristics like large areas of wetlands*	

Appendix O Risk Assessments for Animal and Plant Health

Kent Resilience Forum – Individual Risk Assessment (IRA):

2019 Risk ID	Chapter	2019 NSRA Risk Scenario Title	National Owner	Assessor Group	Risk Priority Score	Review Date
R98	**Human and Animal Disease**	**Major outbreak of animal disease**	**DHSC**	**UKHSA / NHS / KCC / MedwayTrading Standards**		**June 2023**

Reasonable Worst Case Scenario (including Specific Assumptions)

National: A major outbreak of an exotic notifiable disease in animals. There are several exotic animal diseases that are notifiable and have statutory controls. The likelihood of an outbreak depends on the disease, season, and the disease status of other countries.

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) has been assessed as having the greatest potential impact, although other exotic notifiable diseases, particularly diseases that are spread by wildlife, birds or insects are more likely to occur. FMD is a severe, highly contagious viral disease with significant economic impact, affecting cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and all other cloven-hoofed ruminants.

The RWCS is an FMD outbreak where disease is introduced into a large sheep holding. Infected animals, which are not yet exhibiting clinical signs, are sold at market or moved to other premises before the disease is detected, resulting in widely dispersed, multiple outbreaks. The culling and disposal of approximately 1.9 million animals on over 2,900 premises could be required. The movement of all susceptible livestock within Great Britain would be prohibited unless licensed (often referred to as a national movement ban). At the time of publication, there is a much greater likelihood of worst-case outbreaks of African swine fever (ASF) highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) or bluetongue (BTV). On the grid, ASF and AI have a likelihood of 4 and impact of 2. BTV has a likelihood of 3 and impact of 2.

Kent: Gateway between Europe and the UK and host Ashford livestock market, which is the largest in the South of England. Kent is close proximity to continental Europe and continental climate increases vulnerability in blue tongue. Seasonable migration routes for birds come through Dungeness area so on the front line to avian influenza outbreaks. It is an SSSI (site of specific scientific interest). Transportation of livestock including horses through Kent via Eurotunnel is a risk to the county as a large number move in and out of the county. Kent has a significant gypsy and traveller community where horses are sold and bought and transported in and out of the county.

Specific Locations	

Risk Matrix



	Local
Likelihood	2
Impact – Human Welfare	1
Impact – Behavioral	4
Impact – Essential Services	1
Impact - Security	0
Impact – International Order	0
Impact - Environment	3
Impact - Economic	3
Overall Impact	2

Key:

	Risk Rating		Risk Priority		Review Date
Green	Low	=	3	=	2023
Yellow	Medium	=	2	=	2023
Amber	High	=	1	=	2022
Red	Very High	=	1	=	2021

Controls Currently in Place (Local, National, Regional and International)

Individual contingency plan or wider information can be obtained from the KRF capability requirements matrix's.

KRF Plans:
KRF Pan Kent Emergency Strategic Response Plan
KRF Pan Kent Strategic Recovery Plan
KRF Media and Communications Plan
KRF Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

Defra Afra - notifications are sent
World Health Organisation for Animal Health
KCC ACTSO Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan
Animal and Plant Health Agency Notifications

Additional Risk Treatment Required (Capabilities National, regional and local)

National: An estimated 1000 trained vet and techs to conduct surveillance are required, as is sufficient carcass disposal capacity, sufficient lab capacity, staff to conduct vaccinations, Local Authority staff to conduct enforcement activities, sufficient licenced slaughter men operating on up to 800 premises per week, sufficient admin staff, modelling experts and trained policy staff, sufficient approved personal protective equipment, repository protective equipment and disinfectant across operational partners, central and local government, and potential assistance under MACA.

National surveillance of CJD and guidance for quarantine of instruments

Exercises / Training / Incidents

2016 - Exercise Whiteraven - foot and mouth disease exercise KCC led.
Animal and Plant Health e-learning via KCC and EA.
Defra guidance
Statutory training through EA

Background (Incl Historical Evidence)

- 2000 Classic Swine Fever - a serious outbreak in East Anglia affecting 16 farms with 74,793 pigs slaughtered
- 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) - this caused the slaughter of 1,855,000 sheep, 415,000 cows, 110,000 pigs, 2,000 goats (total 2,382,000 animals)
- 2003 Avian Flu - this took place in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany which resulted in the necessary slaughter of more than 28 million poultry.
- 2005 - H5N1 confirmed in quarantine in the UK
- 2005/2006 - DEFRA preliminary Outbreak Assessments
- 2007 Blue Tongue - outbreaks in Kent farms at Boughton Aluph and Ide hill in 2007
- 2007 - outbreaks of Avian Flu in Suffolk in February and November, leading to the slaughter of thousands of turkeys
- 2008 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) - this was found amongst dead wild swans at Abbotsbury in Dorset
- 2020 - Outbreak of Avian flu in a flock of Ducks at Adelaide Farm in Deal, Kent.

FMD is spread by direct and indirect contact and may be wind bound. Controls would require the slaughter of affected and exposed animals. Although vaccinations may be adjunct to control. The disease does not affect humans, but protective measures to control the import of meat is in place.

Impact - Human Welfare

There would be a prolonged impact on farmers. Foot and Mouth is not zoonotic disease and therefore there is no direct risk to human health. Other diseases e.g. avian flu, BVT can be transferable o humans. Trading Standards officers and farm workers are offered seasonal vaccinations.

Impact - Behavioural

Following 2001 Foot and Mouth, lessons learned from this outbreak resulted in policy changes, however, widespread public outrage would be seen by the farming community if another outbreak of this size took place. In 2001, this impacted the tourism within Kent due to being unable to walk across fields. Due to the increased culling of animals and holding on animals at transport hubs the likelihood of animal protests may increase.

Impact - Essential Services

The main essential services would not be impacted, however the group identified that mental health services delivering therapy through animals would be ceased. Ashford cattle market would be closed and local zoos/petting farms would be locked down, which would financially impact. Abattoirs would be under increased pressure impacted due to the increase of humane slaughtering of animals.

Impact - Security

Biosecurity at the border - risk of importing disease / comment on potential risk as a result of additional checks. Local authorities advised that partnership working between trading standards, food safety and animal health enforcement agencies would increase officer resources to actively respond and audit the culling of animals and ensuring that the food chain remained safe.

Impact – International Order

Other impacts - IF the UK were to accidently export disease into another county that was disease free, the impact would substantially increase. Under current EU laws, intracommunity trade can be restored relatively quickly once foot and mouth restrictions have been lifted. EU exit brings uncertainty as to how quickly European trade would be restored when we are no longer part of the EU.

Impact - Environment

Depending on the control policies put into place, there could be long-term impacts on the environment due to mass animal burial and disposal sites.

FMD in Kent 2001 every premises had disinfectant footbaths which could potentially end up in surface water. Guidance is available on how to dispose of disinfectant and farms may have permits to dispose farm waste. Potential for lethal interventions for wildlife which could impact on the environment.

Impact - Economic

There could be impacts on tourism, farming and local businesses.

Recovery Timescales

The Word Organisation for Animal Health sets international standards for resuming trade following an outbreak of animal disease. For food and mouth disease, the minimum period to resume exports is three months from the completion of preliminary C&D on the last infected premises, of after the last vaccinated animal has been culled if vaccine is used as a control measure.

This process can take longer than 2 years.

Linked Risks

R97 – Emerging infectious disease

Kent Resilience Forum – Individual Risk Assessment (IRA):

Hazard / Threat Category	Kent Risk Ref	LRMG Risk Number(s)
PLANT HEALTH **Notifiable plant diseases and Notifiable exotic invertebrate species destructive of plants (e.g. Brown Rot of Potato, Fireblight, Phytophthora sp., Asian Longhorn Beetle, Wheat Bug and Potato Cyst Nematode).** **Non-Notifiable but potentially destructive pathogens and exotic invertebrates (e.g. Ash Dieback and Emerald Ash Borer)**	50	HL43
Date of Revision	Next review date	
May 2016	May 2018	
Overview of hazard or threat:		
Notifiable and Non-Notifiable diseases and exotic invertebrate species with the potential to inflict significant damage to viability of certain cultivated and wild plant populations. Serious plant disease and pest outbreaks affecting commercially important crop species can damage agricultural, construction, retail and other commercial sectors, and their supply chains, and create product supply shortages. In extreme circumstances plant diseases can have grave impacts upon human welfare, as is currently the case with the'Ug99' strain of Black Stem Rust of wheat in Africa and the Middle East, and the devastation of Asian rice harvests by Brown Spot in the 20th, and the Irish Potato Famine in the 19th Centuries. The bacterium Xylella fastidiosa is currently spreading within Continental Europe and is locally devastating commercially important crop and ecologically significant wild plant species including Grape, Peach, Citrus, Olive, Oak, Acer, Euphorbia, Hebe, Lavender and Rosemary. Plant disease and pest outbreaks within wild plant populations can also have very significant negative impacts upon biodiversity and landscape. There may also be (expensive) biosecurity, and health and safety implications arising from such outbreaks e.g. Dutch Elm Disease and latterly Ash Die-back.		
Key historical evidence (last 5 years or of particular note):		

- Asian Longhorn Beetle – outbreak at Paddock Wood in 2012 saw more than 1,300 trees felled and stringent biosecurity measures imposed within and around the outbreak zone.
- Ash Die-back – Destructive fungal pathogen outbreak affecting Kent's most widespread tree species discovered in 2012 triggering establishment of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group and wide-ranging biosecurity measures, which remain in place. Significant health and safety and linked financial implications for highway authorities, rail operators and managers of publicly accessible land.
- Phytophthora ramorum – An outbreak of this Notifiable fungal pathogen which affects a range of tree and shrub species, including commercially significant European Larch and Sweet Chestnut, began in 2009 and has inflicted considerable financial harm on forestry sector in western part of UK in particular.

Likelihood	
Hazard	Likelihood
PLANT HEALTH	3
Impact:	
Summary:	
Hazard	Impact
PLANT HEALTH	3

Details:

Impact associated with risk

Primary

Economic - 4

- Plant health outbreaks may affect a range of commercial sectors beyond agriculture and forestry.
- Potential for restrictions on plant movement including import and export bans.
- Financial hardship for farming and forestry sectors as well as associated industries and retailers.
- Possible impact on the rural economy as a whole including tourism.
- Potential cost arising from health and safety interventions in response to tree diseases and pests can be significant, for example some 0.5m Ash trees grow adjacent to the public highway in Kent and at a conservative £800 per tree for safety works the total cost is £400m.

Social - 2

- Plant diseases and pests can potentially lead to product shortages and price hikes, as well as economic damage and significant unplanned costs to public and private sector purse arising from necessary health and safety interventions (such as tree removal and safety works) with resultant wider negative impacts upon society. Further, landscape change resulting from plant diseases, such as Dutch Elm Disease and Ash Die-back, may inflict cultural and emotional harm.

Health – 2

- The potential for basic foodstuff shortages and price increases, potential contamination of food chain (Ergotism, for example) and health and safety risks (hazards from infected trees in publicly accessible areas, for example) may all negatively impact human health.

Secondary

Environment - 4

- Potentially devastating impacts upon biodiversity, functioning of terrestrial eco-systems and landscape (including short to medium term negative impacts upon subsidence, erosion and natural flood storage).

Overall assessment:

Category:

PLANT HEALTH

Likelihood	Impact		Risk Rating
3	Overall	**3**	**High**
	Fatalities	1	
	Casualties	2	
	Economic	4	
	Social Disruption	2	
	Psychological	2	

Controls in place

- Defra Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Evidence Plan
- Defra Tree Health and Plant Action Plan
- Defra Multi-annual National Control Plan for the UK
- Plant Health (England) Order 2015
- UK Plant Health Risk Register
- Defra Protecting Plant Health – A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain 2014
- Fera Contingency Plan for Serious Pest Outbreaks in British Trees
- Defra Chalara Management Plan
- Warning and informing strategy at the local level
- KRF Ash Die-back Action Plan
- KCC Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

Kent County Council Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

Version 3.1 (January 2024)

Plan owner: Kent County Council Resilience and Emergency Planning Service